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ABSTRACT 
The concept of dangerousness in Canadian and French criminal law is a central 
component in the development of prophylactic measures, such as section 810.1 and 810.2 
of the Criminal Code and similar French provisions. The imposition of preventive 
measures to control the risk of future behaviour of potentially dangerous individuals 
relies on inexact science to determine and assess dangerousness. In the last decades, 
several risk assessment tools have been developed, notably some in Canada, but their 
reliability in predicting dangerousness varies. The objectivity and reliability of a 
determination of dangerousness can be affected not only by the type of risk assessment 
tool used by clinicians in the assessment of dangerousness, but also by factors such as the 
procedural setting in which the evidence is treated. When compared to the Canadian 
scheme, the French non-adversarial setting offers new alternatives and procedural 
safeguards in determining and controlling dangerousness. 
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Are we Flipping Coins with the Liberty of Potentially Dangerous Individuals? : A 
Comparative Analysis 
CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION 
This thesis proposes to explore the concept of dangerousness in criminal law, through a 
comparative analysis of specific preventive measures, also known as prophylactic 
measures, in effect in Canada and France. More specifically, given the controversial 
nature of the concept of dangerousness and its repercussions on civil liberties, it tries to 
determine which approach contains the best procedural safeguards. As will be shown, 
there are various preventive measures geared toward the prevention of crime and the 
control of dangerousness. Dangerous offenders and long term offender legislation, as 
well as high risk offender judicial restraints orders (also known as recognizance orders) 
constitute a great example of how the state controls and assess dangerousness. However, 
for the purpose of this thesis, the comparative analysis will be limited to high risks 
recognizance orders in Canada and similar legislative provisions in France, under the 
rubric mesures de suretes (preventive measures).1 As it will be demonstrated, 
recognizance orders allow the State to impose restrictive conditions on an individual who 
demonstrates a particular risk of future dangerousness. These preventive measures are 
also non-punitive in nature. Thus, a comparative analysis of this nature should offer 
suitable grounds for determining which system is in a better position to assess and control 
dangerousness, in the specific context of recognizance orders and restrictive conditions. 
Indeed, it will be argued that the French system of assessing dangerousness, combined 
1 It is worth pointing out that the French word "surete" connotes safety, security and protection. 
1 
with the explicit limited applicability of preventives measures and restrictive conditions, 
provides for more procedural safeguards than the Canadian scheme. 
Evidently, a comparative analysis of this nature requires a clear understanding of the 
underlying principle at the heart of virtually all preventive measures, namely the concept 
of dangerousness. At the outset, it will be noted that dangerousness is not a 
straightforward notion. Its definition and understanding has varied greatly throughout the 
years due to the influence of various theoretical fashions and social movements. As the 
thesis will show, the prevailing concept of dangerousness is intimately related to 
corresponding preventive measures such as recognizance orders. 
In addition, the thesis will show that the assessment and determination of an individual's 
dangerousness is a prerequisite for justifying and imposing preventive detention and 
restrictive measures, even in cases where no crime has been committed. For example, in 
enacting high risk judicial restraint orders under sections 810.1 and 810.2 of the Criminal 
Code of Canada, the Parliament relied heavily on the notion of dangerousness and re-
introduced in legislative form the common law power of the court to impose restrictive 
conditions upon the liberty of a potentially dangerous individual. Thus, a determination 
of dangerousness, whether by mental health professionals or by the court, can have far-
reaching consequences on the liberties and freedom of a targeted individual. 
Consequently, it is important to understand and analyze the various methods of 
determination of dangerousness used by mental health professionals, since they usually 
form the evidential basis for judicial decisions. It will be shown that the quality of the 
evidence presented by clinicians may strongly influence the decision of the trier of fact. 
2 Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [Criminal Code]. 
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The thesis will also demonstrate how the various assessment tools used by Canadian and 
French mental health professionals are plagued with accuracy problems. Inaccuracy in 
conclusively predicting dangerousness can have serious detrimental impacts upon the 
liberty of an individual subjected to a recognizance order application. 
Furthermore, the comparative analysis will show that procedural differences between the 
Canadian adversarial system and the French investigatory system not only have a 
differential effect on the determination of dangerousness by mental health professionals, 
but also on judicial treatment of the evidence. It is argued that the procedural setting in 
which the evidence is heard can affect the quality and objectivity of the evidence 
pertaining to the alleged dangerousness of an individual. In fact, an adversarial setting 
may prove to be detrimental to the rights of an individual subjected to a recognizance 
order application. The predominance of conflicting evidence in an adversarial setting may 
sometimes be beneficial to "discovering the truth", but may also entail risks of bias from 
experts. On the other hand, an investigatory model may favour a more concerted and 
objective approach from all the parties involved in the determination of dangerousness 
and in a sense, may offer a better alternative. With these caveats in mind, it is then 
possible to compare the Canadian and French system of preventive measures. 
Through a thorough analysis of recognizance orders under sections 810.1 and 810.2 of 
the Criminal Code, and their French equivalent, this thesis will show that at the very 
least, the French system provides for more procedural safeguards than the Canadian 
system in its application of the notion of dangerousness. It will be demonstrated that 
recognizance orders under sections 810.1 and 810.2 of the Criminal Code enable the 
3 
State to supervise potentially dangerous individuals in society, "before" the commission 
of a crime. While it appears that Canadian recognizance orders are generally used against 
convicted offenders upon their release from prison, the legislation does not expressly 
limit the applicability of the restrictive measure to convicted offenders. This is a 
fundamental difference between the two regimes. In other words, Canadian recognizance 
orders can theoretically be imposed upon individuals who have no criminal record, 
provided that a particular risk of future dangerousness is demonstrated. This contrasts 
sharply with the French equivalent legislative scheme which provides for a system of 
exceptionality with respect to the imposition of restrictive conditions upon a potentially 
dangerous individual.3 In fact, the French system generally limits the applicability of 
restrictive measures to convicted dangerous offenders and multi-recidivists. 
All in all, the main difference between the two systems, other than procedural aspects and 
protocols for determining dangerousness, appears to be the inapplicability of ante 
delictum restrictive conditions, except in the case of convicted dangerous offenders who 
present a risk of future dangerousness upon their release from prison. In practice, 
however, it appears that Canadian prosecutors implicitly are limiting the applicability of 
recognizance orders under sections 810.1 and 810.2 of the Criminal Code to multi-
recidivists and convicted dangerous offenders. 
When looked at in its entirety, the French system seems to offer numerous tools for 
targeting and identifying potentially dangerous individuals. For example, as we will 
reveal, the role of the Mayor has been transformed into that of "sheriff, who helps in the 
3 See generally the Loi n° 2008-174 du 25fevrier 2008 relative a la retention de surete et a la declaration 
d'irresponsabilite penale pour cause de trouble mental, J.O., 26 February 2008, 3266 [Loi sur la retention 
de surete]. 
4 
coordination of sensitive information concerning at-risk populations. The French system 
focuses on the identification and treatment of the potentially dangerous individual, 
notably by the imposition of social-judicial probation and detention in hospital-prisons. 
On the other hand, the Canadian system appears to be more concerned with the 
eradication and control of potentially dangerous actors, and puts less emphasis on 
effective treatment of dangerousness. 
5 
CHAPTER II - PLAN 
Chapter III of the thesis will seek to justify a comparative analysis of preventive 
measures in Canadian and French criminal law. 
Chapter IV will give a brief general overview of the concept of preventive measures and 
potentially dangerous individuals. In this chapter, the necessary groundwork for tackling 
the notion of dangerousness with a clear understanding as to its origins will be 
undertaken. 
Chapter V will examine the concepts of dangerousness both in Canada and in France, as 
well as their assessment and determination process. As a starting point, we will look at 
the context in which preventive measures have developed. We will examine the concept 
of dangerousness as it evolved progressively through the influence of various justice 
models. In this regard, we will explore the influence of the clinical, justice, and 
community protection models in Canada. These three models, identified mainly by 
Petrunik, have significantly contributed to the enactment of preventive legislation such as 
recognizance orders.4 These models have shaped our perception of what constitutes a 
danger, and what tools should be used to prevent dangerousness. In fact, it will be 
demonstrated that the emergence of the community protection model contributed directly 
to the development of the notion of prevention and control of dangerousness, which gave 
rise to specific recognizance orders, such as sections 810.1 and 810.2 of the Criminal 
Code. As for France, the influence of the concept of social defence and, more recently, 
4 See generally Petrunik, Micheal, Models of dangerousness : a cross jurisdictional review of 
dangerousness legislation and practice (Ottawa : Solicitor General Canada, Ministry Secretariat, 1994) 
[Petrunik, Models of dangerousness]. 
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repressive prevention, will be examined. These concepts have also greatly influenced the 
development of preventive legislation targeting potentially dangerous individuals. 
We will also focus attention on the various methods for predicting dangerousness, as 
these are widely used by the judiciary to determine the risk of future behaviour of a 
particular individual. Moreover, we will critically assess various methods for predicting 
dangerousness since their accuracy varies significantly from one another. The differences 
in the interpretation of these risk assessment methods given by mental health experts and 
judges will also be examined. As we will demonstrate, some predictions of 
dangerousness may be biased due to the influence of external factors, such as the 
procedural setting in which the mental health professional practises. 
Following from the previous discussion, in Chapter VI particular attention will be given 
to the procedural distinctions between the two systems. Differences between the 
Canadian adversarial system and the judge-centred investigatory system in France are 
noted, since they indirectly affect the court's treatment of scientific evidence in the 
determination of dangerousness, as well as the availability of procedural safeguards. As 
noted earlier, an adversarial system favours conflicting evidence and the assumption that 
in all likelihood, one party is right, while the other one is wrong. This approach can 
influence mental health professionals in their determination of dangerousness depending 
on which side they must prepare their report. At the least, it may also influence the party 
presenting the report only to choose or use experts known to favour their positions. By 
contrast, an investigatory system favours a judicially co-ordinated team approach, where 
multiple specialists work together to determine the dangerousness of an individual. The 
possibility of bias is, therefore, reduced in the French model. Given the potential 
7 
constitutional infringements caused by the imposition of restrictive conditions upon 
potentially dangerous individuals, the availability of procedural safeguards is paramount 
to the respect of fundamental principles of justice. This chapter will therefore seek to 
identify the influences of each system on the determination of dangerousness. 
Chapter VII will then present an in-depth analysis of peace bond provisions and 
recognizance orders in Canada. This will enable us to look at a very specific piece of 
legislation dealing with the concept of dangerousness in Canada. To ground the analysis 
of recognizance orders, we will begin with a historical and critical analysis of such orders 
in Canada. It will show that recognizance orders owe their origins to peace bond 
provisions, which were originally common law powers. Moreover, particular attention 
will be devoted to the development and judicial treatment of recognizance orders under 
sections 810.1 and 810.2 of the Criminal Code, since these provisions infringe on 
fundamental principles of justice, such as the right to freedom. As noted earlier, sections 
810.1 and 810.2 are preventive measures that allow the State to control potentially 
dangerous individuals by the imposition of restrictive conditions. It is, therefore, 
important to understand Parliament's motivation in enacting these provisions, as well as 
the position of the courts with respect to the possibility of restricting the liberties of 
individuals who have yet to commit a crime. 
Chapter VIII will examine similar preventive and restrictive measures in French criminal 
law. This chapter will enable us to examine how the French Legislature dealt with the 
concept of dangerousness. As we will reveal, there are no peace bond provisions or 
recognizance orders in French criminal law. However, France has enacted several pieces 
of legislation aimed at identifying, controlling, and neutralising potentially dangerous 
8 
individuals. Thus, some parallels can be drawn with section 810's recognizance orders. 
Though most French preventive measures only apply to convicted offenders, some 
measures can be used to identify individuals who may demonstrate a risk of future 
dangerousness even if they do not have a criminal record. The chief difference between 
the French and the Canadian system remains the fact that the French system of 
controlling dangerousness is specifically designed to target convicted dangerous 
offenders and is generally inapplicable to individuals who have no criminal record and 
who have never been convicted of a crime. As we will see, the limited applicability of 
restrictive conditions upon potentially dangerous individual, coupled with the advantages 
of a judge-centred investigative system, places the French scheme in a better position 
when considering the respect of fundamental principles of justice. 
Chapter IX will offer various hypotheses which may explain the absence of recognizance 
orders in French criminal law. While the French system does not contain any express 
legislative provision with respect to recognizance orders or peace bonds, it does allow for 
preventive measures to control dangerousness. This chapter goes beyond simple 
comparison between the Canadian and French systems and offers various potential 
explanations with respect to the main differences and similarities between the two 
schemes which might help explain the absence of peace bond provisions or recognizance 
orders in French criminal law. As we will see, factors such as the nature of the French 
scheme which is fundamentally based on the civil law, coupled with the pervasive 
influence of the criminological and social movement called Defense sociale, are part of 
the reason why there are no peace bond provisions or recognizance orders in the Code 
penal de France. All in all, the absence of express peace bond provisions or recognizance 
9 
orders in French criminal law does not mean that the State has chosen not to control 
dangerousness; it is simply a different approach that takes into account some of the 
constitutional pitfalls normally associated with preventive measures. 
Finally, in Chapter X, we conclude our discussion with a reflection on the need for 
recognizance orders in a system geared toward the prevention of crime. We look 
critically at the approach taken by Canadian and French legislators in determining and 
controlling potential dangerousness. Overall, the French system which also deals with the 
notion of prevention of dangerousness, albeit in a different way, appears to offer a better 
alternative than the Canadian scheme in controlling and treating the risk of 
dangerousness. The French system indirectly acknowledges the problem of inaccuracy in 
determining dangerousness by limiting the applicability of restrictive measures and by 
creating an innovative procedure by which various experts work together to determine 
and assess the dangerousness of an individual. 
10 
CHAPTER III - JUSTIFICATION 
Despite the controversial nature of preventive measures, such as recognizance orders 
under sections 810.1 and 810.2 of the Criminal Code, there has been insufficient judicial 
or doctrinal attention focusing on the constitutionality of these measures, their 
applicability, and their justification in a free and democratic society. Hence, it is 
important to compare the Canadian approach in determining dangerousness and 
preventing a risk of future behaviour with a foreign approach in order to foster new ideas 
in the treatment of potentially dangerous individuals. 
As we will see, sections 810.1 and 810.2 of the Criminal Code (Peace Bonds and High 
Risk Offender Judicial Restraints Orders) are powerful tools in the state's preventive 
measure arsenal. These sections allow virtually anybody to file for an order from the 
court to restrain the freedom of an individual, based on a reasonable fear that he or she 
might commit a crime. For example, under section 810.1 of the Criminal Code, where a 
person has a reasonable fear that another person will commit a sexual offence on a minor, 
and the judge is "satisfied by the evidence adduced" that the fear is reasonable, he or she 
can impose a recognizance order upon the potentially dangerous individual for a period 
of twelve months.5 The recognizance order may include several restrictive conditions. 
Moreover, the types of offences targeted by section 810.1 include sexual offences such as 
incest and/or sexual assault.6 
5 See section 810.1 of the Criminal Code. It is also important to note that under section 810.1(3.01) of the 
Criminal Code, the duration of the recognizance order can be extended to a total of two years. 
6 Ibid. 
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As for section 810.2, its wording is essentially the same as section 810.1. However, 
section 810.2's main focus is on recognizance orders that target potential offenders who 
might commit a serious personal injury offence, such as assault, torture or hostage 
taking.7 
It is also worth pointing out that section 810.2 has received virtually no attention from 
legal scholars. Additionally, its constitutionality has not been examined in detail, other 
o 
than by the Court of Appeal of Ontario in the case of R. v. Budreo, and by the Quebec 
Court of Appeal in Noble v. Teale? Remarkably, almost 12 years after its enactment, it 
has never been examined by the Supreme Court of Canada. 
One could also argue that the applicability of a recognizance order is rare in Canadian 
criminal law, and that the actual benefits of giving the State the ability to control and 
monitor the whereabouts of a potentially dangerous individual surpasses the interest of 
the accused in protecting his or her civil liberties, especially in the context of the 
community protection model. In a sense, a comparative analysis would prove to be futile 
if we were to stop our analysis there. However, in response to that argument, it can be 
said that whether recognizance orders are used or not on a regular basis is irrelevant, 
since even one application can lead to unreasonable constitutional infringements. 
One could also argue that section 810.2 of the Criminal Code is primarily used to target 
convicted dangerous criminals who are on the verge of being released from prison, but 
7 See section 810.2 of the Criminal Code. 
8 Budreo v. «., 46 O.R. (3d) 481,142 C.C.C. (3d) 225,183 D.L.R. (4th) 519 [Budreo cited to O.R.]. 
9 Noble v. Teale, 2005 CarswellQue 10567, 36 C.R. (6th) 258, [2006] R.J.Q. 181, 67 W.C.B. (2d) 851[Noble 
cited to C.R.]. 
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are still considered potentially dangerous. Proponents of this view could also suggest 
that though under sections 810.1 and 810.2 any person can lay information before the 
court if he or she has a reasonable fear that an individual will commit a serious sexual or 
violent offence, "informants" are generally members of the police or members from 
correctional facilities. Therefore, once again, the apparent "restrictive" applicability of 
the measure to the worst class of criminals, namely dangerous offenders and potential 
multi-recidivists, could militate against a critical analysis of the measure. Nevertheless, it 
is important to look at the real consequences of the preventive and restrictive measure as 
this can have serious detrimental effects on the reintegration of an offender. 
Furthermore, that an individual subjected to restrictive conditions under a recognizance 
order need not have a criminal record introduces the issue of punishment before a crime 
is committed. In fact, under sections 810.1 and 810.2, a simple reasonable apprehension 
that a crime may be committed in the future, demonstrated on a balance of probabilities, 
is sufficient to trigger a restraint order from the court. This inevitably brings in the 
question of the normally required evidentiary burden of proof in Canadian criminal law 
procedure; namely, a proof beyond a reasonable doubt. As we will see, courts consider 
the recognizance orders scheme as non-punitive ins nature, but rather preventive.
11 
Moreover, like the French mesures de surete, recognizance orders are not considered 
10 In this regard, one should note the case of Noble, ibid, in which the Crown sought a section 810.2 
recognizance order to impose restrictive conditions upon the defendant, Karla Teale (former Karla 
Homolka). Mrs. Teale, along with Paul Bernardo, now a designated dangerous offender, made the 
headlines in the early 1990s because of their participation in the sordid murders of at least two young 
girls. 
11 Courts have also confirmed the preventive nature of this section on numerous occasions. For example, 
in R. v. Baker, 1999 CarswellBC 615, 64 C.R.R. (2d) 126 (B.C. S.C.)[Baker cited to Carswell], the British 
Columbia Supreme Court states at para. 15 that : "[s]everal courts have held that a s. 810 hearing does 
not create an offence, nor does it bring about a conviction or a sentence. Section 810 prevents rather 
than punishes crime." 
13 
offences. This enables the State to circumvent the normally required burden of proof and 
to impose restrictive measures which effectively curtail the freedom of its citizens. When 
we add the fact that a determination of dangerousness by expert testimony, let alone by a 
judge, is a rather difficult task subject to false positives, questions concerning the 
appropriateness of procedural safeguards inevitably arise, thereby justifying a thorough 
comparative analysis of such preventive measures. 
In the end, it is our hope that our comparative analysis will shed some light on a 
controversial piece of legislation that is part of the Canadian Criminal Code. By 
analyzing similar preventive and restrictive measures in France, it may be possible to 
better understand the Canadian recognizance orders scheme and to propose alternatives. 
The reasons underpinning the choice of France as a measure of comparison are also 
worth discussing in their own right. From the onset, the potential procedural influences of 
the French investigative system on the determination of dangerousness open up the 
possibilities of comparisons. The influence of "Defense sociale" and "repressive 
prevention" on the development of preventive measures is also of importance from a 
comparative standpoint. 
Finally, France's current legislative context also militates in favour of a comparative 
analysis with the Canadian system of preventive measures. In fact, the French legislature 
has enacted several preventive and restrictive measures in recent years, as well as social-
judicial probation. For instance, the recent enactment of the controversial Loi sur la 
retention de siirete,12 which addresses the potential dangerousness of certain convicted 
12 Loi sur la retention de surete, supra note 3. 
14 
offenders, together with the enactment of the Loi sur le traitement de la recidive, which 
enables a judge to impose restrictive conditions upon the multi-recidivist, are also good 
examples of the place reserved to preventive measures in French legislation. 
13 Loi n° 2005-1549 du 12 decembre 2005 relative au traitement de la recidive des infractions penales, J.O., 
13 December 2005,19152 [Loi sur le traitement de la recidive]. 
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CHAPTER IV - A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF HOW CANADA AND FRANCE 
DEAL WITH POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS INDIVIDUALS AND 
PREVENTIVE MEASURES 
This chapter begins by describing generally how Canada and France are dealing with 
potentially dangerous individual by enacting preventive measures. As will be 
demonstrated, preventive measures are designed to prevent the commission of crimes by 
individuals who present a potential risk to society. These measures normally include 
restrictive conditions that can significantly limit the freedom of potentially dangerous 
individuals. In the following paragraphs, we will first analyze briefly what society 
considers to be potentially dangerous individuals before delving into some of the 
measures that target them. 
i) Preventive Measures are Primarily Designed to Deal with Potentially 
Dangerous Individuals 
In Canadian and French criminal law, there is a class of citizens to whom special 
preventive laws apply. This class can be purportedly identified as potentially dangerous 
individuals or individuals presenting a high risk of committing an offence in the future. In 
democratic societies, "potentially dangerous individuals" generally refers to suspected 
terrorists, designated dangerous offenders and long-term offenders, sexual offenders, 
individuals on bail, as well as individuals who are considered to pose an imminent danger 
to others. The common thread between these individuals, labelled potentially dangerous, 
is the risk they pose to other members of society. These individuals may or may not have 
a history of committing criminal offenses, but the State considers them potentially 
dangerous. Therefore, in order to maintain a sense of security and to protect vulnerable 
16 
people, states have enacted various restrictive measures to target these individuals before 
they commit a criminal act. 
Preventive measures stem from the "prevention principle" which "... refer [s] to the 
explanation of the state's ability to act proactively or pre-emptively in order to safeguard 
or protect the public from serious harm".14 In recent years, preventive justice has been at 
the forefront of many countries' political agendas, including Canada and France. 
The controversial nature of preventive measures, which restrict the liberty of individuals 
who have yet to commit a crime, gives impetus to the importance of understanding their 
use and raison d'etre, more so in societies where fundamental principles of justice are 
paramount. As we will demonstrate throughout the following comparative analysis, 
preventive measures inevitably enter into conflict with freedom and liberty of individuals, 
all in the name of the protection of society. 
ii) Examples of Preventive Measures- The Case of High Risk Offender 
Judicial Restraint Orders and Other Restrictive Measures 
The identification and categorization of potentially dangerous individuals is a component 
of one of the criminal law's numerous objectives; namely, the prevention of crime. In 
1982, Canada's Department of Justice identified the various objectives of Canadian 
criminal law as follows: 
1. security goals - the preservation of the peace, prevention of crime, protection 
of the public 
and 
14 Cohen, Stanley A., "Policing Security: The Divide Between Crime and Terror" (2004) 15 Nat'l J. Const. L. 
405 [Cohen], at 409. 
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2. justice goals - equity, fairness, guarantees for the rights and liberties of the 
individual against the powers of the state and the provision of a fitting response 
by society to wrongdoing.15 
As for the French criminal law system, it puts emphasis on the rehabilitation of offenders 
and their safe reintegration into society.16 Crime prevention, by the enactment of various 
preventive measures aimed at identifying and controlling dangerousness, as well as the 
importance of the rehabilitation of potentially dangerous individuals, appear to be two 
1 7 
key concepts in the recent development of French criminal law. 
It should, therefore, come as no surprise that Canadian criminal law, and to some extent 
French criminal law, are both concerned with various objectives including the prevention 
of crime and management of potentially dangerous individuals. 
It is also worth noting that there are various ways of preventing crime and eliminating 
risk factors. Crime prevention can be achieved through social development measures 
which include the implementation of programs and policies targeting at-risk populations, 
1SI 
more effective police enforcement and presence, and education. These preventive 
15 Canada, Department of Justice Canada, The Criminal Law in Canadian Society, Appendix: B -
Background Material Principles to Guide Criminal Law Reform, by Vicki Schmolka, online: Department of 
Justice Canada <http://74.125.93.132/search?q=cache:iOXtijGZ5wYJ:justice.gc.ca/eng/cons/rt-
tr/novl02/annexb.html+Schmolka,+Vicki.+%22Principles+to+Guide+Criminal+Law+Reform&cd=l&hl=en& 
ct=clnk&gl=ca >[Canada, The Criminal Law]. 
16lngraham, Barton L, The Structure of Criminal Procedure: Laws and Practice of France, the 
Soviet Union, China and the United States (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987) at 7. 
17 See generally the Loi sur la retention de surete, supra note 3, and the Loi sur le traitementde la recidive, 
supra note 13. 
18 See Wanda Jamieson & Liz Hart, "Compendium of Promising Crime Prevention Practices in 
Canada" (June 2003), online: <http://www.caledoninst.org/Publications/PDF/42ENG.pdf> [Jamieson] at 
8:"[t]he social development approach attempts to address the root causes of crime in society. It 
recognizes that crime stems from a variety of critical experiences in people's lives: family violence; poor 
parenting; negative school experiences; poor housing; a lack of recreational, health and environmental 
facilities; inadequate social support; peer pressure; unemployment; and lack of opportunity and poverty. 
It emphasizes investing in individuals, families and communities by providing social, recreational, 
educational and economic interventions and support programs for those Canadians, mainly young people, 
who are most at risk of becoming involved in crime, before they come into conflict with the law. Social 
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measures are generally well received by the population and have been proven to be 
particularly efficient in reducing the crime rate as they are designed to address "...the root 
causes of crime in society".1 
There are also preventive measures which can be more appropriately categorised as a 
product of the political and social context. An example of these measures, which often 
hide behind the noble blanket of crime prevention, are "tough on crime statutes" which 
too often serve the interest of political populism and sometimes translates into immediate 
electoral gain. This situation is particularly alarming especially when we consider the 
fact that political populism does not necessarily equate to sound evidence based criminal 
justice policies. In this context, tough on crime legislation are enacted in reaction to the 
population's fear. These measures are not so much concerned with the root causes of 
criminality; rather, they are pre-emptive tools against potential threats and dangerousness. 
While at first glance, these "populist" measures may appear as a sign that the State is 
actively committed to crime prevention, they sometimes strip and circumvent 
fundamental rights. It is one thing to pursue crime prevention by educating the at-risk 
population about the pitfalls and consequences of criminal activity; it is another to place 
restrictions on an individual's freedom or to detain him or her preventively. 
development also includes investing in rehabilitative interventions for people who are already involved 
with the criminal justice system". 
19 Ibid. 
20 See Petrunik, "Models of Dangerousness", supra note 4 at 10, where he states the following: 
"[djangerous offender legislation in many of the jurisdictions where it has been enacted can be better 
understood as a largely symbolic attempt to appease an angry and fearful populace and serve special 
interests (for example, politicians seeking re-election, criminal justice and mental health professionals 
seeking additional resources) than a concerted instrumental effort to reduce the incidence of serious 
harm to the public". 
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However, preventive measures, such as high-risk offender's judicial restraint orders, 
certainly serve the criminal law security goals by protecting society from potentially 
dangerous individuals, at least in the eye of some policy makers. As we will see, these 
measures fit neatly in the community protection model which has gained popularity in 
Canadian criminal law during the last decades.21 In fact, the community protection model 
has influenced the addition of new offences and restraining orders which effectively 
curtail the freedom of potential offenders.22 Nevertheless, the fact that high-risk offender 
judicial restraint orders generally apply in cases where there is likelihood that a particular 
individual will commit a crime, or pose a risk to society, does not address legitimate 
questions as to the potential legal effects on the liberty and freedom of a person that has 
yet to commit a crime. Preventive measures give the State a means to detain or control 
the liberties of citizens on mere suspicions of dangerousness.23 In a post 9-11 world, 
where anti-terrorism legislation has been enacted in democracies around the globe,24 
preventive measures are at the forefront of an ongoing debate on the role of the State in 
21 Petrunik, "Models of Dangerousness", ibid. See also Sebastien Martineau, (Methodological Prospectus, 
Dalhousie University, 2009)[unpublished] [Martineau, Methodological Prospectus]. 
22 Ibid. See also generally Melissa Dahabieh, An Examination of the Risk Management of High-Risk Sex 
Offenders under a Section 810.1 or 810.2 Order in British Columbia, Canada (Thesis, Simon Fraser 
University, 2005)[Dahabieh]. 
23 See Craig Forcese, "Preventive detention is not the real issue", University of Ottawa (Feb. 23, 2007), 
online: University of Ottawa 
<http://www.commonlaw.uottawa.ca/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2210&contact_id= 
38&lang=en&ltemid=26>: where it is explained that opponents of the newly enacted preventive measures 
under section 83.3 of the Criminal Code have condemned detention based on mere suspicions: 
"[opponents view the provision as a travesty allowing the imposition of significant constraints on liberty 
on the basis mere suspicions, not concrete proof. While it has not been used to date, the power could 
produce serious injustice: as the Arar debacle demonstrates, the suspicions of police may be ill-placed...". 
24 See for example Anti-terrorism Act, S.C. 2001, c. 41 and Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 
2001(U.K.), 2001, c.24. See also generally Roach, Kent, September 11, Consequences for Canada 
(Montreal, Qc: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003) and Hor, Michael Yew Meng, Victor Vridar Ramraj 
& Kent Roach, Global anti-terrorism law and policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
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assessing and managing potential risks and threats posed by particular individuals. It 
seems that "...in spite of legal, scientific and humanistic criticism", preventive legislation 
aiming at the eradication of violent and dangerous behaviour or the threat of it is still 
enacted.26 
As explained by the Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin "...history and the law teach 
97 
us that in times of crisis and fear, states are apt to resort to preventive detention". It is as 
if the State needs to show the populace its need to react to a threat by implementing 
concrete measures that are "tough" on crimes. However, states can "overreact", and 
hence the importance of putting in place numerous safeguards which help protect civil 
liberties from unjustified state control. 
It is argued that preventive measures can take many forms in Canadian criminal law. Bail 
provisions, anti-terror provisions such as preventive arrest of suspected terrorists under 
section 83.3 of the Criminal Code, medical confinement, dangerous offender legislation 
Jamieson, supra note 18 at 11. Jamieson also notes the following at 11: "[t]he National Crime 
Prevention Strategy is a federal initiative that is the shared responsibility of the Department of Justice 
Canada and the Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada. Phase I of this Strategy was launched in 1994, 
with the support of police, other criminal justice agencies and communities across Canada. The Strategy is 
based on research which shows that reactive measures - the apprehension, sentencing, incarceration 
and rehabilitation of offenders - are not enough to prevent crime". [Emphasis added]. 
26 Worsmith J.S. & Monika Ruhl, "Preventive Detention in Canada" (1986) 1 J. Interpers. Violence 
399, available online: < http://jiv.sagepub.eom/cgi/content/abstract/l/4/399>, at 400. 
27 See Hon. Beverley McLachlin, "Remarks of the Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, P.C. Chief 
Justice of Canada"( Symons Lecture -2008 delivered at Charlottetown, 21 October 2008), online: Supreme 
Court of Canada < http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/court-cour/ju/spe-dis/bm2008-10-21-eng.asp>. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Section 83.3 of the Criminal Code provides the following: 
"83.3 (1) The consent of the Attorney General is required before a peace officer may lay an information 
under subsection (2). 
(2) Subject to subsection (1), a peace officer may lay an information before a provincial court judge if the 
peace officer 
(a) believes on reasonable grounds that a terrorist activity will be carried out; and 
(b) suspects on reasonable grounds that the imposition of a recognizance with conditions on a person, or 
the arrest of a person, is necessary to prevent the carrying out of the terrorist activity". 
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and long-term offender legislation,30 long-term supervision orders,31 as well as high risk 
offender judicial restraint orders applicable under sections 810.1 and 810.2 of the 
Criminal Code are all forms of preventive measures. In the case of recognizance orders, 
we have witnessed in recent years the development of a wide variety of orders applicable 
to potentially dangerous individuals, including paedophiles, violent offenders, and 
suspected members of organized crime or potential terrorists.32 In France, special 
preventive legislation has also been created for minors and at-risk populations. 
In all circumstances, these preventive measures touch upon two important points: first, as 
we have seen, they inevitably affect fundamental principles of justice, such as the right to 
liberty. If a State detains an individual or restricts his liberty based on a risk of future 
dangerousness, the freedom of the individual is automatically curtailed. 
Secondly, these preventive measures are intrinsically related to the concept of 
dangerousness. In a society where community protection is of utmost importance, 
potentially dangerous individuals are considered to be threatening to social order and 
everything in the State's arsenal is put into place to eliminate the threat. Dangerousness 
is, therefore, an important tool in justifying the imposition of restrictive and preventive 
orders. 
It is worth pointing out that the concept of dangerousness, or the risk of committing a 
crime, is difficult to define, and such conduct is even more difficult to predict. What 
30 See for example sections 752 and 753 of the Criminal Code. 
31 See section 753.2(1) of the Criminal Code. 
32 Cohen, supra note 14 at 425-426. 
33 See for example the Loi n°98-468 du 17juin 1998 relative a la prevention et a la repression des 
infractions sexuelles et a la protection des mineurs, J.O., 18 June 1998, 9255 and the Loi sur le traitement 
de la recidive, supra note 13. 
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constitutes danger in one situation may not equate to danger in another situation. What 
one person may consider a subjective threat to his or her safety may not objectively be 
viewed as dangerous. Furthermore, as we will explain later, the risk of false positives is 
inherent in the process of a determination of dangerousness. If there are problems in 
predicting a future behaviour, how can preventive measures which curtail the freedom of 
potentially dangerous individuals be accepted in democratic societies? According to 
Petrunik, "...whether we decide to retain or abolish legislation based on the 
dangerousness standard, ultimately the question is a moral one and a social policy 
one...".34 Moreover, as Petrunik notes, one has to ask: "...[w]here do we draw the line in 
establishing a balance between individual rights and social protection? As we will see 
in the next chapters, the "line" has been drawn differently in Canada and in France. 
34 See Petrunik, Michael G., "The politics of dangerousness" (1982) 5 Int. J. Law Psychiatry 225 at 246, 
cited in Leong, Gregory B., "Revisiting the Politics of Dangerousness" (2008) 36:3 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry 
Law 278, available online:<http://www.jaapl.org/cgi/content/short/36/3/278> [Leong], at 278. 
35 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER V - AN OVERVIEW AND A DEFINITION OF THE CONCEPT OF 
DANGEROUSNESS 
The following section explores the theme of dangerousness and the development of 
prediction methodologies. It describes some of the chief problems associated with the 
various assessment tools used by mental health professionals to predict a risk of future 
behaviour. It also looks at how courts in Canada and in France make use of these tools to 
decide upon the potential dangerousness of a particular individual in the context of 
dangerous offender legislation and recognizance orders. This analysis will serve as the 
foundation for our argument that preventive measures designed to control dangerousness, 
such as recognizance orders, ought to offer greater procedural safeguards in order to 
ensure the fair treatment of individuals and to take into account, the inaccuracy problem 
in predicting dangerousness. 
i) Dangerousness: A Concept Intrinsically Related to Criminal Law 
Dangerousness, as a term used to describe the state of a particular individual, has not 
always been a politically correct term among probation officers, psychiatrists and 
judges.36 Nevertheless, it lies at the very foundation of many new policies and legislation 
pertaining to crime prevention. It should be cautioned that in recent years "... a turn away 
from the utilization of "dangerousness" terminology in the mental health sciences" has 
been observed to the profit of the "...adoption of "risk" discourse". The concept of 
dangerousness is however intrinsically connected to criminal law. In fact, "[t]he notion of 
dangerousness has long been used in civil and criminal legislation to refer to the capacity 
36 See Walker, Nigel, Dangerous People (London: Blackstone Press Limited, 1996) [Walker]at vii. For 
example, Walker notes at vii that "...[psychiatrists preferred to talk of "vulnerable" patients". 
37 MacAlister, David. "Use of Risk Assessments by Canadian Judges in the Determination of 
Dangerous and Long-Term Offender Status, 1997-2002" in Law Commission of Canada ed., Law and Risk 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2005) 20, at 20. 
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of persons to harm themselves or others, physically, psychologically, or morally, and 
their likelihood of doing so".38 
Dangerousness and the risk of future behaviour are concepts that can easily be mistaken 
for one another. The literature distinguishes the two concepts as follows: 
It is useful to distinguish dangerousness from risk. The latter simply refers to the 
likelihood of a person's committing any future harmful act, while the former 
combines the perceived likelihood of a future act's being committed with a 
perception of how serious that harm is considered to be. To give an example, a 
person considered to be at an 80% risk of shoplifting will be considered to be less 
dangerous than a person considered to be at 20% risk of committing sexual 
assault.39 
When we look at the language used in sections 810.1 and 810.2, it is clear that 
recognizance orders are concerned with future dangerous behaviour (such as violent 
sexual offences) and not necessarily with "non-dangerous" acts. 
Indeed, according to Petrunik, the concept of dangerousness refers to "...perpetrators of 
selected allegedly harmful acts rather than to the entire range of acts that might be 
considered harmful", such as violent sex offenders.40 Dangerousness also refers "...to a 
state of being of individuals which predisposes them to engage in harmful acts..." and is 
"oriented more to the future than to the past".41 
38Ancel, M., Social Defence: A Modern Approach to the Criminal Problem (New York: Schocken, 
1965) [Ancel], at 15, cited in Michael G. Petrunik, "The Hare and the Tortoise: Dangerousness and Sex 
Offender Policy in the United States and Canada" (2003) 45:1 Can. J. Crim. Jus. 43, at 45 [Petrunik, The 
Hare and the Tortoise]. (Footnotes omitted). 
39 Petrunik, "The Hare and the Tortoise", ibid, at 45. 
40 Petrunik, "Models of Dangerousness", supra note 4 at 4. 
41 Ibid, at 4. 
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Far from being a "juridical concept", dangerousness is considered a "criminological 
notion".42 In civil and criminal law, the notion of dangerousness has been applied to 
"certain kinds of acts and persons" and has been used in the following three major 
contexts according to Petrunik: "...civil mental health law, European positivist writings, 
and legislation for violent offenders".43 
In civil mental health law, the concept of dangerousness is associated with "involuntary 
civil commitment", while positivist writings gave rise to the notion of / 'etat dangereux 
and the development of habitual offender legislation.44 The third context in which the 
concept appears is in legislation pertaining to violent offenders, who are considered as 
"...persons who pose a risk because of their alleged proclivity for violent offences or non-
consensual sexual offenses".45 In the legislative context, dangerous offender and long 
term offender legislation, under sections 753 and 754 of the Criminal Code, are good 
examples of the assessment of dangerousness in the case of violent offenders. 
According to Petrunik, most statutes incorporating the concept of dangerousness are 
aimed at dealing with "...four categories of risk creators: sex offenders, violent offenders, 
recidivists, and persons considered to have a mental illness or personality disorder".46 
Petrunik also explains that due to the usual overlapping of these categories, 
dangerousness legislation has typically focused on "...recidivist violent sex offenders who 
42Danet, Jean, "La dangerosite, une notion criminologique, seculaire et mutante" (2008) Vol. V Champ 
penal, New International Journal of Criminology, available online : Champ penal 
<http://champpenal.revues.org/document6013.html >[Danet]. 
43 Petrunik, Michael. The Makings of Dangerous Offenders:The Origins' Diffusion and Use of 
Legislation for Dangerous Offenders in Europe and North America, No. 1984-74, Programs Branch User 
Report, Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada, at 2 [Petrunik, "The Makings of Dangerous 
Offenders"]. 
44 Ibid, at 2-3. See also Leong, supra note 34 at 278. 
45 Petrunik, "The Makings of Dangerous Offenders", ibid, at 3. 
46 Petrunik, "Models of dangerousness", supra note 4 at 8. 
26 
are considered to have a mental illness, personality disorder, or other mental 
abnormality".47 
Furthermore, dangerousness is not a novel concept.48 Indeed, as early as the 19th century, 
dangerousness of certain individuals was at the heart of an intense debate concerning 
habitual offenders.49 Harkening back to the 19th century postulates of Lombroso 
concerning "/ 'individu dcmgereux" or "/ 'etat dangereux", the concept of dangerousness is 
once again at the center stage of policy making.50 In modern criminal law, the concept of 
dangerousness is now best understood as referring to "...an offender's potential to commit 
acts of violence or those of a sexual nature".51 
Throughout the years, Canadian criminal law, as well as French criminal law, has 
developed various preventive measures to deal with the potential dangerousness of 
certain individuals. All in all, however, Petrunik notes that the development of 
dangerousness legislation has been motivated by various societal objectives, such as 
"...community protection, equality under the law, and individual treatment or 
rehabilitation".52 
i7ibid. 
48 Joy Irving, Implications of Indeterminacy in Canada's Dangerous Offender Provisions (Master of Arts, 
Thesis, Carleton University, 2001)[lrving, "Thesis"] at 7. 
49 Rhenter, Pauline. "La presomption de dangerosite et la figure du fou dangereux", Mediapart (14 
November 2008), online: Mediapart <http://www.mediapart.fr/club/edition/les-invites-de-
mediapart/article/141108/la-presomption-de-dangerosite-et-la-figure-du-f >[Rhenter]. 
50 Delphine, Cavallo, "La prise en compte de la dangerosite en droit penal dans les Etats 
europeens" Calenda (19 June 2009), online : revue.org <http://calenda.revues.org/nouvellel2623.html>. 
51 John Howard Society of Alberta. "Dangerous Offenders Legislation Around the World", online: John 
Howard Society <http://www.johnhoward.ab.ca/PUB/C20.htm> [John Howard, "Dangerous Offenders"]. 
52 Petrunik, "Models of dangerousness", supra note 4 at 10. 
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ii) The Concept of Dangerousness in Canadian Criminal Law and the 
Influences of the Clinical, Justice and Community Protection Models 
on its Evolution 
A review of the literature demonstrates that three models have influenced the evolution of 
legislation based on the concept of dangerousness in Canadian criminal law: the clinical 
model, the justice model and the community protection model. The following sections 
will briefly discuss the development of each model. 
a) The Influence of the Clinical Model 
The clinical model is primarily concerned with "...the diagnosis and treatment of the 
criminal psychopath or criminal man".54 This model is at the root of the first dangerous 
offender legislation in Canada, that is, the enactment of a criminal sexual psychopath 
statute in 1948.55 
The various sources of the clinical model have been identified by Foucault56 in 1978, and 
summarised by Petrunik in 1994.57 As Petrunik notes, Foucault extended the definition of 
the "individual who committed a crime" given by the Italian Positivist Garofalo in the 
19th century, to a "criminal man" considered "...as a person who by his very nature is 
driven to commit the most violent of crimes against the most vulnerable of victims".59 
The 19th century concept of "homicidal monomania" used by psychiatrists to explain 
53 Petrunik, "Models of dangerousness", ibid, at 10-12. See also John Howard, "Dangerous Offenders", 
supra note 51. 
54 Petrunik, "Models of dangerousness", ibid, at 13, referring to Foucault, M. "About the Concept of the 
'Dangerous Individual' in 19th- Century Legal Psychiatry" (1978) 1 International Journal of Law and 
Psychiatry, 1 [Foucault]. 
55 Petrunik, "Models of dangerousness", ibid, at 19. 
56 See generally Foucault, supra note 54. 
57 See generally Petrunik, "Models of Dangerousness", supra note 4. 
58 For a summary of Garofalo's work, see Lilly, J. Robert, Francis T. Cullen & Richard A. Ball, Criminological 
theory: context and consequences (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2007), at 21-24. 
59 Petrunik, "Models of Dangerousness", supra note 4 at 14. 
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certain violent and bizarre crimes is also cited as a source of the clinical model. 
Petrunik also refers to Foucault in explaining that: 
...psychiatrists were able to justify their right to intervene in the case of "mentally 
abnormal", but legally sane, dangerous offenders on the basis of a clinical model 
that stressed not just individual treatment but public hygiene. The psychiatrist as a 
diagnostician and caretaker of the dangerous individual took on the role of public 
protector just as practitioners of physical medicine diagnosed and quarantined 
individuals who were actual or potential carriers of contagious disease. ' 
According to Petrunik, Foucault and Ancel, the notion that an individual posing a risk to 
society should be held accountable found its way into criminal legislation "...through the 
concepts of "criminal man" and "I'etat dangereux", and was used to advocate that social 
control should be proportionate, not to the seriousness of the offence, but to the offender's 
"dangerousness his "capacity for and probability of doing harm"". Petrunik in referring 
to Ancel, notes that social control measures took various forms including non-punitive 
measures aimed at neutralising the dangerousness of the offender and that were "... 
designed simply to neutralize the offender, either by his removal or segregation or 
by...remedial or educational methods". There were also, as noted by Petrunik and 
Ancel, indeterminate measures that were "...not fixed in terms of estimates of the nature 
and seriousness of the crime".64 Therefore, within the clinical model, the fundamental 
rights of law, liberty and due process are subordinated to the "...State's duty to ensure 
public protection".65 
Petrunik, "Models of dangerousness", ibid. Petrunik refers to Foucault, supra note 54 at 6-7. 
61 Petrunik, "Models of Dangerousness"', ibid, at 14-15 (Footnotes omitted). Petrunik refers to Foucault, 
supra note 54 at 6. 
62 Petrunik, "Models of dangerousness", ibid, at 14. Petrunik cites Foucault, supra note 54 at 17 and Ancel, 
supra note 38 at 15. (Footnotes omitted). 
63 Petrunik, "Models of Dangerousness" ibid, at 15. Petrunik cites Ancel, supra note 38 at 25. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid, at 16. 
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As one might expect, the clinical model was the object of intense criticism over the 
years.66 Petrunik identifies these criticisms as follows: 
(1) the circularity of some of its key concepts, (2) the low reliability of diagnoses 
of personality disorder, (3) inaccuracy in predictions of violence, and (4) the 
generally low success levels of treatment programs.67 
As early as in the 1970's, the Law Reform Commission of Canada "...recommended 
avoiding clinical evaluations of dangerousness". Nevertheless, in assessing 
dangerousness, Petrunik notes that in recent years, there has been some improvement, 
including the demonstrated usefulness of the Hare's Psychopathy Checklist ("PCL" and 
"PCL-R") in assessing the risk of dangerousness of a particular individual, and the 
combined use of clinical and actuarial techniques, of contextual information, and the 
development of "cognitive-behavioural" approaches.69 Some of these assessment 
techniques will be briefly discussed later in this section. 
b) The Influence of the Justice Model 
While the 19l century and the first half of the 20th century saw the emergence of the 
clinical model emphasising the treatment of the individual's dangerousness, the second 
half of the 20th century was marked by social control measures concerned with 
individual right, hence the development of the justice model. In fact, beginning in the 
1970s, the justice model progressively replaced the clinical model.71 According to 
See generally Monahan, J., The clinical prediction of violent behaviour (Rockville (MD): National Institute 
of Mental Health, 1981).See also Ewing, C. P., "Preventative detention and execution: The 
constitutionality of punishing future crimes" (1991) 12 Am. J. L. & Med.139. 
67 Petrunik, "Models of Dangerousness", supra note 4 at 22. 
68 John Howard, "Dangerous Offenders", supra note 51. 
69 Petrunik, "Models of Dangerousness", supra note 4 at 25-26. 
70 Ibid, at 41. 
71 Durham, Alexis M., "Correctional Privatization and the Justice Model: the Collision of Justice 
and Utility" (1987) 3:2 Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 57, at 58 (abstract). 
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Petrunik, the justice model focuses on the offense and "...principles of individual civil 
rights, equality under the law, and the least restrictive alternative take precedence over 
community protection and offender rehabilitation".72Criticising the notion of 
psychopathy which was the trademark of the clinical model, the justice model influenced 
the "use of the term dangerous offender" as opposed to "sexual psychopath" in various 
statutes.73 
Concerns with the assessment and prediction of dangerousness by clinicians under the 
clinical model were also characteristic of the justice model.74 In some instances, like in 
the United States, the shift toward a justice model caused the abolition of certain "...civil 
sexual psychopath and sexually dangerous persons' statutes".75 Indeterminate sentences 
imposed on some dangerous individuals in the United States, which were once the 
hallmark of the clinical model, were progressively replaced by determinate sentences. 
The protections offered by the law to the offenders' benefit became preeminent with the 
emergence of the justice model.77 
Insofar as the justice model responded to some of the flaws of the clinical model, by 
"....avoid[ing] potential abuses of the rights of offenders and mental patients" and by 
"encourag[ing] respect for fundamental principles such as the rule of law", it was 
criticised for "...the lack of safeguards for the community".78 Consequently, the 1980s 
72 Petrunik, "Models of Dangerousness", supra note 4 at 42. 
73 Ibid, at 43. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid, at 44-46. 
76 Ibid, at 46. 
77 Ibid. 
7Blbid. at 51, and 47. 
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saw the emergence of a new model of social control concerned with public protection, 
TO 
namely, the community protection model. 
c) The Influence of the Community Protection Model 
Concerns with public protection triggered the development of the community protection 
model, which puts emphasis on the rights of victims and potential victims, and on the 
need to have "... strict and comprehensive measures of control".80 According to Petrunik, 
in response to the potential threat of violent sexual offenders, the community protection 
model emerged to address some of the flaws of the clinical and justice models. Under the 
0 1 
community protection model, the risk to public safety is a major concern. Petrunik 
explains that the development of a community protection model can be attributed to the 
following factors: 
(1) Predatory sexual and violent offenders pose a serious and pervasive danger to 
women and children. Even if the number of such offenders is not very large the 
amount of damage - physical and psychological - they do can be very great. 
(2) Politicians and bureaucrats have given insufficient attention to victims of violent 
and sexual offences and their families and too much attention to the rights of 
offenders. Too little has been done to address issues of public safety from violent 
crime. 
(3) Attempts to rehabilitate or treat sexual and violent offenders have had little 
success with the result that such individuals are being released from a prison are 
still a great risk to the public. Violent and sexual offenders should be kept locked 
up until it is clear that they no longer pose a serious threat to the public. 
(4) The justice and mental health systems have failed to adequately monitor 
dangerous individuals who have been released from custody. In addition, these 
two systems provide inadequate information about such individuals to 
79 Petrunik, "Models ofDangerousness", ibid, at 54. 
80 Saleh, Fabian M. et al., Sex Offenders: Identification, Risk Assessment, Treatment, and Legal 
Issues (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), at 412. 
81 Petrunik, "Models ofDangerousness", supra note 4 at 53. 
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communities with the result that community members neglect to take or are 
unable to take measures to protect themselves. 
The community protection model emerged also because of serious concerns from 
"...social movements advocating victims' rights and greater protection for women and 
children from sexual violence".83 This model, therefore, shifted the focus on to protection 
of vulnerable persons.84 As Vess explains, the community protection model can be 
distinguished from the clinical and justice models as follows: 
In contrast to the justice model, the community protection approach is less 
concerned about due process, the proportionality of punishment to the crime, and 
the protection of offender's liberty or privacy rights. In contrast to the forensic-
clinical model, it is less concerned about treatment or rehabilitation of offenders 
intended to reduce recidivism or facilitate community reintegration. The primary 
goal of the community protection model is the incapacity of sexual offenders for 
the sake of public safety.85 
It can be argued that the community protection model favoured the enactment of 
preventive measures to control the risk posed by potentially dangerous individuals. 
Consequently, in Canada, preventive measures, such as high risk judicial restraint orders, 
and new dangerous offender and long-term offender provisions, are a direct result of this 
new movement which focuses on the protection of the community, rather than on the 
rights of the offender or his rehabilitation.86 
' Ibid, at 54-55. 
83 Ibid, at 108. 
Mlbid. 
85 Vess, James, "Preventive Detention Versus Civil Commitment: Alternative Policies for Public 
Protection in New Zealand and California" (2005) 12:2 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law. 357, at 360, cited 
in Connolly, Marie & Tony Ward, Morals, rights and practice in the human services (London: 
Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2008), at 90. 
86 For example, it is worth noting the recent enactment of presumption of dangerousness under 
section753 (1.1) of the Criminal Code which deals with the dangerous offender designation. This measure 
facilitates the designation of a dangerous offender as it automatically presumes his or her dangerousness 
if he or she has committed three serious personal.injury offences. It is argued that in a society concerned 
with the risk pose by potentially dangerous individuals, a presumption of dangerousness fits neatly with 
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In France, a shift toward a system emphasising the protection of the community by the 
enactment of preventive measures, and aimed at identifying and controlling 
dangerousness, has also been observed. However, as will be explained, the French 
scheme appears to put more emphasis on the rehabilitation of the offender while also 
being concerned with due process when determining dangerousness. The next section 
will discuss the influence of the social defence movement and repressive prevention in 
France on the determination of dangerousness. 
iii) The Evolution of the Concept of Dangerousness in France 
The concept of dangerousness evolved throughout the 19th century around the notions of 
"degradation", "periculosite", "redoutabilite" and later under "1'etat dangereux'" which 
was first formulated by Garofalo. According to Bertrand, these notions were used to 
justify the internment of abnormal individuals who could jeopardise the social 
equilibrium.88 Bertrand notes the first signs of the notion of "/ 'etat dangereux''' in French 
criminal law with the adoption of the Loi du 30 juin 1838, which gave the prefect the 
authority to intern any person whose mental state might compromise public order and the 
protection of the community. At around the same time, the notion of "classe 
dangereuse", a category of individuals considered to be dangerous because of their vices, 
the community protection model described by Petrunik. See generally Petrunik, "Models of 
Dangerousness", supra note 4. 
87 Bertrand, Valerie, "La mendicite et I'etat dangereux : I'historicite des representations sociales 
dans le discours juridique", (2003) 80:2 Connexions 137, available online : Cairn info 
<http://www.cairn.info/revue-connexions-2003-2-page-137.htm> [Bertrand]. 
88 Bertrand, ibid. 
89 We will see later that the recent enactment of the Loi n°2007-297 du 5 mars 2007 relative a la 
prevention de la delinquance, J.O., 7 March 2007, 4297 [Loisurla prevention de la delinquance] has given 
more power to mayors in indentifying potentially dangerous individuals. 
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ignorance, and hardships, is described by the Academie des sciences morales et 
politiques. 
Also, in the 19th century, the concept of dangerosite was at the heart of a debate in the 
treatment of habitual offenders.91 The idea of punishing "incorrigible" individuals who 
did not belong to mental health facilities or prisons, but were considered "socially 
abnormal", also saw the light during this period. Drastic measures were eventually 
enacted to deal with these multi-recidivists, including the relegation de surete in 1885. 
The relegation de surete was a preventive measure aimed at deporting habitual offenders 
to remote territories where they would pose a minimal risk of dangerousness, or merely 
cause danger to people who "didn't count".94 
However, it is the emergence of the social defence movement in France that is widely 
credited as being at the heart of the development of legislation dealing with the concept 
of Yetat dangereux, or dangerousness. The social defence movement is concerned not 
only with punishment, but also with the protection of persons and society: "[i]l ne s'agit 
plus de punir, mais d'assurer de la meilleure facon possible la protection de la personne, 
de la vie, du patrimoine et de l'honneur des citoyens".95 To achieve this goal, the judicial 




94 See generally Sanchez, Jean-Lucien, "La relegation (loi du 27 mai 1885)"(2005) Crimino Corpus, La 
Revue, Dossier no.2, available online: Crimino Corpus <http://www.criminocorpus.cnrs.fr/article43.html>. 
See also Kaluszynski, Martine "Le retour de I'homme dangereux. Reflexions sur la notion de dangerosite 
et ses usages"(2008) New International Journal of Criminology, Vol V, available online : Penal Field 
<http://champpenal.revues.Org/6183#bodyftn25>, at para. 25. 
95 Rappard, P., "La fin du non-lieu judiciaire et son incidence sur le but des institutions 
psychiatriques medicolegales" (2008) 166 :7 Annales Medico-psychologiques, revue psychiatrique 569, 
available online through Science Direct :< www.sciencedirect.co> [Rappard], at 571. 
35 
notion of etat danger-ewe is progressively used to justify ante delictum detention of 
potentially dangerous individuals, all in the name of the protection of society. 6 
For example, the social defence movement fostered two preventive statutes legislations in 
the 1950s to deal with two forms of potential dangerousness: alcoholism and drug 
addiction.97 In the words of Ancel, it is in the latter legislation dating from 1954 (Loi du 
15 avril 1954 sur le traitement des alcooliques dangereux) that "...the idea of 
dangerousness first received explicit legislative recognition". The Loi sur le traitement 
des alcooliques dangereux enabled the preventive and sanitary detention of dangerous 
alcoholics.100 
From that point on, the concept of dangerousness in French criminal law gained 
considerable momentum. In fact, the social defence movement gradually extended its 
influence and contributed to the "...establishment of a system of social prevention in what 
may be called the "pre-criminal" stage..,".101 According to Ancel, social defence premises 
allow for the implementation of a preventive system which strikes a balance between the 
rule of law and a "system of social prevention" if the following conditions are met: 
First, a special kind of dangerousness needs to be clearly distinguished and 
carefully defined. Secondly, the boundaries of this socially dangerous condition 
must be delimited by means of a legal formula which should be worked out 
Rappard, ibid. 
97 Ancel, supra note 38 at 171. Rappard, supra note 95 at 571 also notes that the Loi n° 7443 du 30juin 
1838 sur les alienes, Bulletin des lois, Vol. 16, n°581, July 1838,1005, which dealt with persons suffering 
from mental incapacity, is one of the first legislation influenced by the social defence movement. 
98 Loi n°54-439 du 15 avril 1954 sur le traitement des alcooliques dangereux pour autrui, J.O, 21 April 
1954, 3827. 
99 Ancel, supra note 38 at 171. 
100 Godfryd , Michel, Le droit de la sante mentale par les textes (Thoiry : Editions Heures de France, 2000), 
at 53. See also Tribolet, Serge & George Desous, Droit et psychiatrie (Thoiry: Editions Heures de France, 
1995), at 220-222. 
101 Ancel, supra note 38 at 171. 
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with the greatest possible precision. Thirdly, there ought to be statutory 
recognition of the State's right to intervene for purposes of prevention, such 
right to be exercised only within narrow limits strictly defined by statute. 
Fourthly, the specific conditions in which the State may exercise its right to 
intervene should form part of a system of judicial and procedural safeguards 
1 (Y) * 
which ought, in principle, to be those laid down by the general law. [Emphasis 
added]. 
Thus, just as it was in Canada, the concept of dangerousness in France evolved toward a 
system focusing on the prevention of dangerousness in the name of the protection of 
society. The concept of dangerosite in French criminal law is now considered a 
"measurement of a probability of recidivism".103 According to Danet, France 
progressively applied various alternatives in the treatment of potentially dangerous 
offenders.104 It is not just a question of incarcerating potentially dangerous offenders and 
releasing them into society once their debt is paid to society. In fact, French law now 
focuses on offering alternatives to incarceration, in the hope of rehabilitating potentially 
dangerous offenders. 
Danet explains that there are now numerous alternatives for controlling dangerousness 
which can be applied progressively depending on the seriousness of the case: "1) 
punishment and treatment (injonction de soins) for all individuals subjected to a social-
judicial probation (suivi socio-judiciaire), 2) punishment, treatment and supervision 
through the social-judicial probation or through other supervision methods such as the 
surveillance de siirete, 3) finally, punishment, treatment, detention and treatment until the 
risk of future dangerousness is decreased to levels justifying a release into society, but 
also a possibility of re-imposing a retention de surete should there be a high probability 
102 ibid. 
103 Danet, supra note 42. 
104 Ibid. 
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of dangerousness or recidivism".105 These are all punitive measures with a preventive 
follow-up aimed at controlling the risk of future dangerousness of a particular individual. 
As we will explain later, the social defence model encouraged the development of various 
mesures de surete (or measures aimed at controlling dangerousness). However, in the 
context of French criminal law, these so-called mesures de surete are only applicable to 
convicted offenders who present a risk of dangerousness upon their release from prison. 
On this note, it could be argued that the Canadian scheme of recognizance orders is also 
generally used to restrain the liberties of convicted offenders. However, as we will later 
explain, the chief difference between the two systems resides in the fact that the Canadian 
scheme leaves the door wide open to impose recognizance orders on potentially 
dangerous individuals, whether they have been convicted or not in the past for criminal 
offenses.106 Before examining the French scheme of preventive measures in more detail, 
we will look at the concept of prediction of dangerousness, which is a key component in 
the imposition of preventive measures. 
iv) Reliability and Accuracy Issues in Prediction of Dangerousness 
The following section will examine in greater detail the ongoing debate among clinicians 
and members of the legal community on the reliability of prediction of dangerousness. 
There has been an evolution towards a mixed approach combining clinical and actuarial 
105 Ibid. "Translated by author". The noted paragraph is a translation of Danet's text:"La dangerosite 
s'affiche desormais comme la mesure d'une probabilite de recidive. Le legislateur sort alors de 
I'alternative enfermer/ « laisser sortir la dette payee » et il gradue les reponses : 1) punition et traitement 
avec injonction de soins pour tous ceux qui encourent un suivi socio-judiciaire, 2) punition, traitement et 
surveillance par le suivi socio-judiciaire ou par la surveillance de surete, et enfin 3) punition, traitement, 
retention et traitement jusqu'a abaissement de la dangerosite susceptible de justifier le retour a la 
situation precedente, mais aussi retour a la retention en cas d'augmentation de la dangerosite, de la 
probabilite de recidive". 
106 See generally section 810.1 and 810.2 of the Criminal Code. 
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tests in determining dangerousness. However, the literature generally demonstrates that 
even the best approach is subject to false positives. Consequently, the reliability issue in 
the determination of a risk of future behaviour should be a concern in the development of 
new policies pertaining to the control of dangerousness. 
In a society where the rule of law is paramount, the assessment of dangerousness, which 
can lead to the alienation of certain liberties by the imposition of recognizance orders or 
preventive detention, presents a moral dilemma.107 As Walker suggests: 
[w]e want to prevent the harm such people may do to others, yet we feel guilty 
when prevention entails drastic interference with their lives. The horns of the 
dilemma are sharpest when the harm feared is of a kind that destroys life or the 
quality of life, and when the only effective means of prevention is detention. The 
horns are blunter when the harm is merely financial and the risk of it can be 
reduced by non-custodial measures, such as disqualification or supervision. 
Criminal sanctions, at least in common law systems, have been invoked on the basis of 
"explicit predictions of dangerousness" since the 16th century.109 Over the years, the 
criminal justice system has seen the development of anticipatory interventions targeting 
potential criminals despite the lack of "...jurisprudential justifications for such 
interventions and knowledge of their efficacy". n 0 
In the context of dangerous offender legislation, as well as in other dangerousness 
legislation (such as bail and recognizance orders for potentially dangerous individuals), 
judges have to make a determination on the potential dangerousness of the individuals. 
107 Walker, supra note 36 at 1. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Morris, Norval & Marc Miller, "Predictions of Dangerousness" (1985) 6 Crime and Justice 1, available 
online through HeinOnline, [Morris & Miller], at 7. For example, at 7-8, Morris & Miller, ibid, refers to the 
Vagrancy Acts and the Habitual Offenders Laws in England and in the United States. 
110lbid. at 6. 
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They will often rely on evidence from expert witnesses (i.e. psychiatrists and 
psychologists) to assess the dangerousness of the individual. However, as Menzies et al. 
explain, "[t]he clinical prediction of dangerousness is currently among the most 
controversial issues in the areas of medico legal research and practice".111 This issue 
inevitably raises the following question: if clinicians are unable to predict dangerousness 
accurately, how are judges supposed to make findings on the potential dangerousness of 
individuals? Hence one must look into the different forms of prediction of future 
behaviour and their flaws, as well as at the various challenges faced by mental health 
professionals in determining dangerousness. The discussion also explores the standards 
used by the court in making a determination of dangerousness. 
v) An Overview of Various Risk Assessment Tools Used in the 
Determination of Dangerousness 
It has been said that "[t]he ability to predict future behaviour has long been an elusive 
goal".112 Furthermore, a cursory review of the doctrine pertaining to the prediction of 
dangerousness by mental health professionals quickly reveals an unsettled and 
controversial debate.113 This is not to say that clinicians have not, over the years, tried to 
develop assessment tools to evaluate the risk of future behaviour and dangerousness of an 
individual. In fact, multiple assessment and prediction tools are used by clinicians.114 In 
the clinical community, there are essentially three forms of prediction of future 
behaviour, which enable an assessment of dangerousness. 
111 Menzies, Robert J., Christopher D. Webster & Diana S. Sepejak, "The Dimensions of 
Dangerousness: Evaluating the Accuracy of Psychometric Predictions of Violence among Forensic 
Patients" (1985) 9:1 Law and Human Behavior, 49, available online through JSTOR,[Menzies] at 50. 
112 MacAlister, supra note 37 at 27. 
113 Melton, Gary B. et al., Psychological Evaluations for the Courts, 2nd ed., (New York: The 
Guilford Press, 1997) [Melton] at 277. 
114 Slobogin, Christopher, Proving the Unprovable: The Role of Law, Science, and Speculation in 
Adjudicating Culpability and Dangerousness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007)[Slobogin] at 101. 
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Morris & Miller identify them as anamnestic prediction, actuarial prediction, and clinical 
prediction.115 By looking into the behavioural history of an individual in a particular 
circumstance, clinicians use anamnestic predictions to indicate future behaviour. 
Actuarial predictions are concerned with how a given class of individuals behave in a 
given set of circumstances. 117As for clinical prediction, it is based on professional 
I I S 
judgment and involves some of the "elements of the first two" forms of prediction. 
Other researchers, such as MacAlister, also identify three forms of risk of future 
behaviour assessment approaches similar to the ones identified by Morris & Miller, but 
classify them under different labels: the early clinical approaches, the actuarial risk 
assessment, and structured clinical judgment.ng 
Before the 1980s, most, if not all, predictions of risk of future behaviour made by mental 
health practitioners was purely clinical in nature. The typical clinical judgment process 
is explained as follows: "[t]ypically, a mental status exam of the subject and a review of 
file data led an assessor to identify the behavioural and psychological dynamics present 
in the individual. These findings would often result in a clinical diagnosis over which 
assumptions regarding dangerousness prevailed*'.121 Early clinical approaches, which 
"...tended to be based upon the clinical judgment of the mental health practitioner", 
115 Morris & Miller, supra note 109 at 13-14. It is also worth pointing out that The Canadian Oxford 
Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. "anamnesis", defines anamnesis as follows: " 1 . [the recalling of things past; 
reminiscence. 2. A patient's account of his or her medical history...". 
116 Ibid. 
117 Ibid, at 14. 
Ibid. 
119 MacAlister, supra note 37 at 27. See also Slobogin, supra note 114 at 101. However, Slobogin adds 
another prediction methodology, namely the "adjusted actuarial assessment". According to Slobogin, at 
101, the adjusted actuarial assessment "....begins with an actuarial assessment that the professional then 
adjusts, based on individualized factors not considered in the actuarial formula". 
120 Slobogin, ibid, at 101. 
121 MacAlister, supra note 37, at 27. 
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presented numerous reliability issues.122 Over the years, clinicians were able to refine 
their techniques in predicting a risk of future behaviour by using the clinical approach. 
However, the non-existence of "...professional standards in psychology or other mental 
health disciplines for the assessment of risk for violence" continues to plague the early 
form of clinical approach. As MacAlister points out, this particularity opened the door 
for the development of alternative approaches to the assessment of future violence.124 
One of these alternatives, which has been widely used in Canada in the assessment of 
future violence, is the actuarial risk assessment. Actuarial risk assessment tools rely, 
for the most part, on "...on a finite number of preidentified variables that statistically 
correlate to risk and that produce a definitive probability or probability range of risk" and 
are more structured than clinical prediction methodologies. 
Since the 1980s, several actuarial tools have been developed, including the SIR scale 
(Statistical Information on Recidivism); the DBRS (Dangerous Behavior Rating 
Scheme); the VRAG (Violence Risk Appraisal Guide) and its key component, the PCL-R 
(Hare Psychopathy Checklist).127 The development of these risk assessment tools and 
their increasing use by mental health practitioners has contributed to increase the 
reliability of the prediction of future behaviour. However, actuarial tools are not without 
122 MacAlister, ibid. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Ibid. In this regard, MacAlister, ibid, points out at 27 that "[njowhere has the development of risk 
assessment tools been more prolific than in this country", namely Canada. Moreover, as will be discussed 
later, France differs from the Canadian approach since mental health practitioners are still widely making 
use of psychoanalysis in assessing the risk of future violence and relying on unstructured clinical 
judgment. See Xavier Bebin, "Comment ameliorer 1'evaluation de la dangerosite en France?", Institut pour 
la Justice (avril 2009), online: Institut pour la justice < http://www.publications-
justice.fr/publications/notes-syntheses/comment-ameliorer-l-evaluation-de-la-dangerosite-en-france> 
[Bebin]. 
126 Slobogin, supra note 114 at 101-102. 
127 MacAlister, supra note 37 at 28. 
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flaws. They are valuable when used in relation to a group, but their accuracy "...is not of 
much value if the question concerns a particular individual".128 In other words, actuarial 
tools are unable to predict what type of crime is going to be committed by a particular 
individual. Nevertheless, these tools can be used with some effectiveness in predicting a 
risk of future behaviour. 
Another alternative identified by MacAlister is the structured clinical judgment, which 
combines "...actuarial methods with clinical or professional expertise to form risk 
assessment". It is now the dominant approach in the assessment of future behaviour in 
Canada. Once again, on this point, we will demonstrate later that such is not the case in 
France currently. 
The structured clinical judgment approach has seen the emergence of several assessment 
tools which have the particularity of combining actuarial elements with clinical 
judgment.130 MacAlister identifies them as being the "PCL-R, the VRAG, the Sex 
Offender Risk Appraisal Guide (SORAG), the Rapid Risk Assessment for Sex Offender 
Recidivism (RRASOR), and the STATIC-99,...[as well as]...the Violence Prediction 
Scheme (VPS), the Historical/Clinical/Risk Management guide (HCR-20), the Spousal 
Assault Risk Assessment guide (SARA), and the Sexual Violence Risks guide (SVR)".131 
Slobogin considers the HCR-20 as one of the best examples of structured clinical 
judgement and describes it as "...consisting] of twenty items relating to three categories 
128 Walker, supra note 36 at 119. 
129 MacAlister, supra note 37 at 28. 
130 Ibid, at 29. 
131 Ibid. (Footnotes omitted). See also for example Hanson, R. Karl, The Development of a Brief Actuarial 
Risk Scale for Sexual Offense Recidivism, 1997-04, online: Department of the Solicitor General of Canada 
<http://ww2.pssp.gc.ca/publications/corrections/199704_e.pdf>, at 14. An example of the RRASOR 
developed by Karl R. Hanson is also included in Appendix C of the present document. 
43 
of information: historical, clinical, and risk management". Slobogin also points out that 
while the HCR-20 may appear similar to actuarial methodology, it differs from it since 
"...the examiner arrives at risk ratings of low, moderate, or high based on his or her 
I T T 
clinical assessment of the various items in the protocol. 
No matter which approach is preferred in assessing risk of future behaviour, no 
methodology can be deemed "perfect". However, Slobogin notes the advantage of 
actuarial and structured clinical judgment over the early clinical approaches as being 
more objective, and more reliable.134 MacAlister points out that the objectivity of the 
tests used in actuarial assessment is "[ljending an air of mathematical precision to the 
dangerousness assessment [which] is intuitively desirable for mental health experts, 
judges, and lawyers alike".135 In comparison, an unstructured clinical judgment is much 
more influenced by the subjectivity of the assessor: 
An unstructured clinical prediction, in contrast, "must ultimately be based upon 
an overall subjective impression which is based upon an understanding of the 
interrelatedness of many facts." Because "subjective impressions" may differ 
from clinician to clinician, and even from case to case for the same clinician, each 
clinical prediction will probably be based on a different constellation of factors, 
some of which may be irrelevant or based on erroneous stereotypes and 
prejudices.136 
The development of a variety of approaches in the assessment of risk of future behaviour 
is said to have increased the reliability of risk assessments tool. Overall, it appears that 
"[t]he common wisdom that expert predictions about violence risk are wrong more often 
Slobogin, supra note 114 at 104. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
MacAlister,supra note 37 at 28. 
Slobogin, supra note 114 at 105. (Footnotes omitted). 
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than they are right is probably not true".137 Nevertheless, it is important to take into 
consideration that some risk assessment tools are more reliable than others in predicting 
dangerousness. It is a fundamental consideration because it ultimately affects the quality 
of the evidence presented to the judge. 
Today, the predominance of the structured clinical judgment tool in psychiatric 
1 T O 
assessment of risk of future behaviour is clearly apparent in Canada. However, as we 
will demonstrate, the situation is different in France. 
vi) Predictions of Dangerousness in the French Context and the 
Predominance of Psychoanalysis in the Determination of 
Dangerousness by French Mental Health Experts 
While the aforementioned actuarial and structured clinical judgment tools, such as the 
HCR-20, are widely used by Canadian mental health professionals, the same cannot be 
said of their French colleagues. The most reliable tools for predicting a risk of future 
1 ^0 
behaviour are under used in France by mental health professionals. Experts have 
vehemently denounced the fact that France has yet to codify evaluation methods for 
individuals who have committed serious, complex and serial crimes.140 Bebin adds that 
assessment tools, such as the HCR-20 and the VRAG, have not been validated nationally 
137 Slobogin, ibid, at 114. 
138 MacAlister, supra note 37 at 28. 
139 Bebin, supra note 125 at 2. 
140 Benezech, M., T.H. Pham B. & P. Le Bihan, "Les nouvelles dispositions concernant les criminels 
malades mentaux dans la loi du 25 fevrier 2008 relative a la retention de surete et a la declaration 
d'irresponsabilite penale pour cause de trouble mental: une necessaire evaluation du risque criminel" 
(2009) 167 Annales Medico-Psychologiques 39, at 47. 
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in France.141 He also notes that the Hare's Psychopathy Checklist is not used at all by 
French mental health practitioners.142 
In fact, in evaluating the risk of future behaviour, French mental health professionals are 
still widely using unstructured clinical judgment, despite its deficient reliability.143 One 
has to wonder why actuarial tools and structured clinical judgment tools are not part of 
the French clinician's regular arsenal in determining dangerousness. In this regard, Bebin 
offers some possible explanations asserting that psychoanalysis, a practice which has 
fallen out of favour in other developed countries, is still widely used in France.144 Bebin 
points out that traditionally, psychoanalysis is hostile to prediction tools which are not 
geared toward understanding the individual.145 All in all, the lack of uniformity and 
national validation of risk assessment tools has led to numerous conflicts between experts 
in the Cours d'assises in France.146 However, perhaps one of the explanations for the lack 
of use of actuarial and structured clinical judgment by French mental health experts 
resides in the fact that the particular legislative context does not give rise to an extensive 
use of dangerousness assessments. There are no peace bonds or recognizance orders in 
France and the imposition of preventive measures such as the mesures de surete is limited 
and exceptional for the most part. In other words, since the imposition of restrictive 
conditions based upon a positive assessment of dangerousness constitutes an exception in 
France, the need for these assessment tools may not be as pronounced. 
141Bebin, supra note 125 at 2, citing Lamanda, Vincent, Amoindrir les risques de recidive criminelle des 
condamnes dangereux (Paris : Presidence de la Republique, 2008), at 15. 
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It appears that French clinicians have not emulated Canada's mental health practitioners 
in their shift towards the use of actuarial and structured clinical judgment in assessing the 
risk of future behaviour. Even so, the risk of false positives in the determination of 
dangerousness remains a common problem that plagues both systems, no matter what 
methodology is preferred. The following paragraphs will examine the problem of false 
positives and false negatives in the use of risk assessment tools. 
vii) The Pitfalls of Erroneous Predictions of Dangerousness: The Case of 
False Positives and False Negatives 
Although some authors have questioned the following assertion, the fact remains that 
clinical predictions of dangerousness are often considered inaccurate and over-
predicting.147 This is particularly true when one reviews the abundant literature on 
prediction of dangerousness: 
... dangerousness is governed by a discretionary system involving probability 
rather than certainty, and estimations based on moral, interpersonal, political, 
and sometimes arbitrary criteria.[...] It is abundantly clear that forensic 
assessments of dangerous behaviour, even under the most advantageous 
conditions, will never approach perfect accuracy.148 [Emphasis added]. 
This is a particularly alarming situation when we consider that judges rely in part on 
clinical assessment of dangerousness to impose recognizance orders, or to designate 
dangerous offenders, which may lead to an indeterminate-indefinite period of 
incarceration. The judiciary appears to be aware of the problems in predicting 
dangerousness, at least in the dangerous offender legislation context. A clear example 
Walker, supra note 36 at 13. See also generally Cocozza , J.J. & Steadman, H.J., "Prediction in 
Psychiatry: an Example of Misplaced Confidence in Experts" (1978) 25 Social Problems 265; Steadman, 
H.J. & Morrissey, J.P.,"The Statistical Prediction of Violent Behaviour: Measuring the Cost of a Public 
Protectionist Versus a Civil Libertarian Model" (1981) 5 Human Behaviour, 263. But see Slobogin, supra 
note 114 at 117. 
148 
Menzies, supra note 111 at 67. 
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where a court has acknowledged the inaccuracy of psychiatric evidence in assessing the 
risk of future behaviour is in the case of R. v. Lyons.14 
Examining the dangerous offender scheme under Part XXIV of the Criminal Code, the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Lyons addressed the false positive issue and described it as 
""[...]a statistical term representing the erroneous over-prediction of future violence".150 
Despite the consequences and reality of false positives, the majority in Lyons held that 
"[fjhis problem does not appear to undermine the utility and fairness of the scheme so 
much as to fortify the conclusion that the procedural protections accorded the offender, 
especially on review, ought to be very rigorous".151 
All in all, complete accuracy appears to be a Utopian dream in the prediction of risk of 
future behaviour. Consequently, false positives constitute an inherent risk to a scheme 
relying on prediction of future behaviour. It is true, however, that new prediction tools, 
such as actuarial and structured clinical judgment, have decreased the risk of false 
positives. Moreover, the risk of false positives can be reduced (but not eradicated) 
through the help of procedural safeguards. MacAlister cautions members of the Canadian 
judiciary in these words: 
Given the grave risk of false positive predictions of dangerousness, members of 
the judiciary must be cautious, particularly when faced with actuarial risk 
assessments, cloaked as they are in the terminology of mathematical precision. 
149 R. v. Lyons, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309, 44 D.L.R. (4th) 193[Lyons cited to S.C.R.], at 365-366. In the landmark 
decision of R. v. Lyons, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that Part XXI (now XXIV) of the Criminal Code 
did not violate the rights guaranteed under section 7, 9,11 and 12 of the Charter. The Supreme Court also 
affirmed the need for dangerous offender legislation which serves the purpose of protecting society. In 
this regard, see Lyons, ibid, at 321-323, 372. See also Martineau, Methodological Prospectus, supra note 
21 at 8. 
150 Lyons, ibid, at 367. See also Martineau, Methodological Prospectus, ibid, at 12. 
151 Lyons, ibid, at 368. 
152 Slobogin, supra note 114 at 114. 
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They must be careful not to lose sight of the fact that probabilistic 
assessments are being made based on group behaviour, while they are 
dealing with real individuals appearing before them. [Emphasis added]. 
The possibility of false positives in prediction of risk of future behaviour inevitably 
brings in the question of false negative. In a false negative scenario, an individual 
assessed as being at a low-risk of committing a crime or being dangerous actually 
commits an offense. As Petrunik explains, false negatives occur when "...individuals [are] 
diagnosed as insufficiently dangerous to confine (or as safe enough to release) ...[and] are 
later convicted of serious acts of personal violence or sexual offences".154 
Petrunik remarks that the media tends to focus on the problem of false negatives, "...often 
dramatically".155 False negatives can, therefore, have a major impact on the public's 
perception of the efficacy of dangerousness legislation and its ability to accurately predict 
a risk of future behaviour. Therefore, false negatives are not viewed favourably by the 
public which generally prefers "...to believe that all dangerous offenders have been 
labelled and sentenced...".156 Consequently, as we will briefly demonstrate later, it should 
come as no surprise that false negatives can have an impact on the subjectivity of 
clinicians when assessing the risk of future behaviour. The "low societal tolerance for 
false negatives", combined with the repercussions linked to the release of an individual 
who later commits a crime, can push a clinician towards over-prediction.157 This 
MacAlister, supra note 37 at 38. 
154 Petrunik, "The Makings of Dangerous Offenders", supra note 43 at 65. 
155 Ibid. 
156 Irving, "Thesis", supra note 48 at 125. 
157 Ibid, at 123. But see Poletiek, Fenna H., "How Psychiatrists and Judges Assess the Dangerousness of 
persons with Mental Illness: An 'Expertise Bias'" (2002) 20:1-2 Behav. Sci. & L. 19 [Poletiek], at 19: [i]n 
assessing the seriousness of the danger, experts tend to be more tolerant with regard to false negatives, 
as the type of behaviour is more familiar to them". 
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situation, coupled with the influences of an adversarial setting, may have detrimental 
effects on the results of a dangerousness assessment of an individual. 
viii) The Various Challenges Faced by Mental Health Professionals in 
Determining Dangerousness 
It could be argued that the objectivity of actuarial and structured clinical judgment offers 
a shelter from critics who argue that clinicians tend to alter their judgment based on 
subjective findings. The "...air of mathematical precision" offered by actuarial and 
structured clinical judgment decreases the subjectivity of the clinician. However, errors 
in the application of these prediction tools can still affect their reliability, and eventually, 
the weight given by courts. For example, in the recent case of Noble v. Teale,15 the 
Quebec Superior Court dismissed the evidence provided by a psychiatrist who had 
misapplied the H.A.R.E. test.160 
The task of mental health professionals in applying prediction of future behaviour tools is 
challenging because of "...definitional problems, the dearth of useful research on 
prediction, unconscious and conscious judgment errors and biases, and the political 
consequences of an erroneous prediction".1 1 The definitional problems that clinicians 
face are amplified by the fact that what constitutes "dangerousness" and a "legally 
relevant risk" is variable depending on the context. Since there is no clear definition, 
there is a risk that "...clinicians may turn to definitions in other areas of statutory or case 
law, or they may apply their own value judgments as to what constitutes dangerous 
behaviour. In either case, they risk failing to address the question the court wants 
158 MacAlister, supra note 37 at 28. 
159 
Noble, supra note 9. 
160 Ibid, at para. 107. 
161 Melton, supra note 113 at 277. 
Ibid. 
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answered". In the case of sections 810.1 and 810.2, it is not clear what legally 
constitutes a risk of dangerousness. The provisions only provide that the court can impose 
a recognizance order if it is "... satisfied by the evidence adduced that the informant has 
reasonable grounds for the fear" that an offense will be committed.164 The type of 
evidence that is to be considered by the court is not prescribed in the legislation. It is, 
therefore, an open invitation for the court to consider any evidence it deems reasonable, 
and clinicians may not have enough guidance. Floud explains the elusiveness of the 
concept of dangerousness and the importance of clinicians' assessments in the context of 
English criminal law: "[i]n short, the concept of dangerousness in English criminal 
justice is prevalent but elusive. It is not used consistently or with any precision and the 
nature of the risk to which it refers is never clearly defined".165 Arguably, the same can 
be said in Canada. All in all, it is important to consider the fact that the difficulties 
associated with defining clearly what constitutes dangerousness in the case of 
recognizance orders is not an isolated problem. Fagan & Guggenheim states the 
following in the context of preventive detention statutes and their lack of definition of 
what constitutes dangerousness: 
Preventive detention involves a short-term prediction of dangerousness, or the 
prediction of some future harm. However, many statutes fail to use precise 
definitions of pre-trial danger; the absence of definitional standards makes it 
difficult to determine what is being prevented, what is the type and magnitude of 
the harm predicted, and what is the predicted level of risk and the rate of that 
harm. The product of these variables constitutes "dangerousness".166 
Ibid. (Footnotes omitted). 
164 See sections 810.1 and 810.2 of the Criminal Code. 
165Floud, Jean, "Dangerousness and Criminal Justice" (1982) 22 Brit. J. Criminology 213, at 215. 
166 Fagan, Jeffrey & Martin Guggenheim, "Preventive Detention and the Judicial Prediction of 
Dangerousness for Juveniles: A Natural Experiment" (1996) 86:2 J. Crim. L. & Criminology, 415, at 419. 
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Despite these difficulties, assessments of dangerousness performed by mental health 
experts constitute relevant evidence for the trier of facts who must determine if a 
preventive measure, such as a recognizance order, should be imposed based on a risk of 
dangerousness. As Parry & Drogin note: "...actuarial data still are likely to be considered 
important sources of evidence for fact finders making dangerousness determinations 
related to bail or sentencing because, although flawed in many ways, it typically 
represents the best predictive information that is available".167 Moreover, in the context 
of dangerous offender legislation, MacAlister observes that courts will rely on actuarial 
tools to assess the risk of dangerousness of an offender and declare them dangerous: "[o]f 
the various DO [Dangerous Offender] applications in which the court refused the DO 
designation and found the offender to be a long-term offender, several involved 
judgments that specifically pointed out a low score on the PCL-R".168 MacAlister adds: 
"[wjhile individual variation among judges exists, there does not appear to be any 
preference regarding risk assessment methodology among most judges. They appear 
equally happy with clinical judgments, actuarial assessments, or some combination in a 
structured clinical judgment".169 Therefore, the results obtained by clinicians in assessing 
the dangerousness of a potential offender can ultimately influence the trier of fact. 
It is also worth pointing out that the unreliability of some forms of prediction of 
dangerousness does not deter the court from hearing testimony from mental health 
experts, especially in the context of an imprecise definition in the law of what constitute 
dangerousness. In this regard, Parry & Drogin note the following: "[rjegardless of the 
167 Parry, John & Eric York Drogin, Mental Disability Law,Evidence and Testimony (Chicago: 
American Bar Association, 2007)[Parry] at 279. 
168 MacAlister, supra note 37 at 31. (Footnotes omitted). 
169 Ibid, at 32. 
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problems inherent in making dangerousness assessments of any kind, courts are likely to 
continue to admit this type of expert testimony, absent a determination that the experts 
lack the proper qualifications or are acting in an unprofessional manner when making 
their assessments".170 
Furthermore, the definition of dangerousness, as it is understood by clinicians, is equally 
applicable to judges who rely on risk assessments tools and expert testimony in imposing 
preventive measures. This contrasts with the insanity defence context in which 
psychiatrists' opinion is not to be taken "blindly", with respect to the possibility that an 
individual may or may not suffer from a "disease of the mind".171 In the insanity defence 
context, the question of the "disease of the mind" is a legal issue surrounded by a history 
of considerable scepticism concerning the adequacy and/or accuracy of expert opinion. 
In the case of dangerousness, while it is true that the court is ultimately responsible for 
imposing preventive measures on potentially dangerous individuals, the fact remains that 
it relies heavily on the evidence provided by mental health experts with respect to the 
dangerousness of an individual. 
Another challenge faced by clinicians specialising in the prediction of risk of future 
behaviour is the large amount of literature on the subject and its complexity. This has 
Parry, supra note 167 at 280. 
171 See section 16 of the Criminal Code which states the following: "16. (1) No person is criminally 
responsible for an act committed or an omission made while suffering from a mental disorder that 
rendered the person incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of the act or omission or of knowing 
that it was wrong". In R. v. Parks [1992] 2 S.C.R. 871, 95 D.L.R. (4th) 27 [Parks cited to S.C.R.], at 899, the 
question of the "disease of the mind" was examined by the Supreme Court of Canada which stated: 
[bjecause "disease of the mind" is a legal concept, a trial judge cannot rely blindly on medical opinion". 
172 See for example R. v. Fontaine, 2004 SCC 27, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 702. 
173 
Melton, supra note 113 at 278. 
53 
proven to be "...a blessing and a curse".174 It has enabled the identification of certain 
characteristics found in potentially dangerous individuals but has also showed serious 
methodological limitations in several studies.175 
Clinicians also face the possibility of errors and biases in their judgment. For example, 
clinicians may forget to take into account factors that are "...known to influence the 
accuracy, or validity, of predicting dangerousness...". Amongst these factors, Campbell 
notes "...the type of violence (e.g., physical assault, sexual assault, homicide); the 
perpetrator's relationship to the victim (e.g., history of violence, mental health issues); 
and the time period of the prediction (e.g., acute danger or chronic danger". 
As pointed out by Melton, some researchers have demonstrated that clinicians may put 
too much emphasis on the nature of the charge in determining dangerousness without an 
adequate rational analysis.177 The stigma attached to a charge for a violent offense may 
subjectively affect the assessment of dangerousness. Other possibilities of errors and 
biases cited by Melton include unfounded correlations between two variables despite 
empirical data to the contrary (i.e. making a deduction that a mentally ill individual is 
violent), and personal biases, due to "...cultural differences between the examining 
clinician and the person being assessed". 
Moreover, as we will see later, procedural characteristics of a particular judicial system 
can also affect a clinician's determination of dangerousness. An adversarial system may 
174 Melton, ibid. 
175 Ibid. 
176 Campbell, Jacquelyn C, ed., Assessing dangerousness: violence by batterers and child abusers, 
2nd ed. (New York : Springer Publishing, 2007) [Campbell], at 9. 
177 Melton, supra note 113 at 278. 
178 Ibid, at 278-279. 
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actually increase the risk of biases in clinical prediction of dangerousness, while an 
investigatory system may actually favour neutrality. The reality of "...collaborative but 
potentially apprehensive relationship" between law and psychology may also affect the 
determination of dangerousness.180 The conservativeness of the law sometimes clashes 
with creativity-driven psychology.181 As Young explains, this situation can prove to be 
particularly problematic in the context of an adversarial system. In that system: 
[a]ttorneys function ... with the obligation to present the best case possible for 
their clients, whereas psychologists function in terms of adequately finding and 
describing the most parsimonious explanation of an individual's symptoms, 
irrespective of the side that has retained them in a legal dispute. Inevitably, the 
psychologist is exposed to biases, and the best manner in dealing with them is to 
conduct an impartial, comprehensive assessment in which she or he evaluates all 
reasonably likely factors that can influence conclusions offered to the court. 
The numerous challenges faced by psychologists in an adversarial system are pointed out 
by Young: "[t]hey need to attempt to remain impartial, evidence-based, and scientific in 
their reasoning and methodology, despite the pushes and pulls from attorneys and a host 
of other biasing factors". As we will examine later, the French investigatory system may 
favour a "collegial" approach among clinicians, thereby reducing biasing factors such as 
pressure from attorneys. 
Young, Gerald, et.al., Causality of Psychological Injury (New York, Springer, 2007) [Young] at 36. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Ibid. Young examines the differences between psychology and law and their potential effects on 
psychological assessment in the judicial context. At 36, Young explains the following: "Haney and Smith 
(2003) differentiate between law and psychology. For example, law is authoritarian and conservative, 
whereas psychology is creative and empirical (data-driven). In seeking facts-truths, the methodology of 
psychology is scientific, but for the law it is adversarial. Psychologists are trained to be objective, but 
lawyers, in their adversarial stance, function from a built-in biased perspective. Law emphasizes certainty, 
predictability, and finality; psychology deals in probability, and attaching qualifiers and conditionals to 
statements. To better deal with legal matters, psychologists need to adhere to the standards and norms 
of their discipline, "not the dictates of the court" (Haney & Smith, 2003, p.198). Miller (2003) concurs that 
psychologists may be subject to the biases of the side that retains their services". 
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Finally, Melton points out the negative impact of an erroneous prediction by clinicians, 
especially in the context of false negative: "[i]f the client is released on the basis of the 
clinician's prediction and subsequently commits a violent act, the clinician can expect 
extensive negative publicity in connection with media coverage...".183 On the other hand, 
the possibility of false positives has fewer consequences for the clinician as Melton 
remarks: 
..., there are typically no legal or reputational consequences if a client is predicted 
to be dangerous, whether the client is subsequently confined or released (at least if 
it is a court that ignores the clinical prediction). The obvious incentive created by 
these facts is to lean in the direction of a "dangerous" finding in borderline 
184 
cases. 
On this note, it is important to underline the fact that in the case of false positives and 
preventive detention, there is virtually no way of determining whether a prediction of 
dangerousness was accurate or not since the potential offender is not released into 
society. In that case, the potential offender cannot "test" the reliability of the prediction. 
Thus, clinicians risk falling into the "over-predicting trap" when assessing the risk of 
future behaviour due to political and social pressures.185 In the end, it may be argued that 
the various challenges faced by mental health practitioners in the prediction of risk of 
future behaviour, combined with the problems of reliability of assessment tools, pose a 
further challenge to the judiciary who bears the responsibility of weighing the evidence. 
Melton, supra note 113 at 279. (Footnotes omitted). See also Irving, "Thesis", supra note 48 at 123, 
citing Grant, L. "Legislating public safety: the business of risk" (1998) 3:2 Can. Crim. L. Rev.177. But see 
Poletiek, supra note 157, at 19. 
184 Melton, ibid. (Footnotes omitted). 
185 Irving, "Thesis", supra note 48 at 123. 
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Because of these challenges, the quality of the evidence presented by mental health 
professionals can vary and this inevitably affects the trier of facts. 
In the next paragraphs, we will look at some of the standards used in Canadian and 
French criminal courts to assess dangerousness. As we will demonstrate, the Canadian 
legislator has given more flexibility to judges in imposing various conditions on 
potentially dangerous individuals. In France, while there are no recognizance orders, the 
legislator has, nevertheless, enacted preventive measures, or pre-emptive legislation, 
aimed at reducing the risk of dangerousness of offenders. For example, under the 
restrictive conditions that can be imposed with a social-judicial probation, a French judge 
is bound by the conditions enumerated in the Code penal. Therefore, French judges have 
virtually no flexibility for imposing restrictive conditions beyond what has been provided 
for by the legislation. In contrast, the Canadian scheme appears to rely on jurisprudence 
to define the limits of available restrictive measures under recognizance orders. 
ix) Judicial Standards and Methodology in Assessing Dangerousness 
a) The Canadian Approach 
While there are unresolved issues in the determination of dangerousness among clinical 
experts, the truth of the matter is that Canadian courts must assess dangerousness during 
dangerous offender designation and recognizance order hearings. 
With respect to peace bonds and recognizance orders, they constitute exceptions to the 
underlying principles of punishment as a response to a past behaviour in Canadian 
criminal law, to the extent that they restrict liberties based on a risk of future 
186 Melton, supra note 113 at 301. 
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behaviour.187 The analysis and understanding of the proclivity to commit a dangerous 
crime by a particular individual, therefore, becomes of utmost importance for a judge 
weighing protection of the society on one hand, and civil liberties on the other. 
The inability to predict a risk of future behaviour with complete accuracy has not 
hindered the development of jurisprudence supporting dangerqusness legislation, such as 
dangerous offender legislation or recognizance orders under sections 810.1 and 810.2 of 
the Criminal Code. In fact, courts consider psychiatric evidence as "...probably relatively 
superior in this regard to the evidence of other clinicians and lay persons". Slobogin 
1 &Q 
argues that in court, prediction testimony can be "probative and helpful". He explains 
that "[i]t is probative whenever it is derived from a methodology that produces 
predictions that are better than chance, and it is helpful whenever it is based on the 
literature about violence risk and avoids ultimate issue language".190 
Canadian courts are aware that assessments of future behaviour by mental health 
professionals are not entirely reliable, and, are flawed in some respects.191 However, the 
Supreme Court of Canada considers that the unreliability of the evidence affects the 
weight of psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness, "[rather than]...the 
admissibility of such evidence". In the words of the Supreme Court of Canada, "[t]he 
test for admissibility is relevance, not infallibility". In the case of R. v. Jones, [1994] 2 
187 MacAlister, supra note 37 at 20. 
188 Lyons, supra note 149 at 366. See also Menzies, supra note 111 at 66, and Martineau, Methodological 
Prospectus, supra note 21 at 12. 
189 Slobogin,supro note 114 at 115. 
190 Ibid. 
191 Lyons, supra note 149 at para. 366. 
192 R. v. Langevin 1984 CarswellOnt 50, n C.C.C. (3d) 336, Lacourciere J.A. at 355 cited in Lyons, ibid, at 
366. 
193 Lyons, ibid, at para. 366. 
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S.C.R. 229, the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed the importance of psychiatric 
evidence for the determination of risk of future behaviour in the context of dangerous 
offender legislation.1 4 
In terms of that legislation, the prevailing rule in assessing the dangerousness of an 
individual is a "...likelihood of specified future conduct occurring".195 As we will explain 
later, judges are also influenced by the same rule when determining the potential 
dangerousness of an individual under a section 810 recognizance order.196 It is, therefore, 
worthwhile to discuss briefly the state of the law in terms of determination of 
dangerousness in the context of a dangerous offender designation, as this has direct 
consequences on recognizance orders. 
In the context of Dangerous Offender ("DO") legislation, MacAlister points out as 
follows: 
"[t]he statutory scheme for DO declarations requires a judge to determine a 
"likelihood" of future risk to re-offend. To most of us, likelihood is a 
mathematically linked concept. Something is "likely" if it is "probable" that it 
will occur. Probability speaks to mathematical chance or certainty, which is 
typically a greater than even chance that something will occur". 
In the landmark decision of Lyons, the Supreme Court examined the use of psychiatric 
evaluations and the required standard of proof in the determination of dangerousness 
under the dangerous offender legislation. It explained the accepted standard as being a 
likelihood of future risk in these terms: 
R.v.Jones, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 229,114 D.L.R. (4th) 645 [Jones cited to S.C.R.] at para.46-47. 
Lyons, supra note 149 at 364-365. 
Budreo, supra note 8 at para. 43-44. 
MacAlister, supra note 37 at 29. 
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...The criminal law must operate in a world governed by practical considerations 
rather than abstract logic and, as a matter of practicality, the most that can be 
established in a future context is a likelihood of certain events occurring. [...] 
[...] It seems to me that a "likelihood" of specified future conduct occurring is the 
finding of fact required to be established; it is not, at one and the same time, the 
means of proving that fact. Logically, it seems clear to me that an individual 
can be found to constitute a threat to society without insisting that this 
requirefs] the court to assert an ability to predict the future. I do not find it 
illogical for a court to assert that it is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
test of dangerousness has been met, that there exists a certain potential for harm. 
That this is really only an apparent paradox is aptly captured by Morden J. in R. v. 
Knight (1975), 27 C.C.C. (2d) 343 (Ont. H.C.), at p. 356: 
I wish to make it clear that when I refer to the requisite standard of proof 
respecting likelihood I am not imposing on myself an obligation to find it 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt that certain events will happen in the 
future—this, in the nature of things would be impossible in practically 
every case-but I do refer to the quality and strength of the evidence of past 
and present facts together with the expert opinion thereon, as an existing 
basis for finding present likelihood of future conduct.198 [Emphasis 
added]. 
Therefore, Canadian courts consider "the likelihood of future risk of behaviour" when 
assessing the potential dangerousness of an offender, in the context of dangerous offender 
legislation. Despite the qualification in Lyons, MacAlister found that "[i]n several cases, 
judges seemed to adopt a mathematical approach to the DO requirement of "likely" to re-
offend violently. They appeared to equate likelihood to re-offend with "probability" or a 
greater than 50 percent chance".199 
Lyons, supra note 149 at 364-365. 
199 MacAlister, supra note 37 at 32. On this note, MacAlister, ibid, also points out at 32 that "[t]he 
following cases appeared to involve judges who were moved to declare an offender dangerous, at least in 
part because of a risk assessment showing a greater than 50 percent chance of violent re-offending: R. v. 
L.C.W., [2000] S.J. No. 422 (Q.B.); R. v. Berikoff, [2000] B.C.J. No. 1373 (S.C.); R. v. L.D.A., [1999] B.C.J. No. 
1781 (S.C.); and R. v. R.E.L, [1998] B.C.J. No. 1440 (P.C.). 
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MacAlister remarks that most judges will declare an individual dangerous if an actuarial 
tool, such as the PCL-R, demonstrates a "high risk to offend".200 While it appears that the 
PCL-R risk assessment tool is often used in court in the case of a dangerous offender 
designation, judges "...appear to be equally happy with clinical judgments, actuarial 
assessments, or some combination in a structured clinical judgment". 
In fact, according to MacAlister, judges will "...work with whatever information is 
provided to them" when assessing the potential dangerousness of an individual under the 
909 
dangerous offender legislation. 
The above risk assessment tools are relied upon by judges across the nation. The next 
logical question is to determine which tests courts apply when determining the risk of 
future harm and reasonableness of a fear under a recognizance order application pursuant 
to sections 810.1 and 810.2 application. 
As we will see, recognizance orders under these sections require the judge to assess, on a 
balance of probability, the reasonableness of an informant's fear of future harm by a 
particular offender. In other words, what the judge is asked to do is to predict the 
likelihood that the individual will commit a sexual offense (section 810.1 of the Criminal 
Code) or a serious personal injury on another person (section 810.2 of the Criminal 
Code). Moreover, while it could be argued that sections 810.1 and 810.2 are not 
considered as offences, but rather as preventive measures falling under the summary 
conviction part of the Criminal Code, the reality is that these provisions were created to 
Ibid, at 32. 
Ibid. 
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target past offenders who are being released from prison but still constitute a potential 
danger to society.203 In these cases, it is argued that judges will often have in hand a 
multitude of clinical assessments on the risk of future violent behaviour of the individual, 
due to past criminal activities and time served in the penitentiary system. Consequently, it 
is argued that in most cases, judges will rely on risk assessment tools that were applied to 
the individual while he or she was sojourning in the penitentiary, before determining 
whether or not a recognizance order should be imposed. 
In this regard, it should be noted that the two most important cases dealing with 
recognizance orders under sections 810.1 and 810.2, namely Budreo and Teale, clearly 
illustrate the use by judges of all information available in determining the offender's 
proclivity for committing crimes in the future, including risk assessment tools normally 
used in dangerous offender designation. These cases, along with other relevant ones 
dealing with sections 810.1 and 810.2 recognizance orders, will be examined in the next 
chapter. 
b) The French Approach 
In the context of determination of dangerousness by the French courts, one could argue 
that the most fundamental difference between the Canadian and French system is the fact 
that members of the French judiciary benefit from a concerted approach of various 
mental health professionals. The Loi sur la retention de surete, which will be examined 
later, provides the foundation for a system of determination of dangerousness. This 
system is primarily based on an assessment of the particular risk of future dangerousness 
203 In Budreo, supra note 8, at para. 60, the Court of Appeal explained that: "...s. 810 is in Part XXVII 
dealing with summary convictions". 
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of an individual by a multidisciplinary committee. As we will see, the committee 
formulates a recommendation to a panel of judges who must determine whether the 
individual can be released into society after completing his mandatory prison sentence; or 
whether he must be imposed a mesure de suivi socio-judiciaire (social-judicial probation) 
or if he must be kept in a retention de surete. In the case of a social-judicial probation, the 
Court can impose restrictive conditions upon the potentially dangerous individual. As for 
a retention de surete, it offers a social-judicial approach, coupled with various treatment 
options, in a specially created "hospital-prison" with the objective of lowering the 
particular dangerousness of the individual to acceptable levels.204 
French judges are, therefore, not confronted with potentially biased opinions from mental 
health professionals retained by one side or the other in a case, as it is arguably the case 
in an adversarial setting. However, as we explained earlier, risks assessment techniques 
used by French mental health professionals to determine dangerousness are not without 
flaws, and in most cases, still rely on unstructured clinical judgment. 
Before delving into a historical and critical analysis of the development of peace bonds 
and recognizance orders in Canadian criminal law, and similar preventive measures in 
France, it is imperative to take a brief look at some of the key differences and similarities 
between the Canadian adversarial system and the French investigatory system. It is 
argued that the procedural differences between the two systems have an impact on the 
determination of dangerousness. 
See generally the lot sur la retention de surete, supra note 3. 
Bebin, supra note 125. 
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CHAPTER VI - CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CANADIAN ADVERSARIAL 
SYSTEM AND THE FRENCH INVESTIGATORY SYSTEM AND THEIR 
RESPECTIVE INFLUENCES ON THE DETERMINATION OF 
DANGEROUSNESS 
i) A Brief Overview of the Adversarial and the French Investigatory 
Models 
A comparative analysis focusing on procedural differences in the treatment of potentially 
dangerous individuals would not be complete without exploring the chief differences 
between the adversarial system and the French investigatory system, and their respective 
influences on the adjudication process. It is argued that different processes of 
adjudicating and finding the truth can have an influence on the determination of 
dangerousness; thus, a comparative analysis of these two systems is deemed necessary. 
Before venturing into the potential influences of each system on the determination of 
dangerousness in Canada and in France, it is important to define their respective 
characteristics. At the outset, it is worth pointing out that both the adversarial system and 
the French investigatory system borrow and incorporate features from one another's 
system.206 For example, Hodgson notes that the French system: 
...is better described as 'mixed', rather than 'inquisitorial' in that it retains some 
of the inquisitorial principles and structure, but is not conducted entirely in secret 
such that there is some opportunity for parties to participate. 
Jacqueline Hodgson, "The Investigation and Prosecution of Terrorist Suspects in France, An 
Independent Report Commissioned by the Home Office" Security Home Office UK (November 2006), 
online: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1321868> [Hodgson], at 8. Hodgson notes that there is no "pure" 
adversarial or inquisitorial system. As we will see later, the term "inquisitorial" is often use by common 
law scholars to describe the French system, but an appropriate terminology would rather describe is as a 
"judge centered investigatory system". 
207 Ibid, at 9. See also Delmas-Marty, Mireille & J.R. Spencer, eds., European criminal procedure 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002)[Delmas-Marty], at 11 where the authors describe briefly 
the evolution of the French procedural scheme in these terms: "[t]o the French, this was not a return to 
the old inquisitorial system, but the introduction of a new system that was neither accusatorial nor 
inquisitorial, and which they called (and still call) "mixed". 
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Hodgson also explains that recent changes in French criminal methodology have given 
the defence "...a greater role in both the pre-trial and trial procedure". This shift 
towards a system that incorporates adversarial procedures has been influenced by the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. (ECtHR) and by putting greater 
emphasis on the "principle of contradictoire"}m The incorporation of adversarial 
elements into the non-adversarial model has been observed not only in France, but also 
throughout Continental Europe.210 However, despite the metamorphosis of the French 
system into a "mixed system", some common law authors have argued that the defence 
still has a diminished role in the French investigatory model. Despite the incorporation 
of elements from both models, it is argued that the process of adjudicating and the 
determination of dangerousness are clearly influenced by the procedural differences 
between the two systems. 
It is worth pointing out that the literature often identifies two principal models of 
adjudication, namely the "adversarial" model, which influences the Canadian 
adjudication process212 and the "inquisitorial" model, which can be found in continental 
Europe. The common law doctrine sometimes refers to the French system as being 
208 Hodgson, ibid, at 9. 
209 Ibid, at 9. 
210 Van Koppen, Peter J. & Steven D. Penrod, eds., Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Justice: 
Psychological Perspectives on Criminal Justice Systems, Perspectives in Law and Psychology vol. 17, (New 
York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2003)[Van Koppen], at 1. 
211 Hodgson, supra note 206 at 10. 
212 Cochran, Doug, Mary Ann Kelly & Michael Gulcyz, Rules of Evidence: A Practical Approach 
(Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2007)[Cochran], at 6: "[i]n Canada, as in most other countries whose legal 
system is based on the British common-law system, the judicial process is adversarial". 
213 See Block, Micheal K. etal., "An Experimental Comparison of Adversarial versus Inquisitorial 
Procedural Regimes" (2000) 2:1 Am. L. & Econ. Rev.170 [Block], at 171. See also Hodgson, supra note 206, 
at 8. For a discussion on the characteristics of an adversarial system and a non-adversarial system, see 
also Elisabetta Grande, "Dances of Justice: Tango and Rumba in Comparative Criminal Procedure" (2009) 
9:4 Global Jurist(Frontiers), Article 6, available online: <http://www.bepress.com/gj/vol9/iss4/art6>. 
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"inquisitorial" in nature. However, the modern French system is better described as being 
a "judge centered investigatory system" rather than purely "inquisitorial". This 
description circumvents more appropriately the negative connotation associated with the 
x . . . 214 
Inquisition. 
In this regard, it is worth pointing out that the early days of the "inquisitorial" procedure 
in France were marked by numerous abuses of process and the fact that the accused had 
virtually no rights while being potentially subjected to torture. As Stefani & Levasseur 
points out, the early form of the French "inquisitorial" model was not even able to 
adequately serve the defense interest of society. While there is no doubt that the French 
system can no longer be qualified as being purely "inquisitorial" in nature, some 
procedural aspects have been influenced by the inquisitorial model. Thus, the following 
paragraphs will examine some of the characteristics of the adversarial model and the 
inquisitorial model in general, as both have had influences on the procedural system of 
Canada and France. Subsequently, some of the particularities of the French investigatory 
model will be examined in more detail. The term "investigatory" system will be used to 
describe the modern procedural model in France. 
Generally, in an adversarial model, emphasis is put on "...the contesting parties' 
917 
autonomy and control of legal proceedings". An adversarial system also "...puts 
See Guinchard, Serge & Jacques Buisson, Procedure Penale (Paris: Litec, 2000) [Guinchard], at 44, 
where it is noted that the Inquisition was originally founded in 1231 as an "ecclesiastic tribunal" for the 
repression of heresy. 
215 Stefani, G. & G. Levasseur, Procedure Penale, 9th ed., Tome II (Paris: Dalloz, 1975) [Stefani & 
Levasseur], at 57. 
216 Ibid, at 58. 
217 Block, supra note 213 at 171. 
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emphasis on public procedures [and] oral hearings...".218 In an adversarial setting, the 
judge hears the evidence as gathered and presented by both parties. The judge does not 
participate actively in the search for evidence. 
On the other hand, in a non-adversarial model, the judge is at the center of the 
investigation process. Stefani & Levasseur notes that the ancient inquisitorial models 
favoured a secret and non-contradictory procedure.219 As for Elliot, she explains that an 
"inquisitorial" system 
...is characterised by a process that is not open to the public, the parties do not 
automatically have a right to be heard, the judges play an important and active 
role in collecting the evidence and an emphasis is placed on collecting written 
documentation to prove or disprove the case. 
Stefani & Levasseur also describes the judge as being a central actor in finding the truth 
and who will take all the measures to find it. Furthermore, as explained by Dammer et 
al., a non-adversarial model is also generally characterised by the emphasis put on pre-
trial proceedings (including investigation and interrogation) "...that are designed to 
ensure that no innocent person is brought to trial".222The downside, as identified by 
Stefani & Levasseur, is the fact that the rights of the defense at the pre-trial level were in 
the past often limited.223 In fact, the older inquisitorial procedure often led to the non 
218 Elliott, Catherine, French Criminal Law (Uffculme: Willan Publishing, 2001)[Elliot], at 13. 
219 Stefani & Levasseur, supra note 215 at 52-53. 
220 Elliot, supra note 218, at 13. 
221 Stefani & Levasseur, supra note 215 at 53. 
222 Dammer, R., Erika Fairchild & Jay S. Albanese, Comparative Criminal Justice Systems, 3rd 
ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2006)[Dammer et. al], at 143. 
223 Stefani & Levasseur, supra note 215 at 53. 
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respect of the rights of a suspect and, in some cases, led to the condemnation of innocent 
individuals.224 
Furthermore, authors have identified the advantage of the adjudication process in an 
adversarial system as being "...the superior information of the parties". On the other 
hand, they have also identified "neutrality" in the process as an advantage of the 
"inquisitorial" system.226 We will see that in the latter case, neutrality has played a role 
in shaping the determination of dangerousness process in the French investigatory system 
of France. 
In the next paragraphs, the French investigatory system will be examined in more detail 
to determine if there are any other features that might influence the neutrality of experts 
in assessing dangerousness and, ultimately, the court's decision. As will be explained, the 
role of the French magistrate is to gather evidence and pass judgment. Therefore, he or 
she does not necessarily have to hear evidence from opposing parties which could be 
tainted with bias. 
ii) The Features of the French Investigatory System 
A chief difference between the Canadian adversarial system and the investigatory system 
of France is the role of the judge, or the examining magistrate (magistraf), who conducts 
Guinchard, supra note 214 at 42. This is a flaw which is also characteristic of the adversarial system in 
Canada as the series of inquiries into wrongful convictions, such as in the cases of Donald Marshall Jr. and 
Thomas Sophonow attest. See for example "Canada's wrongful convictions", CBC News (23 October 
2009), online: CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2009/08/06/f-wrongfully-convicted.html>. 
225 Froeb, Luke M. & Bruce H. Kobayashi, "Evidence Production in Adversarial vs. Inquisitorial 
Regimes" (2001) 70:2 Economics Letters, 267, available online through Social Science Research Network 
Electronic Paper Collection: SSRN< http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=179182>, [Froeb cited 
to SSRN], at 1. 
226 Froeb, ibid. 
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the investigation and gathers the evidence.227 Hodgson explains that the magistral has the 
public interest in mind and "...is charged with searching for the truth". 
The magistrat uses neutral investigative procedures for "...gathering evidence which 
might exculpate as well as incriminate the suspect".229 This is a clear distinction from the 
adversarial setting in which opposing parties present their most favourable evidence to an 
impartial judge.230 However, the role of the magistrate has been criticised due to "...the 
secrecy and length of the proceedings, the sweeping powers enjoyed by the magistrates, 
and cases of abuse of powers".231 When considering the determination of dangerousness 
made by a French magistrate, it is important to keep in mind that they are influenced by 
investigatory principles, such as participating actively in the process of finding the truth. 
iii) Other General Characteristics of an Adversarial and Investigatory 
Systems that May Influence a Determination of Dangerousness 
There are other characteristics that must be taken into account when comparing the 
adversarial and non-adversarial regime such as the French investigatory system, 
especially with respect to how the court gathers the information. In an adversarial model, 
which favours cross-examination of witnesses, it has been argued that the "...setting 
contributes to the concealment of information".232 The adversarial system divides parties 
227 Investigation powers are usually given to members of the judiciary in France. In this regard, Hodgson, 
supra note 206 at 13-14, notes that members of the judiciary are composed of several actors: "[i]n France, 
..., the judicial function is a more broadly defined concept, encompassing as it does, the trial judge, the 
juge d'instruction and the procureur. These three are all magistrats, referred to collectively as the 
magistrature". Hodgson, ibid, remarks, however, that the investigative role of the magistrate has been 
progressively shifted to the police, "..., under the supervision of either the procureur or they'uge 
d'instruction". 
228 Hodgson, ibid, at 10. 
229 Ibid. 
230 Cochran, supra note 212 at 6. 
231 Dammer, supra note 222 at 146. 
232 See Roger C. Park, Adversarial Influences on the Interrogation of Trial Witnesses in Van Koppen, supra 
note 210 at 152. 
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and forces them to present their most favourable evidence. As Park notes, witnesses who 
are called upon by the parties are, therefore, prepared for direct examination by the 
lawyers and this situation "... creates subtle incentives for otherwise neutral witnesses to 
be part of the team".233 
On the other hand, a non-adversarial model relies on a "neutral investigation and 
interrogation" of the witness, thereby minimising the risk of bias with expert witnesses.234 
Courts generally rely on pre-screened and competent experts who have been identified by 
the court as such, and not by the parties.235 In this regard, article 157 of the French Code 
de procedure penale prescribes the following: 
Experts are chosen from the natural persons or legal persons registered either on a 
national list drafted by the office of the Court of Cassation, or on one of the lists 
drafted by the appeal courts under the conditions provided for by Law no.71-498 
of 29 June 1971 relating to judicial experts . 
In exceptional cases, the courts may by means of a reasoned decision choose 
experts not registered on any of these lists. 
Arguably, this national list of experts favours the neutrality and independence of expert 
237 
testimony. 
Furthermore, a non-adversarial system permits experts to view the evidence from every 
angle. In this regard, Saks explains that: "[e]xpert witnesses are more able to gain all (not 
half) of the picture of the evidence in the case, and give all of the evidence they feel is 
important to resolving the issues before the court (rather than being limited to answering 
233 Ibid, at 152-153. At 152, Parks, ibid., notes that the preparation of "the witness for direct 
examination...facilitates the slanting of testimony so that it reveals information helpful to the proponent 
while concealing information helpful to the cross-examiner". 
234/b/d. 
235 Ibid, at 240. 
236 See Article 157 of the Code de procedure penale. See also Delma-Marty, supra note 207 at 260. 
237 See Micheal J. Saks, Expert Witnesses in Europe and the United States, [Saks],in Van Koppen, supra 
note 210 at 240. 
70 
the questions posed by partisan counsel)". Saks also points out that a non-adversarial 
model favours the accountability of expert witnesses to their own field, "...rather than to 
police or parties or lawyers...".239 
In assessing dangerousness, mental health experts play a crucial role in influencing 
members of the judiciary in their decision of imposing restrictive conditions upon the 
liberties of a potentially dangerous individual. While it is true that some predictions of 
dangerousness remain inaccurate, it is argued that at the very least, the procedural setting 
should favour the objectivity and neutrality of mental health experts in their assessment 
and subsequent testimony in court. For the reason described above, it is argued that the 
French investigatory system favours the objectivity of mental health experts by stripping 
away the use of conflicting evidence and the indirect necessity to answer the needs of the 
party they represent. 
An adversarial system can have several pitfalls, including the risk that an expert may be 
tempted to tweak his or her opinion to satisfy the parties' overall position before the court 
from fear of not being hired again by the party. Kaye et al. asserts that "[a]t the extreme, 
expert witnesses may go beyond shading their testimony to fit the side who pays 
them".240 In such a system, a party can canvass several experts and only retain the one 
who sounds likely to be sympathetic. Of course, no system can eliminate the possibility 
of biased opinion given by experts. However, based on the above, it appears that a non-
238 ibid. 
239 ibid. 
240 Kaye, David H., David E. Bernstein & Jennifer L. Mnookin, The New Wigmore, A Treatise on 
Evidence (New York: Aspen Publishers, 2004) [Kayes], at 342. Kaye et al, ibid, at 330 also notes some of 
the "..., most frequently heard criticisms" about the use of experts include the following: "...[they] are 
unduly partisan, identifying too strongly with the parties who pay their bills and shading their testimony 
accordingly....,[and] [attorneys choose those experts with effective courtroom demeanor and a 
willingness to testify favorably, rather than those who are most knowledgeable or most evenhanded...". 
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adversarial system minimises that risk. All in all, the procedural setting of an 
investigatory system is important to take into consideration, especially when most of the 
evidence given is based on an imprecise science. It is argued that the procedural setting 
can limit and control the possibility of subjectivity while emphasising neutrality. 
iv) The Influence of Each Procedural Model on Scientific Evidence 
When determining dangerousness*, judges in both the Canadian adversarial and the 
French investigatory systems have the difficult task of assessing the risk that a particular 
individual may pose to society. As explained in the previous chapter, tests administered 
by mental health professionals involved in the assessment of risk of future behaviour are 
far from faultless. Furthermore, despite improving techniques, the assessment of a future 
risk of behaviour remains a controversial procedure. Yet, members of the judiciary have 
to weigh the evidence and decide on its merit before reaching conclusions about the 
potential dangerousness of an offender. 
The procedural scheme, whether adversarial or investigatory in nature, can influence the 
determination of dangerousness achieved through the evidence from mental health 
professionals. In an adversarial model, it can be argued that the judge must surmount an 
additional obstacle when weighing the evidence. Traditionally, in an adversarial model, 
"[t]he purpose of expert testimony is to provide the trier of fact with useful, relevant 
information".241 In some instances, however, the judge must weigh "...conflicting 
evidence of partisan experts". In the case of conflicting psychiatric and psychological 
evidence, judges are therefore confronted "...with an often difficult, sometimes a virtually 
Kaye, ibid, at 2. 
242 McKillop, Bron, Anatomy of a French Murder (Sydney: Hawkins Press, 1997)[McKillop], at 101. 
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impossible, job to do in deciding scientific issues on the evidence before them". 
Furthermore, as noted by Frankel, "[c]ourts are increasingly faced with litigation that 
presents complex issues of science and technology... In light of this increasingly complex 
litigation, questions have been raised about the ability of judges or juries to make 
reasoned decisions".244 This difficulty in dealing with expert evidence is metaphorically 
evoked by Kaye et al. who cite this passage found in a legal journal: "...[t]he summoning 
of expert witnesses by plaintiff and defendant, like the collision of opposing rays of light, 
ends only in darkness".245 
Moreover, in an adversarial and non-adversarial system, members of the judiciary must 
rely on fields of knowledge which develop independently from the system.246 For 
example, it could be argued that the development of risk of future behaviour tests, such as 
the VRAG, have been developed by actors outside of the judiciary; namely, mental health 
professionals with clinical purposes in mind. Members of the judiciary in an adversarial 
system rely on those tests to issue recognizance orders and to assess the potential 
dangerousness of an individual. If there are inconsistencies or problems in the reliability 
of those tests, lawyers should pinpoint those flaws to the court. However, lawyers and 
judges do not always possess sufficient knowledge on controversial developments in 
certain fields. In this regard, Saks points out that one of the major weaknesses of the 
adversarial model is the following: 
243 McKillop, ibid. See also for example the case of R. v. Fontaine, supra note 172, where the Supreme 
Court of Canada examined the question of mental disorder automatism and the appropriate evidential 
burden. 
244 Mark S. Frankel, "The Role of Science in Making Good Decisions" (10 June 1998), online: 
American Association for the Advancement of Science, Testimony before the House Committee on 
Science <http://www.aaas.org/spp/sfrl/projects/testim/mftest.htm>. On this note, arguably, judges in a 
non-adversarial setting also face "increasingly complex litigation". 
245 Kayes, supra note 240 at 336, citing Juries of Experts, 5 Alb. L.J. 227 (1872). 
246 Saks, in Van Koppen , supra note 210 at 236. 
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If a field falls short of the law's expectations, the system assumes that attorneys 
motivated to win will draw that failing to the attention of the court. But most 
lawyers have terribly limited knowledge of most fields, which puts them in poor 
position to raise such challenges. To be fair, how can lawyers or judges or anyone 
be sufficiently knowledgeable about a multitude of fields that they can point out 
947 
the weaknesses of those fields over the protestations of asserted experts? 
Therefore, an adversarial system affects "...the capability of the attorneys—both 
prosecutors and defence counsel—to present and to attack scientific evidence". 
In an adversarial setting, while it might be assumed that in theory, each party is equal and 
is competing in a neutral arena,249 the reality is that criminal defendants are often at a 
disadvantage when confronting the resource rich prosecution. Once again, this problem 
is clearly illustrated by Saks: 
Few defendants have comparable experts of their own to double check, detect 
errors, and challenge bad science or erroneous applications or interpretations—all 
of the theory of the adversary process expects and intends will happen. But 
without such resources on both sides, it cannot. 
On this issue, the advantage of the French investigatory model is evident given that the 
judge or the magistrate conducts the investigation and directs the inquiry. However, the 
disadvantage of such a model becomes the question of impartiality of the judge who "... 
must also balance previous knowledge gained by the investigation that he or she guided, 
with the need to retain impartiality".252 
247 Ibid, at 236-237. 
248 Ibid, at 237. Arguably, in a non-adversarial system, the judge faces the same challenges. 
249 Hodgson, supra note 206 at 8, explains the following: "[adversarial procedure 
assumes a broad equality between the opposing parties - prosecution and defence-each of whom is 
responsible for gathering evidence to support their case and advocating it before a neutral judge". 
250 Saks, in Van Koppen, supra note 210 at 239. 
251lbid. 
252 Dammer, supra note 222 at 143. 
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Finally, another disadvantage to the adversarial model with respect to the treatment of 
scientific evidence, and identified by Saks, is the "distortion of science" by interested 
parties. Scientific evidence can be distorted when emphasis is put on one opposing view 
rather than the other.253 In other words, when opposing parties present evidence to the 
judge, they will generally agree on certain facts and have diverging views on others. For 
example, in the case of risks of future behaviour tests, opposing counsel and expert 
witnesses in an adversarial setting may agree that actuarial predictions are superior to 
unstructured clinical judgement in terms of reliability, but disagree on the interpretation 
given to test results. Emphasis may be put on certain technical aspects of a test in order to 
favour the respective position of the party. Saks describes the distortion of scientific 
evidence by distributing the facts of a case on a continuum (agreed facts are in the middle 
and opposing facts are at the opposite ends of the continuum): 
Different fact-assembling procedures will draw from different parts of that 
distribution. The adversary system will emphasize the tails of such a distribution 
to the extent that it is advantageous to the parties to take opposing positions on 
scientific propositions (Saks & Van Duizend, 1983). This contrasts sharply with 
systems that seek consensus among those holding diverse views (e.g., medical 
consensus conferences). Those systems tend to draw from the center of the 
information distribution posited above.254 
On this particular issue, the French investigatory model looks advantageous. As will be 
demonstrated in Chapter VIII, the "collegial" approach used by mental health experts in 
the French model when assessing dangerousness, favours a consensus. Furthermore, it 
could be argued that consensus among the experts will render the judge's task easier in 
determining dangerousness. In this regard, McKillop explains that: 
253 Saks,in Van Koppen, supra note 210 at 239. 
254 Ibid, at 239. 
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The French system of official, essentially neutral, experts allows those issues 
to be resolved by those better qualified to do so, preserving to the accused the 
right to a counter-expertise but aiming, in the event of a difference of expert 
opinion, at an eventual consensus among the experts. The logic of the 
adversary system as regards lay witnesses does not necessarily entail the same 
treatment of expert witnesses.255 [Emphasis added]. 
However, in a non-adversarial setting, the judge must "gather evidence for himself, 
rather than "...rely on the reports of interested parties", which could arguably prove to be 
a tedious task. 256 
These characteristics have to be taken into account when comparing procedural 
differences in the determination of dangerousness in France and Canada, because they 
can influence how the evidence is treated in court. 
In the next section, the analysis will focus on the development of peace bonds and 
recognizance orders in Canadian criminal law, as well as similar preventive measures in 
France. As will be explained, these preventive measures constitute great examples of the 
state's willingness to control dangerousness and the risk of future behaviour. Thus, they 
are ideal for a comparative analysis, especially when we consider that these measures are 
controversial in nature and could prove to be detrimental to upholding fundamental 
principles of justice. 
McKillop, supra note 242 at 101. 
Froeb, supra note 225 at 1-2. 
76 
CHAPTER VII - PREVENTIVE MEASURES: THE CASE OF PEACE BONDS 
AND RECOGNIZANCE ORDERS IN CANADIAN CRIMINAL LAW 
i) A Brief Historical Overview Of Peace Bonds Provisions and 
Recognizance Orders in Canadian Criminal Law 
Peace bonds provisions and high risk judicial restraint orders (or recognizance orders) are 
generally available in the Criminal Code under Section 810.257 For ease of reference, the 
full text of section 810 is included in Appendix A of the present thesis. Peace bonds 
provisions under section 810 are normally "...used to protect an identified victim, a 
person already harmed, from further harm where evidence points to the likelihood of 
danger to the victim from continuing contact with another person". Generally 
speaking, recognizance orders under sections 810.1 and 810.2 are similar but were 
enacted to target sexual and violent offenders respectively. 
However, there are differences between peace bonds and recognizance orders. The main 
difference can be attributed to "...the group of likely victims and the breadth of 
restrictions that may be imposed" under recognizance orders.259 Section 810 is limited to 
identifiable parties, normally two known individuals. It allows for an individual to 
personally seek the court's protection against another potentially dangerous individual. 
By contrast, sections 810.1 and 810.2 are really remedies emanating from public law, 
since these sections have been created to allow any person to apply for a recognizance 
order on behalf of another individual who might be at risk. For example, in essence, 
section 810.1 provides for the protection of children under the age of 16, while section 
257 It is worth pointing out that there are other sections in the Criminal Code that allow for the imposition 
of recognizance orders. For instance, section 83(3) of the Criminal Code allows the Court to issue a 
recognizance order against an individual suspected of being linked to terrorist activities. 
258 
Budreo, supra note 8 at para. 31. 
259 Ibid, at para. 32. 
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810.2 focuses on the protection of potential victims of serious and violent personal 
injury.260 The following paragraphs will examine the development of recognizance orders 
in Canadian criminal law and will demonstrate its origins attributable to peace bonds 
provisions. 
In 1997, the Liberal Government of Jean Chretien introduced Bill C-55 to Parliament to 
amend several provisions of the Criminal Code. One of these amendments, namely the 
addition of section 810.2, made it possible for the court to issue high risk offender 
judicial restraint orders or recognizance orders in cases where it is feared that an 
individual might commit a serious personal offence.261 Sec tion 810.2(1) provides as 
follows: 
810.2 (1) Any person who fears on reasonable grounds that another person 
will commit a serious personal injury offence, as that expression is defined in 
section 752, may, with the consent of the Attorney General, lay an information 
before a provincial court judge, whether or not the person or persons in respect of 
whom it is feared that the offence will be committed are named.262 [Emphasis 
added] 
Section 810.2 can be distinguished from section 810.1 since it is intended primarily to 
target individuals who are likely to commit a serious personal injury offence, as opposed 
to violent sexual offenders (section 810.1). More specifically, section 810.1, added to the 
Criminal Code in 1993: 
...requires the court, where satisfied on reasonable grounds of the fear that the 
individual will commit a sexual offence against a child, to order the individual to 
agree to be bound by specific conditions that restrict the person's movements and 
Budreo, Ibid. 
Dahabieh, supra note 22, abstract. 
Criminal Code, supra note 2 at s. 810(2). 
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behaviour, especially in areas where children are known to be present such as 
playgrounds and schools.263 
The federal government considers these recognizance orders as "...preventative court 
orders requiring an individual to agree to specific conditions to keep the peace". 4 In 
other words, the court can "... restrict the freedom of individuals identified as [at] high-
risk to commit a violent and/or sexual crime by imposing a set of conditions, often 
beyond their warrant-expiry date". 
In the case of potential sexual offenders, the court can impose the following conditions 
under section 810.1 (3.02) in order to secure their good conduct: 
(a) prohibit the defendant from engaging in any activity that involves contact 
with persons under the age of 16 years, including using a computer system within 
the meaning of subsection 342.1(2) for the purpose of communicating with a 
person under that age; 
(b) prohibit the defendant from attending a public park or public swimming area 
where persons under the age of 16 years are present or can reasonably be expected 
to be present, or a daycare centre, schoolground or playground; 
(c) require the defendant to participate in a treatment program; 
(d) require the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device, if the Attorney 
General makes the request; 
(e) require the defendant to remain within a specified geographic area unless 
written permission to leave that area is obtained from the provincial court judge; 
(f) require the defendant to return to and remain at his or her place of residence at 
specified times; or 
(g) require the defendant to abstain from the consumption of drugs except in 
accordance with a medical prescription, of alcohol or of any other intoxicating 
substance.266 
Under section 810.1(3.03), the court can also "...prohibit the defendant from possessing 
any firearm". A restrictive condition requiring the potential sexual offender to report to 
authorities may also be imposed under section 810.1(3.05). 
263 See Public Safety Canada, Peace Bonds, online: Public Safety Canada 
<http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/cor/tls/sec810-eng.aspx> [Public Safety]. 
264 Public Safety, ibid. 
265 Dahabieh, supra note 22 at 1. 
266 Criminal Code, supra note 2 at s. 810.1(3.02). 
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A court can also impose restrictive conditions upon a potentially dangerous individual 
who is at risk of committing a serious personal injury offense. In this regard, the 
conditions available under section 810.2 (4.1) include requiring the individual: 
(a) to participate in a treatment program; 
(b) to wear an electronic monitoring device, if the Attorney General makes the 
request; 
(c) to remain within a specified geographic area unless written permission to leave 
that area is obtained from the provincial court judge; 
(d) to return to and remain at his or her place of residence at specified times; or 
(e) to abstain from the consumption of drugs except in accordance with a medical 
prescription, of alcohol or of any other intoxicating substance.269 
Again, under section 810.2(5), the court can impose restrictive conditions with respect to 
970 
the possession of firearms. As for section 810.2(6), it allows the judge to impose a 
condition requiring the potential offender to "...report to the correctional authority of a 
971 
province or to an appropriate police authority". 
It is important to note that the judge possesses a discretion under both sections 
810.1(3.02) and 810.2(4.1) to "...add any reasonable conditions to the recognizance that 
[he or she] considers desirable to secure the good conduct of the defendant...".272 
Despite this discretion, courts will typically impose restrictive conditions such as: 
"...regular reporting requirements to police or correctional authorities; weapon 
prohibitions; close monitoring of the individual's activity [including electronic 
monitoring] and prohibitions against being within a specific distance of any place such as 
267 Ibid, at s.810.1(3.03). 
268 Ibid, at s. 810.1(3.05). 
269 Ibid, at s. 810.2(4.1). 
270 Ibid, at s. 810.2(5). 
271 Ibid, at s. 810.2(6). 
272 Ibid, at s.810.1(3.01)and s.810.2(4.1). 
80 
schools". There is also case law to the effect that the words "including conditions that 
require the defendant" which immediately precedes the list of conditions provided under 
section 810.1(3.02) and 810.2(4.1) limits the imposition of restrictive conditions at odds 
with the ones already enumerated. 
Recognizance orders under s.810.1 and 810.2 are, therefore, preventative and restrictive 
tools intended to target potential offenders before they commit a crime, all in the name of 
the protection of the public.275 Despite the recent enactment of these recognizance orders, 
it is important to note that the idea of imposing restrictive conditions on individuals who 
have yet to commit a crime is not novel in Canadian criminal law. In fact, judicial 
restraint orders and peace bonds provisions have been part of the Canadian criminal law 
arsenal since the late 19th century.276 Moreover, when the federal government included 
peace bonds provisions in the Criminal Code of Canada in 1892, it simply codified "...the 
common law peace bond available to magistrates to order individuals likely to commit 
property offences to "keep the peace"".277 
When former Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, the Hon. Allan Rock, 
introduced section 810.2 of the Criminal Code to the Standing Committee on Justice and 
Legal Affairs, he noted the long common law tradition of Peace Bonds in Canadian 
Public Safety, supra note 263. 
274 See Budreo, supra note 8 and Noble, supra note 9. 
275 Public Safety, supra note 263. 
276 In this regard, section 959(2) of the Criminal code, 1892, 55-56 Victoria, chap. 29,together with An act 
to amend the Canada Temperance Amendment Act, 1888, being chapter 26 of the same session, provided 
the following:"Upon complaint by or on behalf of any person that on account of threats made by some 
other person or on any other account, he, the complainant, is afraid that such other person will do him, 
his wife or child some personal injury, or will burn or set fire to his property, the justice before whom such 
complaint is made, may, if he is satisfied that the complainant has reasonable grounds for his fears, 
require such other person to enter into his own recognizances, or to give security, to keep the peace, and 
to be of good behaviour, for a term not exceeding twelve months". See also Public Safety, supra note 263. 
277 Public Safety, ibid. 
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criminal law.278 The former Minister took time to explain that the courts had had for a 
very long time an inherent power to "...require someone to keep the peace, to enter into a 
recognizance or a bond...", failure to do so would result in an offense.27 He also 
remarked that peace bonds were in fact: "...an ancient power which courts in an 
organized and civil society have possessed, not depending upon somebody committing a 
crime but rather in order to achieve the important objective of maintaining a peaceful 
• 4. 55 280 
society . 
Through the years, the courts have also noted the long history of peace bonds provisions 
in common law jurisdictions. Of importance to our discussion is the Supreme Court of 
Canada's decision in MacKenzie v. Martin.281 In that case, our highest court examined the 
development of peace bond provisions and confirmed a court's common law jurisdiction 
to require an individual to maintain the peace. The Supreme Court, in quoting 
Blackstone, defined the nature of peace bonds as follows: 
[t]his preventive justice consists in obliging those persons, whom there is 
probable ground to suspect of future misbehaviour, to stipulate with and to give 
full assurance to the public, that such offence as is apprehended shall not happen; 
by finding pledges or securities for keeping the peace, or for their good 
behaviour. 
The minority judgment rendered by Judge Rand in MacKenzie is also insightful for our 
historical analysis of peace bond provisions and recognizance orders in common law: 
278 Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs, Tuesday, December 3,1996, Comments from 
Honourable Allan Rock, online:<http://www.parl.gc.ca/35/Archives/committees352/jula/evidence/88_96-
12-03/jula88_blkl01.html>[Standing Committee, Allan Rock]. 
279 Standing Committee, Allan Rock, ibid. 
280 Ibid. 
281 MacKenzie v. Martin, [1954] S.C.R. 361 [MacKenzie]. 
282 Standing Committee, Allan Rock, supra note 278. See also generally MacKenzie, supra note 281. 
283 MacKenzie, ibid, at 368, citing Blackstone, Vol. iv, at 251. See also R. v. Parks, supra note 171. 
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In early Saxon law preservation of the peace was secured in the liability of the 
freemen of a tithing or a hundred for the conduct of each person within it, which 
in the time of Edward the Confessor became at least supplemented by an 
ordinance empowering sureties to be required, administered by conservators of 
the peace. This capacity was, after the Conquest, incident to certain high offices 
of state, or based on prescription, or annexed to certain tenures of land. Generally, 
however, the conservators were elected by the freeholders sitting in full county 
court before the sheriff. What they were to preserve was the King's peace, to 
guard the community and individual life of his subjects against mischievous 
disturbances and fear of personal injuries and trespasses on or to their 
possessions. 
The first modification of this general administration was the sending of writs by 
Edward III in the first year of his reign to every sheriff commanding him 
that the peace be kept throughout his bailiwick on pain and peril of 
disinheritance and loss of life and limb. 
This was immediately followed by a statute enacted in the same year which 
provided that 
for the better maintenance and keeping of the peace in every county, good 
men and lawful who were not maintainers of evil or barretors in the 
country should be assigned to keep the peace": Blackstone, Bk. 1, p. 
350-51. 
This assignment was construed to be by royal commission and transferred the 
appointment of conservators from the freemen to the King. Later, by 34 Edward 
III, c. 1, the name "justice" was introduced, and jurisdiction for the first time was 
conferred upon two or more of them to try felonies. As to keeping the peace, 
they were charged jointly and severally; but a further authority was vested in them 
to take of those 
that be not of good fame ... sufficient surety and mainprize of their 
good behaviour towards the King and his people ...: Burn's Justice of 
the Peace, 13th ed. vol. 5, p. 755.284 [Emphasis added]. 
Peace bonds provisions have therefore existed in common law jurisdictions since very 
ancient times. Preventive measures are also the result of precautionary state action. 
Coupled with the emergence of a community protection model focusing on the 
prevention of dangerousness, it could be argued that the right conditions were in place for 
the enactment of recognizance orders targeting potentially dangerous individuals. The 
Mackenzie, ibid, at 371. 
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following section will examine the importance of the concept of prevention in the 
development of peace bonds and recognizance orders in Canadian criminal law. 
ii) The Prevention Principle and its Influence on the Development of 
Peace Bonds Provisions and Recognizance Orders 
One of the various objectives of Canadian criminal law is the prevention of crime as well 
as the preservation of the peace.285 Preventive judicial orders such as peace bonds and 
recognizance orders can be understood as an extension of the prevention principle sought 
by Parliament. In this regard, Cohen explains: "[preventive law enforcement" and the 
"prevention principle" are shorthand expressions for the state's ability to act proactively 
or pre-emptively in order to safeguard or protect the public from serious harm". 
However, when preventive justice is applied in cases where no crimes have been 
committed, fundamental rights, such as liberty, are undeniably infringed upon. In this 
regard, Cohen explains that recognizance orders "...stand as an exception to a cardinal 
tenet of the criminal justice system that, absent a subsisting criminal charge, intrusions on 
an individual's liberty ordinarily ought not to be countenanced". Therefore, the 
imposition of restrictive conditions that curtail the liberty of individuals who have yet to 
commit a crime necessitate a careful balance between the rights of the potential offender 
and the right to a peaceful and risk-free society. In achieving balance, it is argued that 
preventive measures must also contain numerous procedural safeguards which take into 
account the problem of inaccuracy in predicting dangerousness. 
In Canada, as we have seen, conflict of preventive justice with fundamental principles of 
rights has not deterred Parliament from enacting peace bond provisions and recognizance 
285 Canada, The Criminal Law, supra note 15. 
286 Cohen, supra note 14 at 409. 
287 Ibid, at 425. 
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orders under section 810 of the Criminal Code, nor did the inaccuracy which plagues 
some of the assessment tools used by mental health professionals to predict 
dangerousness inhibit our lawmakers. An analysis of the judicial treatment of sections 
810.1 and 810.2, is therefore, necessary to enable us better understand the rationale 
behind these coercive measures. As we have seen, so far, sections 810.1 and 810.2 have 
been deemed constitutional in Canada, at least by lower courts. However, the 
comparative analysis will later demonstrate that the French scheme provides for more 
procedural safeguards in imposing restrictive conditions based on potential 
dangerousness. 
iii) An Analysis of the Judicial Treatment of Recognizance Orders under 
Sections 810.1 and 810.2 
To date, there has been no judicial treatment on the constitutionality of sections 810.1 or 
810.2 at the Supreme Court of Canada level. However, two important decisions from the 
Court of Appeal of Ontario and the Quebec Superior Court are often cited as the leading 
cases examining sections 810.1 and 810.2 recognizance orders. The case of R. v. Budreo 
from the Court of Appeal of Ontario, and the judgment from the lower court, examined 
the constitutionality of section 810.1. The judgment of the court in Budreo laid the 
groundwork for the legislator to enact section 810.2. In the highly publicised case of 
Noble v. Teale (involving the former Karla Homolka), the Quebec Superior Court 
examined the reasonability of the conditions imposed on the former offender. 
Before venturing into these judgments in more detail, it is worth mentioning that both 
leading cases dealt with recognizance orders involving previous offenders, for which the 
288 
Budreo, supra note 8. 
289 
Noble, supra note 9. 
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court could rely on past criminal offenses in assessing the risk of future behaviour of the 
individual. It should not come as a surprise that both leading cases involved past 
convicted offenders, since an application under section 810.1 or 810.2 is normally made 
after an information is laid by the police or the Crown prosecutor, rather than a citizen.290 
However, it should also be noted that in the cases of Budreo and Noble, the offender had 
not committed a "contemporary" crime or had not engaged in any further relevant 
misconduct. The informant's fear in both cases was primarily based on the offender's 
past history of criminal behaviour and risk of recidivism upon release from prison. 
iv) The Seminal Case of R. v. Budreo 
The first case worth examining is Budreo?91 As previously mentioned Budreo confirmed 
the constitutionality of recognizance orders under section 810.1 of the Criminal Code and 
paved the way for the enactment of s.810.2. However, as will be explained below, 
Budreo may very well be one of the leading Canadian decisions in terms of analysing 
sections 810.1, but it fails to analyse in detail the fundamental concept of dangerousness 
and the problems of inaccuracy that plague various predicting tools. It is almost as if the 
court simply accepted and trusted the system of determination of dangerousness without 
investigating potential pitfalls. Evidently, the advantages of the French investigatory 
system in determining dangerousness were not addressed by the court. However, in all 
See Public Safety, supra note 263, where it is stated: "[ojrdinarily, police and/or provincial crown 
attorneys apply for sections 810.1 and 810.2 of the Criminal Code". See also Government of Alberta, 
Justice and Attorney General, High risk Offender Judicial Restraint Orders (Sections 810.01, 810.1 and 
810.2 of the Criminal code), May 20, 2008, online: 
<http://www.justice.gov.ab.ca/criminal_pros/default.aspx?id=5684>, where it is stated that policing 
agency will normally apply for a recognizance order "..., upon receiving a so-called Warrant Expiry Package 
from Corrections Services (Government of Canada) or Correctional Services Division..., or upon otherwise 
learning of a high risk offender who is in need of community supervision pursuant to ss. 810.01 or 810.2." 
291 Budreo, supra note 8. For another summary of Budreo, see Cohen, supra note 14 at 426-428. 
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fairness, the court of Appeal of Ontario did not have to venture beyond the Canadian 
legal realm in this case. 
On the other hand, the court did provide an excellent historical analysis of peace bonds 
provisions in Canadian criminal law. More importantly to the present analysis, the court 
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qualified recognizance orders as being "preventive" rather than "punitive" measures. 
In fact, considerable effort was deployed by the Court of Appeal in characterizing a 
recognizance order as a preventive measure. As we will explain, the distinction between 
"preventive" and "punitive" measure is extremely important since it almost automatically 
90^ 
saves the Canadian legislator from requiring stricter constitutional tests. It would 
therefore appear that preventive measures are not subject to the same constitutional 
treatment as punitive measures, since their consequences on the liberty of an individual 
are not as serious. However, as we will see, conditions attached to a recognizance order 
can have a devastating effect on the rights of a potential offender in some instances, and 
may prove to be more coercive than preventive in nature. Moreover, characterization of a 
restrictive condition as being preventive rather than punitive prevents the court from 
pushing the analysis further, especially in considering the constitutionality of legislative 
provisions largely based on controversial assessment of dangerousness. 
In Budreo, the Court of Appeal confirmed the court's jurisdiction over maintaining the 
peace under the common law tradition through the use of preventive tools such as peace 
bonds and recognizance orders.294 Perhaps the most striking feature of the decision in 
Budreo, ibid, at para. 25. 
293 It will be explained later that the French's mesures de suretes are also considered as preventive 
measures. 
294 Budreo, supra note 8 at para. 27-31. 
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Budreo is the court's general approval of the imposition of restrictive conditions on 
individuals who have never committed a crime. In this regard, the opening statement of 
the court to the effect that "[a] recognizance may be imposed though the person has not 
committed an offence and has no previous criminal record", is quite revealing of the 
court's position towards prophylactic measures and gives the tone to the rest of the 
i 295 
judgement. 
In Budreo, the court focused its attention on recognizance orders under section 810.1 of 
the Criminal Code and affirmed their constitutionality, despite the infringing nature of 
9 Oft 
the section upon principles of fundamental justice. As explained by the Court of 
Appeal, section 810.1 allows the court to impose "...a recognizance on any person likely 
to commit any one of a number of listed sexual offences against a child under 14 years of 
age".297 At the time of the court's decision, the provision was intended to provide for the 
prevention of sexual offences against a child under "14 years of age". However, the 
recent enactment of the Tackling Violent Crime Act raised the age of consent for sexual 
activities to 16 years.298 
In Budreo, restrictive conditions under section 810.1 had been imposed by the judge on a 
diagnosed paedophile who had a long history of sexual offenses.299 Prior to his release 
from prison, Mr. Budreo had been examined by a psychiatrist to determine if he could be 
295 
Budreo, supra note 8 at para.l. 
296 Ibid, at para. 53. 
297 Ibid, at para.l. It should be noted that sections 810.1 and 810.2 of the Criminal Code are virtually 
identical in terms of procedure and application. The only difference is that the former is a preventive 
measure available to the court to target sexual offenders while the latter focuses on violent offenders 
who risk committing a serious personal injury offence. Therefore, it can be argued that the reasoning of 
the Court of Appeal in Budreo would be similar under a section 810.2 hearing. 
298 See generally Tackling Violent Crime Act, R.S., c. C-46. 
299 Budreo, supra note 8 at para. 1. 
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admitted under the Mental Health Act?00 Two different psychiatric assessments 
determined that Mr. Budreo "...did not pose a sufficient risk of serious harm to himself or 
to members of the public".301 A psychiatric treatment plan was nevertheless prepared for 
the potential offender which included psychiatric counselling and drug treatment. 
However, the "negative publicity" arid numerous news reports surrounding his release 
forced the Crown to apply for a section 810.1 recognizance order in the days following 
Mr. Budreo's release from prison.303 In fact, the Crown was concerned with the past 
criminal history of the offender.304 The Crown even admitted that Mr. Budreo had not 
committed any wrongs upon his release, but sought a recognizance "...because of his 
criminal record and his diagnosis as a paedophile".305 
The Crown was not only motivated by the negative publicity surrounding Mr. Budreo's 
release, but also by the fear expressed by a member of the Toronto police force. The 
police's fear was founded on various psychiatric, hospital and parole board reports, some 
of them dating as far back as the 1960s and which portrayed the offender as a high-risk 
paedophile.306 
The recognizance order sought by the Crown on the basis of the police's fear included 
several conditions intended to limit Mr. Budreo's liberty, in particular "...in any area 
300 Ibid, at para. 8. Mental Health Act, R.S.0.1990, c. M.7. 
301 Budreo, Ibid. 
302 Ibid, at para. 9. 
303 Ibid, at para. 10-11. 
304 Ibid, at para 11. 
305 Ibid. 
306 Ibid, at para. 13. 
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where children were expected to be present".307 They were drafted upon the conditions 
that were set for his bail, prior to the section 810.1 hearing and included the following: 
• he [should] not engage in any activity involving contact with persons under the 
age of 14 unless in the presence of and under the supervision of [two adults]; 
• he not be at or be within 50 metres of a public park, swimming area, daycare, 
schoolground, playground, community centre or any other place where persons 
under 14 can reasonably be expected to be found, except in the presence of and 
under the supervision of [two adults]; 
• continue to take Luperon (or Provera) at least once a month; and that he continue 
counselling or treatment at the Clarke Institute.308 
The first question considered by the Court of Appeal in Budreo was to determine if a 
recognizance order under section 810.1 was constitutional. More particularly, the Court 
focused its attention on a potential violation of section 7 of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms which guarantees "...the right to life, liberty and security of the 
person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of 
fundamental justice".309 It was clear from the outset that the conditions imposed on Mr. 
Budreo restricted his liberty and freedom. The Crown admitted that these restrictions 
infringed section 7 of the Charter. The main discordance was to determine if the 
"...restrictions on the appellant's liberty [were] in accordance with the principles of 
fundamental justice...".311 As for the crux of the defendant's argument, it revolved around 
the fact that the violation was contrary to principles of fundamental justice because "...it 
307 Cohen, supra note 14 at 426. 
308 Budreo, supra note 8 at para. 16. 
309 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.) 1982, c. 11, 
[Charter], s. 7. 
310 
Budreo, supra note 8 at para. 23. 
Ibid. 
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create[d] an offence based on status; it [was] overbroad; and it [was] void for 
vagueness".312 
Therefore, the first point considered by the Court of Appeal was to determine if a 
recognizance under section 810.1 created an offence based on status. According to the 
Court, the status in question was the one attributed to the offender due to his past criminal 
convictions and medical diagnosis, despite the absence of any "current offending 
conduct". 313 Because of the preventive nature of recognizance orders and the fact that 
they involve an assessment of the risk of future behaviour of an individual, they cannot 
be considered as creating an offense based on status.314 The Court explains the aim of 
section 810.1 in these terms: 
...It is a preventive provision not a punitive provision. It aims not to punish past 
wrongdoing but to prevent future harm to young children, to prevent them from 
being victimized by sexual abusers. The second answer is that s. 810.1 is not 
about a person's status. It is about assessing the present risk of a person 
T I C 
committing a sexual offence against young children. 
If the Court had characterized section 810.1 as being punitive rather than preventive in 
nature, the provision would have probably been subjected to a stricter preventive 
constitutional test, due to a lack of adequate constitutional safeguards. The protection 
of children from potential paedophiles pushed the Court to consider the restrictive 
conditions available under section 810.1 as preventive in essence. The court notes, 
however, that "[s]ome aspects of s. 810.1 are punitive or coercive...", including "...the 
availability of an arrest warrant; detention pending a hearing unless the defendant is 
312 Budreo, ibid. 
313 Ibid, at para. 24. 
314 Ibid, at para. 25 and 33. 
315 Ibid, at para. 25. 
316 Ibid, at para. 26. 
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released on bail; and jail on the defendant's refusal to enter into a recognizance". The 
Court considers these coercive aspects as "necessary' and not sufficient to transform 
section 810.1 into a punitive provision despite the stigma attached to it.318 
1 1 G 
Furthermore, in citing the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Shubley 
and R. v. Wigglesworth320, the court explains that section 810.1 was not punitive because 
its purpose was not "to mete out criminal punishment" and it did not have "true penal 
consequences".321 The Court refers to Wigglesworth in which "true penal consequences" 
was defined as an "...imprisonment or a fine which by its magnitude would appear to be 
imposed for the purpose of redressing the wrong done to society at large...". Based on 
the fact that the main objectives of section 810.1 are to prevent the commission of a 
crime not to "redress a wrong", the recognizance orders were considered as preventive 
and not punitive by the Court. 
The Court then turned to the constitutionality of section 810.1 with respect to the second 
and third contentions of the defendant, namely the overbroad, and void for vagueness 
principles under section 7 of the Charter. Generally, in Budreo, the court considers 
recognizance orders under section 810.1 as not overly broad. Citing the decision of R. v. 
Heywood324 the Court explains that in determining if a particular piece of legislation is 
317 Ibid, at para. 28. 
318 Ibid, at para. 28. 
319 R. v. Shubley [1990] 1 S.C.R. 3,52 C.C.C. (3d) 481, 65 D.L.R. (4th) 193[Shubley cited to S.C.R.], at 20-21. 
320 R. v. Wigglesworth [1987] 2 S.C.R. 541, 37 C.C.C. (3d) 385, 45 D.L.R. (4th)235 [Wigglesworth cited to 
S.C.R.], at 561. 
321Budreo, supra note 8 at para. 29. 
322 Ibid. 
323 Ibid, at para.30. 
324 R. v. Heywood, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761 [Heywood]. 
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overbroad, it is important to look at the means used by Parliament to achieve its particular 
objective.325 The following statements are of particular relevance to our analysis: 
The means chosen must be sufficiently tailored or narrowly targeted to meet their 
objective. If the means chosen are too broad or too wide, if the law goes further 
than necessary to accomplish its purpose, the law becomes arbitrary or 
disproportionate. A person's rights will be limited without good reason. The 
principles of fundamental justice will be violated. 
In the case of section 810.1, the objective of the legislation is the protection of children 
from potential paedophiles. In the Court's view, the preventive nature of the section 
justifies a measure restricting the liberties of potential paedophiles: 
Children are among the most vulnerable groups in our society. The sexual abuse 
of young children is a serious societal problem, a statement that needs no 
elaboration. A sizable percentage of the sexual offences against children — 
according to the record, approximately 30 percent ~ occurs in public places, the 
very places specified in s. 810.1. The expert evidence shows that recidivism rates 
for sexual abusers of children are high and that keeping high-risk offenders away 
from children is a sound preventive strategy. Parliament thus cannot be faulted for 
its objective in enacting s. 810.1. The state should not be obliged to wait until 
children are victimized before it acts. The societal interest in protecting children 
from sexual abuse supports Parliament's use of the preventive part of its criminal 
law power.327 
It is therefore clear that the Court of Appeal places a high value on the protection of a 
vulnerable segment of the population, in this case, children. Moreover, it considers that 
325 Ibid, at 792. Moreover, in Heywood, ibid, at 784-785, one of the leading case examining section 7 of the 
Charter, the Supreme Court of Canada examined the constitutionality and definition of the word "loiter" 
in section 179(l)(b) of the Criminal Code. In applying the principle of fundamental justice of overbreath, 
the Supreme Court concluded that section 179(l)(b) of the Criminal Code infringed upon section 7 of the 
Charter and the violation was not reasonable under section 1 of the Charter. 
326 Budreo, supra note 8 at para. 36. 
327 Ibid, at para.37. 
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the means chosen by Parliament to achieve its objective to protect the children "...were 
reasonable and in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice". 
In considering the defendant's argument with respect to the overbroad nature of section 
810.1, the Court also examined the restrictive conditions imposed on the defendant. 
Again, the Court came to the conclusion that the restrictive conditions were not 
overbroad.329 Essentially, the Court's reasoning was founded on three main assertions: 
the restrictions imposed on the defendant were not considered as "detention or 
imprisonment", they were proportional to the "...societal interest in s. 810.1, the 
protection of young children" and they were "...narrowly targeted to meet Parliament's 
objective".330 
In light of the overbreadth argument, the Court also examined the fact that a recognizance 
order may be sought even in cases where the potential offender has no criminal record. 
The wording in section 810.1 simply requires the judge to be satisfied that "...the 
informant has reasonable grounds for the fear that the defendant will commit a sexual 
offence against a child under 14". 
In citing Lyons, R. v. Morales, as well as the Ouimet Report, the Court restated 
"the impossibility of precise predictions" and adopted the Supreme Court of Canada's 
Budreo, ibid, at para. 38. 
329 Ibid, at para. 39. 
330 Ibid, at para 39-41. 
331 Ibid, at para. 42. 
332 Ibid, at para. 42. See also R. v. George, 2007 CarswellOnt 131, 2007 ONCJ16, 73 W.C.B. (2d) 45 [George 
cited to Carswell] at para.42, where the Court examined the decision in Budreo, ibid, and stated that a 
"... s.810.2 order may arguably require more than a simple demonstration that the defendant is more 
likely than not to commit a designated class of offence,". The Court added the following, again at para 42: 
"...at a minimum, what is required is proof, on a balance of probabilities, of a reasonably grounded fear of 
serious and imminent conduct". 
Lyons, supra note 149. 
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view on the threshold necessary to make a determination of dangerousness as being one 
of a "likelihood of future dangerousness".336 In this regard, the Court of Appeal explains 
that: "[l]ogically, it seems clear to me that an individual can be found to constitute a 
threat to society without insisting that this require the court to assert an ability to predict 
the future". However, as we will see in the critique below, the Court of Appeal simply 
took the test of "likelihood of future dangerousness" developed in the context of 
dangerous offender legislation (Lyons) and bail hearings (Morales) and applied it to 
section 810.1 recognizance orders.337 
On the question of the adequacy of procedural safeguards contained in section 810.1, the 
Court of Appeal was satisfied that they were sufficient to ensure the "overbreadth" 
doctrine under section 7 of the Charter was not engaged. The procedural safeguards noted 
by the Court includes the notice of hearing; the conduct of a full hearing as a summary 
conviction trial before any order is made by the Court that possesses discretion to impose 
the conditions; the temporary character of the restrictions imposed; and finally, the 
possibility of appealing the recognizance order.338 
R. v. Morales, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 711,17 C.R. (4th) 74 [Morales cited to S.C.R.]. 
335 See Canada, Canadian Committee on Corrections, Toward Unity: CriminalJustice and Corrections 
(Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1969) (Chair: Roger Ouimet)[Ouimet Report]. 
336 Budreo, supra note 8 at para. 43-44. 
337 Ibid, at para 43-44. It is worth noting that bail provisions, under section 515 of the Criminal Code, may 
appear similar to the recognizance order scheme under section 810. In R. v. F. (M.), 2001 CarswellOnt 
1516,155 C.C.C. (3d) 521 [F.(M.) cited to Carswell] at para. 31, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice notes 
the similarities between the two provisions of the decision: "... the goal of the two proceedings is to 
regulate the conduct of the individual in the community and to prevent danger to the community, the oral 
and evidentiary standard in both proceedings are similar, if not the same, and the consequences of 
breach of any order granted, exposes the defendant to jail". However, at para. 33, the court distinguishes 
the two provisions, stating that in the case of a recognizance orders, the individual is not an accused 
awaiting trial. Moreover, as stated by the court at para. 33, in the case of a bail hearing, "[ejntry into the 
recognizance is predicate to release". As the court points out, in the case of section 810, a recognizance 
order can be imposed to an individual who is already in liberty. 
33SBudreo, supra note 8 at para. 47. See also George, supra note 332 at para. 4. 
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The Court of Appeal concludes that section 810.1 is not overbroad since it "...strikes a 
reasonable balance between the liberty interest of the defendant and the state's interest in 
protecting young children from harm".339 According to the Court of Appeal, section 
810.1 reconciles two objectives: "...the interest of likely child sexual abusers in going 
where they please, including places where young children gather, and the interest of the 
state in ensuring that young children can go safely and securely to places typically 
associated with children's activities".340 
On the question of section 7 of the Charter's arguments on "void for vagueness" in 
relation to section 810.1, the Court of Appeal adopts a similar approach then the one used 
in the overbreadth analysis. It looks at the "precise means" used by Parliament to achieve 
its objectives and at the "clarity" of the means to ascertain that the legislation is not 
"...vague contrary to the principles of fundamental justice".341 The Court looks at the 
Defendant's argument that the word "fear" of the informant in section 810.1 was too 
vague. In the Court's opinion, "fear" and "on reasonable ground" must be considered 
together, which limits the fear to "...a reasonably based sense of apprehension about a 
future event".342 However, as the Court points out, there is a second layer in the analysis 
of the reasonableness of the fear of the informant. The judge must also be "...satisfied by 
"evidence" that the fear is reasonably based" and he will therefore weigh the evidence 
Budreo, ibid, at para. 48. 
340 Ibid, at para. 40. 
341 Ibid, at para. 49. 
342 Ibid, at para. 51. This reasoning is in accordance with Then J. of the Ontario General Division Court R. v. 
Budreo, 1996 CarswellOnt 24, 45 C.R. (4th) 133,104 C.C.C. (3d) 245 [Budreo, Qnt. Gen. Crt, cited to C.R.], 
where Then J. explained at para. 25 the meaning of the word fear: [i]t is clear then that the use of the 
word « fear » in a legislative context does not put the judicial process at the mercy of unsubstantiated 
paranoia but requires an allegation to be objectively provable". [Emphasis added]. 
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before him. In other words, if the court is satisfied that the informant's allegation is 
"objectively provable", it can impose a recognizance order.344 
It is worth pointing out the fact that the Court of Appeal in Budreo acknowledges the 
imprecise nature of section 810.1 due to the fact that recognizance orders are based on a 
"likelihood of future dangerousness", an imprecise determination. However, the Court's 
contention is to the effect that the lack of precision is not enough to pass the high 
threshold necessary in "...declaring a law void for vagueness".345 
All in all, in Budreo, the Court of Appeal confirms the constitutionality of section 810.1 
and reiterates its preventive nature and its importance in the protection of children, a 
particularly vulnerable segment of the population. While the Court gave some compelling 
reasons for the reasonableness of the measure in a society concerned with protection of 
the community, it barely touched the problem of determination of dangerousness, a key 
component at the heart of prophylactic measures in criminal law. The following section 
will offer a critique of the judgment in Budreo on some very specific points, namely the 
over breadth principle; the detrimental effects of restrictive conditions upon a potential 
offender and his or her reintegration into society; and finally, the adoption of the 
"likelihood of future dangerousness" test normally reserved for dangerous offender 
designation and bail hearings. 
v) A Critique of the Overbroad Test as Applied by the Court in Budreo 
It can easily be argued that the protection of children from potential paedophiles is a 
noble objective. It does, however, have implications for the rights of a particular class of 
343 Budreo, ibid, note 8 at para. 52. 
344 Budreo, Ont. Gen. Crt, supra note 342 at para. 25. 
345 Budreo, supra note 8 at para. 53. 
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individuals, namely, persons considered at risk of committing a crime. Moreover, when 
the statutory provision enables the imposition of restrictive conditions on an individual to 
protect a "group of victims", rather than a particular named individual, it broadens up the 
applicability of the measure. 
Earlier, we explained that sections 810.1 and 810.2 have been crafted by Parliament to 
encompass unnamed victims, as opposed to a section 810 peace bond provision which 
involves identified parties. In imposing restrictive conditions on potentially dangerous 
individuals to protect a particular segment of the society (i.e. children or victims of 
serious personal injury), as opposed to protecting a known potential victim, a preventive 
measure can have detrimental effect on the rights and liberties of an individual. It is 
worth pointing out that the Court of Appeal in Budreo made no mention of the reasoning 
of the Supreme Court of Canada in Parks346 in reaching its conclusion to the effect that 
section 810.1 is not overbroad. In Parks, the Supreme Court of Canada made it clear that 
preventive judicial orders must be limited and not be overbroad. Justice Sopinka 
expressed concerns as to the constitutionality of preventive judicial orders that do not 
limit the potential victims: 
..., I have grave doubts as to whether a power that can be exercised on the basis of 
"probable ground[s] to suspect future misbehaviour" without limits as to the type 
of "misbehaviour" or potential victims, would survive Charter scrutiny. If such a 
power allowed the imposition of restrictive conditions following an acquittal on 
the basis of a remote possibility of recurrence, it may well be contrary to s. 7.347 
Parks, supra note 171. 
347 Ibid, at 912. See also Poyner, Errin, "Drawing Boundaries - Monitoring Preventive Justice" (1997) 3 
Appeal, Review of Current Law and Law Reform 6, at 10: "[i]n cases where no such person or persons are 
identified, however, the state cannot rely upon "the protection of the public" to confine legally innocent 
people to their homes... Overstating the risk that a person poses to the public is an evasion of the 
overbreadth test: it allows the state to severely restrict the liberty of an individual for no reason other 
than its inability to predict the harm that such a person might cause". 
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While it is true that sections 810.1 and 810.2 limit the type of behaviour (violent sexual 
offence and serious personal injury), and identify the targeted group of victims (children 
under the age of 16 in the case of section 810.1; and potential victims of serious personal 
injuries in the case of section 810.2), the fact remains that potential victims constitute a 
particularly large group. Consequently, by imposing restrictive conditions prohibiting an 
individual to enter into contact with a member of a large group, the risk of breaching a 
condition is exponentially increased. As we will see, this situation can have real 
detrimental effect on a potential offender's right to liberty, and jeopardize his 
reintegration into society. 
Furthermore, from its conclusion as to the legitimacy of section 810.1, it can be deduced 
that the Court in Budreo relied heavily on expert evidence demonstrating a high risk of 
recidivism amongst sexual offenders. It is worth considering the fact that the reliability 
of expert evidence appears not to be in questioned in Budreo, despite the important 
repercussions of a successful section 810.1 application. It may be viewed as a noble 
objective from the court's perspective to endorse Parliament's legitimate aim to prevent 
the risk of harm to children, but to rely on controversial evidence without addressing the 
problem of reliability is questionable. 
In this regard, it was argued earlier that the assessment and determination of 
dangerousness, even by highly qualified mental health professionals, is a difficult 
exercise prone to inaccuracies, false positives and potential biases. Neither of these 
aforementioned problems were addressed by the Court in Budreo in any detail. The fact 
that the measure has been characterized as preventive rather than punitive may very well 
348 
Budreo, supra note 8 at para. 37. 
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be part of the explanation. Preventive measures are not subjected to the same stringent 
considerations, since, theoretically, they are not coercive in nature. On paper, 
recognizance orders are indeed designed to prevent the commission of a crime and to 
restrain the liberties of a potentially dangerous individual. Recognizance orders do not 
seek to punish a future crime, but simply to prevent one. However, just as was the case in 
Budreo, often, the evidence on the dangerousness of the individual is based primarily on 
past criminal behaviour. It is, at the very least, a good source of motivation for 
prosecutors to seek recognizance orders for individuals who are just about to be released 
into society but who have a particular history of criminality. The juxtaposition of the true 
nature of recognizance orders and this point were not even mentioned in the decision of 
the Court of Appeal in Budreo. In this context, they are used as an additional punishment 
after the initial punishment. The concept of serving a sentence is tossed away and 
replaced by a supplementary sentence that operates at the end of the mandatory sentence. 
vi) The Application of the "Likelihood of Future Dangerousness" Test in 
Recognizance Order Hearings 
Earlier, it was explained that the Court of Appeal in Budreo simply applied the 
"likelihood of future dangerousness" test confirmed in Lyons, to recognizance orders 
without adapting it to the reality of section 810.1 and their implications for the rights of 
potential offenders. Currently, in a section 810 hearing, if the judge is satisfied on a 
balance of probability that the individual is likely to be dangerous, he can impose several 
restrictive conditions pursuant to a recognizance order. However, in a recognizance order 
hearing, the individual is not necessarily a convicted criminal, as he or she has either 
never committed a crime or has already served his or her mandatory prison sentence. 
This particularity differs from the designation of Dangerous or Long-Term Offenders. In 
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those cases, the court must be satisfied that the offender has committed a serious offense 
for which he has been convicted while presenting a "...pattern of repetitive behaviour or 
persistent aggressiveness".349 The evidence must also demonstrate a "substantial degree 
of indifference" or "a failure to restrain his behaviour".350 In the case of sexual offenses, 
"a failure to control his or her sexual behaviour" is also required to designate an offender 
as dangerous.351 Since it is impossible to predict with accuracy the risk of future 
dangerousness, a simple likelihood of future dangerousness is sufficient to designate an 
offender as dangerous. Arguably, in the case of dangerous offender legislation, the 
rationale for imposing a low threshold of a simple likelihood of dangerousness can be 
understood and justified due to the importance of protecting the community from 
potentially dangerous individuals. Dangerous offender legislation is aimed at controlling 
the worst criminals who have consistently shown repetitive violent or sexual 
behaviour.352 
However, in the case of recognizance orders, it is argued that the court should increase 
the threshold of required evidence to demonstrate that an individual is potentially 
dangerous. The threshold should be higher for individuals who have never committed a 
crime due to the difficulties in assessing the risk of future dangerousness without any 
historical data. At the very least, recognizance orders should not be applied to individuals 
who have no criminal records. On that point, the Court of Appeal in Budreo did state that 
the requirement of having a criminal record in all recognizance order hearing "...would 
Criminal Code, supra note 2 at s.753(l). 
Ibid. 
Ibid, at s. 753.1(b). 
See generally Lyons, supra note 149. 
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undermine the preventive purpose of s. 810.1". The Court acknowledged the relevancy 
of criminal records but stopped short of requiring it in all section 810.1 applications 
because this "...would require a child to be victimized before the Crown could act, even if 
the Crown had highly reliable evidence of dangerousness".354 This position is a legitimate 
one, if one takes into consideration the protection of the community as the only starting 
point. On the other hand, as previously stated, the Court did not address the problem of 
inaccuracy in determining dangerousness or the influences of the adversarial system that 
may affect the objectivity of the evidence presented. As noted earlier, a determination of 
dangerousness by mental health experts implies an assessment of the risk posed by a 
particular individual to society. It is a calculation based mostly on a probability that the 
individual will commit a crime in the future. Since a recognizance order seeks to prevent 
the commission of crime, based largely on a probability that it will be committed, it is 
fundamental that the very process by which it is determined is sound. However, one 
cannot take away the fact that a determination of dangerousness consists in a calculation 
of a risk, a process that may be flawed by false positives and expert biases. For those 
reason, a high threshold in imposing restrictive conditions under a recognizance orders 
should be required. Arguably, the imposition of a recognizance order should also be 
limited to an individual who has a past criminal history, at least, until such time as 
science is able to decrease significantly the risk of false positive while improving the 
accuracy of the various assessment tools. 
What the Court failed to address in Budreo, that is the importance of having a higher 
threshold when determining dangerousness, was examined by another court in Quebec, 
353 Budreo, supra note 8, at para. 44. 
354 Ibid. 
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although briefly. We will next examine the case of Noble v. Teale which dealt with the 
sufficiency of the evidence in imposing a recognizance order pursuant to section 810.2 of 
the Criminal Code. It would appear that the Court applied a higher threshold than the 
simple "likelihood of future dangerousness" as adopted in Ontario. 
vii) The Case of Noble v. Teale and its Interpretation of Recognizance 
Orders under Section 810.2 
The other leading case which dealt with the constitutionality of recognizance orders is 
Noble v. Teale. Mrs. Karla Teale, the former Karla Homolka, was serving a sentence of 
imprisonment for manslaughter. As she was about to be released from prison, an 
informant, in this case a police officer, laid an information before the court to seek a 
recognizance order imposing restrictive conditions under section 810.2 of the Criminal 
Code. The informant's application was successful and conditions were imposed upon the 
defendant but were later quashed on Appeal. 
The case of Noble is particularly relevant to our analysis because it delves into the 
reasonableness of certain restrictive conditions that were imposed upon Mrs. Teale. Two 
points in appeal are relevant: the constitutional challenge of section 810.2 and the 
sufficiency of the evidence in an application for a recognizance order. 
In Noble, the Quebec Superior Court dealt with the applicability of section 810.2 and 
defined its limits. Although the Court examined briefly the constitutional challenge raised 
by the defendant with respect to section 810.2, it did mention that it was inappropriate to 
do so since the issue was never raised before the hearing judge. The Court also stated 
that constitutional questions should not be dealt with in the absence of relevant facts: 
355 Noble, supra note 9. 
356 Ibid, at para. 6. 
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"Charter decisions should not and must not be made in a factual vacuum". 
Nevertheless, the Court stated its views on the constitutionality of section 810.2 in the 
event it was to be challenged on her position not to entertain the constitutional debate due 
to the lack of relevant facts.358 
Consequently, the Court adopted the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in Budreo, as to 
the constitutionality of section 810.2 .359 It confirmed again the preventive nature of the 
provision and the fact that it did not constitute an offence.360 In the Court's opinion, the 
constitutionality of section 810.2 in relation to a section 7 overbreadth argument is 
demonstrated by the following facts: 
• the hearing judge [does not have]... an unfettered discretion to impose any type 
of condition in the order; 
• the impossibility of making exact predictions of future dangerousness does not 
render s. 810.2 Cr. C. overbroad. Both the dangerous offender legislation and the 
bail system rely on predictions of future dangerousness; 
• the procedural safeguards in s. 810.2 are adequate; 
• the recourse to hearsay evidence is not objectionable. Ultimately, the order can 
only issue on evidence that is judged credible and trustworthy; 
• the need for the informant to establish a "fear" of future dangerousness does not 
render s. 810.2 void for vagueness. 
In the Court's opinion, the conclusions reached by the Court of Appeal in Budreo as to 
the constitutionality of recognizance orders were valid. Moreover, in affirming the 
reasonableness of the scheme, the Court relied heavily on the fact that recognizance 
357 Noble, ibid, at para. 11, citing Mackay v. Manitoba, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 357 at 361. 
35B Noble, ibid, at para. 22. 
359 Ibid. 
360 Ibid, at para. 23, citing Budreo, supra note 8 at para. 25. 
361 Ibid, at para. 25. 
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orders pursuant to section 810.2 can only be imposed on a potential offender if the 
"...informant establishes on a balance of probabilities that he or she has reasonable 
grounds to fear that the defendant will commit a serious personal injury offence". 
The second ground of appeal dealt with by the Quebec Superior Court in Noble and 
relevant to our present analysis is the sufficiency of the evidence. Recognizance orders 
under section 810.2 require the presiding judge to determine, on a balance of 
probabilities, if there are reasonable grounds to impose restrictive conditions on a 
potential offender. In performing an assessment to determine the risk of future 
dangerousness, the judge must look at evidence presented by both parties. And, of course, 
in the context of the Canadian adversarial system, the judge must generally decide 
between opposing evidence. 
In Noble, the Quebec Superior Court examined how a court should determine the 
reasonableness of the informant's fear. In the Court's opinion the fear cannot only be 
based on past criminal activities, it must also "... relate... to the present portrait which is 
offered of the defendant by the informant".364 An element of immediacy in the risk posed 
Noble, ibid, at para. 3. 
363 The question of the of the required evidence to trigger a recognizance order under section 810.2 (and 
arguably section 810.1) was examined by the Ontario Court of Justice in George, supra note 332 at 41: 
"[w]hen considering the s.810.2 application, the Court must scrutinize carefully the evidence put before it. 
As the late Justice Sopinka expressed it in R. v. Parks [1992 CarswellOnt 996 (S.C.C.)], "the law requires a 
proven factual foundation which raises a probable ground to suspect a future misbehaviour." And as 
Justice Fairgrieve expressed in R. v. Harding [1998 CarswellOnt 2426 (Ont. Prov. Div.)], "the test requires 
both that the underlying facts be established on a balance of probabilities and secondly, that the harm 
feared be more likely than not to occur." These references are conveniently found with citations in the 
judgment of Justice Bellefontaine in the R. v. Tausendfrende case [2003] O.J. No. 3739 (Ont. C.J.) at 
paragraphs [14]-[17]". [Emphasis added]. 
364 Noble, supra note 9 at para. 42. 
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by the potential offender is also required before a recognizance order can be imposed. 
In other words, "...[t]he fear must reflect a risk of serious and imminent danger". 
The Court adopted the reasoning of the Ontario General Division Court in Budreo, who 
had cautioned judges to exercise care before imposing restrictive conditions under section 
810.2.367 Moreover, on the question of the required threshold required to demonstrate 
dangerousness, the Court again cited the decision in Budreo : 
Both ss. 810 and 810.1 speak of a reasonably grounded fear that the defendant 
"will" commit an offence. To my mind, as a matter of legislative construction, this 
takes the appropriate threshold a notch above a simple demonstration that the 
defendant is more likely than not to commit an offence. A reasonably grounded 
fear of a serious and imminent danger must be proved on a balance of 
probabilities.369 
In light of the gloss given by the Court in Noble, it would appear that the threshold 
required for imposing a recognizance order is indeed higher. Not only must it be proven 
that the defendant "will commit an offence", but the informant must have a "reasonably 
grounded fear" that the potential offender is imminently dangerous. 
365 Noble, ibid, at para. 43-44. 
366 Ibid, at 43. In Noble, the Quebec Superior Court also cited the case of Nabhan c. Henault, 500-09-
010514-016, 2003-09-25 (C.A. Que.), [2003 CarswellQue 2074], where the Court of Appeal of Quebec 
stated that the fear of the informant must reflect an imminent danger: « [i]l doit s'agir de la crainte 
raisonnable d'un danger reel et imminent qu'une personne commette I'infraction que Ton cherche a 
prevenir ». It is also worth mentioning that the above noted reasoning of the Court in Noble appears to be 
in line with the Supreme Court decision in Parks, supra note 171 at 911, where the common law power to 
keep the peace was examined. At 911 of the decision, the Supreme Court stated that "mere speculations" 
are not sufficient to impose a peace bond. Rather, "...a proven factual foundation which raises a probable 
ground to suspect of future misbehaviour", must be demonstrated. See also F. (M.), supra note 323, 
where the Ontario Superior Court of Justice applied the principle enunciated in Parks to section 810.2 of 
the Criminal Code. 
367 Noble, ibid, at para.44, citing Budreo Ont. Gen. supra note 342 at para. 25. 
368 Budreo, Ont. Gen., ibid. 
369 Noble, supra note 9 at para.44,[Footnotes omitted], citing Budreo, Ont. Gen., ibid. 
370lbid. 
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While the Court characterised the threshold as higher than a simple proof of likelihood 
that an individual will commit a crime, it does not, like Budreo, addresses the problem of 
inaccuracy in determining dangerousness. While someone may have a reasonable fear of 
a serious and imminent danger created by a particular individual, it must still be 
determined at some point that this individual actually poses a risk to society. Again, if the 
very process by which the court bases its decision can potentially be flawed, due to 
problems of inaccuracy or biases in the assessment of dangerousness, there is a risk that 
an individual may be unjustly exposed to restrictive conditions. In the case of 
convicted criminals, that risk may be acceptable. However, in the case of individuals with 
no previous criminal record, the risk may not be acceptable, since science is incapable of 
predicting the future with accuracy. The assessment of dangerousness, although a key 
element at the base of preventive measures, such as recognizance orders under sections 
810.1 and 810.2 of the Criminal Code, is once again not considered by the Court in 
Noble. 
The Quebec Superior Court in Noble did, nonetheless, look at the evidence that was 
presented to the presiding judge and determined that it did not demonstrate a "real and 
imminent danger".372 Both parties had provided various psychological assessments to the 
presiding judge.373 Acknowledging that the powers of an appellate court are limited when 
examining evidence already considered by the trial judge, the Court, nevertheless, 
rejected the informant's contention that the evidence demonstrated a reasonable fear of an 
In Budreo, supra note 8 at para. 53, the Court stated that the problem of inaccuracy in predicting 
dangerousness is not enough to render the legislation "void for vagueness". 
372 Noble, supra note 9 at para. 46. 
Ibid, at para. 47. 
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imminent danger posed by the defendant.374 In the Court's opinion, the evidence 
demonstrated that there might be a risk of recidivism but she was not imminently 
dangerous.375 The Court was satisfied that the risk of reoffending was minimal and that 
the conditions imposed on Mrs. Teale should be quashed. 
Nevertheless, the Court decided to examine the reasonableness of the conditions that 
were imposed upon Mrs. Teale in case it had made an error in quashing them. The 
Court examined the breadth of statutory conditions provided in section 810.2 and pointed 
out that these include the following: 
• statutory obligation to impose a condition to keep the peace and be of good 
behaviour; 
• such other reasonable conditions; 
• prohibition, in general terms, to possess weapons; 
• obligation, in general terms, to report to correctional or police authorities.378 
The Court also looked at the breadth of peace bonds and recognizance orders available 
under section 810 generally. It explains that section 810 is normally used in cases 
"...where domestic violence is feared". According to the Court, restrictive conditions 
that can be imposed under section 810 include "prohibition of possessing weapons" and 
"restraining conditions, prohibiting the defendant from entering into contact" with 
identified victims.380 
374 Noble, ibid, at para. 52-53. 
375 Ibid, at para. 82. 
376 Ibid, at para. 119. 
377 Ibid, at para. 121. 
378 Ibid, at para. 130. 
379 Ibid, at para. 134. 
380 Ibid, at para. 134 and 136. See also Criminal Code, supra note 2 at s. 810(3.1) and s. 810(3.2). 
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As for section 810.01, the Court explains that this provision is used where there is "...fear 
T O 1 
of organized crime and terrorist activities". The restrictive conditions that can be 
imposed under that section includes "...the prohibition of possessing weapons".382 
The Court also looked at the breadth of restrictive conditions that can be imposed under 
section 810.1 which targets paedophiles who would commit sexual offences against 
persons under the age of sixteen.383 The Court noted that section 810.1 enables a judge to 
order restrictive conditions, such as prohibiting the defendant to engage "...in any activity 
that involves contact with persons under the age of fourteen years", and attending places 
"1QA 
where these persons could "...reasonably be expected to be present". 
As for section 810.2, which is available in cases where it is feared that an individual 
might commit a serious personal injury offense, the Court explains that the restrictive 
conditions that can be imposed by the presiding judge include the "prohibition of 
possessing weapons" and "...the obligation to report to correctional or police 
authorities".385 
In all cases, namely sections 810, 810.01, 810.1 and 810.2, the Court in Noble remarks 
that the presiding judge can also impose any other reasonable conditions similar to the 
ones prescribed in the specific provision. In the case of section 810.2, the Quebec 
Superior Court stated that other reasonable conditions which can be imposed have to be 
Noble, ibid, at para. 137. 
Ibid, at para. 139. See also Criminal Code, supra note 2, at s. 810.01(5). 
Noble, ibid, at para. 140. 
Ibid, at para. 141. 
Ibid. para. 143. 
Ibid, at para. 149. 
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similar in essence to the "prohibition of possessing weapons" and the obligation to report 
to authorities.387 
Thus, due to the lack of similarity with the specified conditions in section 810.2, the 
Court concluded that some of the conditions imposed on Mrs. Teale were not reasonable. 
These conditions included a prohibition to enter into contact with violent offenders or 
families of past victims; possession of illicit substances; prohibition to work where she 
"...would be placed in a position of trust vis-a-vis persons under the age of sixteen"; as 
well as an obligation to give a DNA sample or to follow a therapy with a mental health 
professional.388 Therefore, the Court clarified the breath of the restrictive conditions 
available under a recognizance order pursuant to section 810.2 of the Criminal Code. 
In conclusion, the Quebec Superior Court adopted the reasoning of the Court in Budreo 
as to the reasonableness of the breadth of the conditions available under a section 810.2 
recognizance order. Perhaps the most relevant comment of the Court to our analysis 
resides in the judge's caution as to the use of recognizance orders to prevent crime. In 
this regard, the Court restated the findings of the Ontario General Division Court in 
Budreo to the effect that "...where there has been no offence and only a likelihood of 
harm proven, the restrictions imposed in the name of preventive justice can only be 
•50Q 
relatively slight". As we explained earlier, however, courts may actually impinge upon 
the rights of a potential offender when imposing recognizance orders. 
Noble, ibid. 
Ibid, at para. 153. See also conditions 7 to 14 as cited in the Appendix of the decision in Noble. 
Ibid, at para. 145, citing Budreo, Ont. Gen. Crt., supra note 342 at para. 69. 
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viii) Other Relevant Case Law Pertaining to Recognizance Orders Under 
Sections 810.1 and 810.2 of the Criminal Code 
The Courts in the cases of Budreo and Noble have examined the constitutionality of 
sections 810.1 and 810.2 of the Criminal Code. They have confirmed the constitutionality 
of the scheme, its preventive nature, as well as the fact that recognizance orders are not to 
be considered as offences. In these decisions, the court also clarified the breadth of 
restrictive conditions: the presiding judge can only impose reasonable conditions which 
are similar to the ones already provided in the provision. 
There have been other important interpretations by courts as to the applicability of 
sections 810.1 and 810.2 recognizance orders. The following paragraphs will examine 
some of these decisions. 
In R. v. Obed,390 the Nova Scotia Provincial Court heard an application for a 
recognizance order under section 810.2. In that case, the Crown sought a recognizance 
order that would have imposed restrictive conditions upon the defendant's release from 
prison. The court specified that the past conduct of the offender was relevant to 
determining if he or she should be subjected to restrictive conditions pursuant to a 
recognizance order, but that it was the present situation which was essential to the 
determination of dangerousness.391 In the court's opinion, "[t]he past act can operate as 
the thermometer, so to speak, to gauge the present behaviour". 
R. v. Obed, 2000 CarswellNS 95, [2000] N.S.J. No. 18 [Obed cited to Carswell]. 
391 Ibid, at para. 36. On that note, it is worth pointing out the reasoning of the Court in Baker, supra note 
11 at para. 32, cited in Obed, supra note 390, at para. 51, with respect to the "present situation" of the 
potential offender: [i]f the Crown can point to a "contemporary act" of the defendant then this will 
undoubtedly bolster the Crown's case on reasonable grounds. However, this does not mean that an "act" 
of the defendant need be demonstrated before a recognizance can be issued". 
392 Obed, ibid, at para. 36. 
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Furthermore, in Obed, the court interpreted Parliament's objective in enacting section 
810.2 and explained that it was "...to be used as a shield and not as a sword". The court 
explains as follows: "Parliament intended it, I think, to protect, in a positive passive 
manner, individual members of society who may be vulnerable to the offender, and not 
for it to be used as a negative pro-active tool to identify, vilify and subject otherwise 
innocent persons to legal process without just cause".394 Therefore, according to the 
court, the aim of section 810.2 is "...to protect the community from high risk offenders 
and low risk nonviolent offenders". 
The court also distinguishes the scheme under section 753 of the Criminal Code 
(dangerous offender designation) and section 810.2 and remarks that while the two 
sections are concerned with the "present behaviour of the defendant", they do so in a 
"different and distinct manner". The court considers section 810.2 as only applicable to 
persons who can be identified, and not to the community as a whole. It states the 
following: 
Therefore, I think that the section must be confined to the protection of 
identifiable persons who can cause or suffer an injury. Here, the community per 
se, cannot suffer bodily harm, be sexually assaulted or ha[ve] its life endangered. 
In short, the community is not a living human being. In the end, having regard to 
the natural and ordinary meaning of the words used, the community per se, in my 
opinion, is not a person as envisaged by the section. Thus, the community per se, 
cannot avail itself to the section as it is presently worded. 
With respect to the constitutionality of section 810.2, the court explains that recognizance 
orders under this section are reasonable. In the court's opinion, individuals cannot have 
Ibid, at para. 37. 
Ibid. 
395 Ibid, at para. 67. 
396 Ibid, at para. 63. 
397 
Ibid, at para. 66. 
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restrictive conditions imposed upon them based only on the fact of what they represent, 
due to their past behaviour.398 The simple fact that a person has committed a crime in the 
past should not be sufficient to trigger a section 810.2 recognizance order.399 Therefore, 
the ambit of section 810.2 is not to address the concern of society towards a particular 
individual, but rather the imminent risk of dangerousness that he or she may present. 
Before examining other decisions pertaining to the applicability of recognizance orders, it 
is worth to pointing out that in Obed, the defendant was a member of a group of Inuit 
who had a history of difficulty of integration due to forced dislocation.400 This point is 
relevant because the court did mention the evidence given by a mental health expert who 
had "...comment[ed] on the culturally inherent biases" of some risk assessment tools. In 
fact, during the defendant's incarceration, various risk assessment tools, including the 
Hare PCL-R, were administered to evaluate his risk of dangerousness.401 Once again, 
problems in the reliability of assessment tools, and more specifically when they are 
applied to some cultural minorities, are noted. It is argued that special consideration 
should also be given by judges when weighing the evidence emanating from risk 
assessment tools in cases involving minorities since the assessment tools may not have 
been validated. In this regard, some studies suggest that assessment tools may not 
perform as well with minorities.402 This is a particularly relevant issue, when it is 
considered that minorities are often "...over-represented in the criminal justice system".403 
398 Obed, ibid, at 78. 
399 Ibid. 
400 Ibid, at para. 3. 
401 Ibid, at para. 8. 
402 See for example Douglas L. Epperson et al., "Minnesota Sex Offender Screening Tool-Revised 
(MnSOST-R) Technical Paper: Development, Validation, and Recommended Risk Level Cut Scores" (2003), 
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Several other decisions in Canadian criminal jurisprudence have examined the 
applicability of recognizance orders under sections 810.1 and 810.2. For example, in R. v. 
Bateman404, the Ontario Supreme Court of justice limited the applicability of 
recognizance orders to "..., persons who pose the greatest threat to all other members of 
society".405 
In the decision of R. v. Falle406, the Alberta Provincial Court explained that "...section 
810.2 enacts concepts of preventive or restorative justice".407 The court explains the 
following: 
I find that this section of the Criminal Code is Parliament's attempt to move away 
from mere punishment to something approaching penitence by attempting to 
achieve character reform for those who have demonstrated habits and actions and 
lifestyles that are violent and dangerous to the peace of civil society.408 
In the eyes of the court, a recognizance order under section 810.2 can be viewed as a tool 
utilized to achieve "post-release supervision" in order to protect vulnerable members of 
the society in cases where the offender was not reformed.409 
Furthermore, in R. v. George, the Ontario Court of Justice commented on the sufficiency 
of the evidence needed to trigger the issuance of a recognizance order. The court stated 
online: Minnesota Sex Offender Screening Tool - Revised 
<http://www.psychology.iastate.edu/~dle/TechUpdatePaperl2-03.pdf, at 22. 
403 Joanne Fuller, "Assessing and Supervising Violent Offenders in the Community, A Report to the 
Multnomah County Board of County Commissioners And The Local Public Safety Coordinating Council" (14 
July 2005), online: Department of Community Justice, Multnomah County Oregon 
<http://www.co.multnomah.or.us/dcj/violence_report05.pdf>, at 8. 
404 ft. v. Bateman, 2006 CarswellOnt 9391, O.J. No. 2219 (Ont. S.C.J.)[Bateman cited to Carswell]. 
405 Ibid, at para.7, also cited in ft. v. Helary, 2006 CarswellNfld 323 [Helary], at para. 7. 
406 ft. v. Falle, 2001 CarswellAlta 185, 2001ABPC 36, 285 A.R. 391 [Falle cited to Carswell]. 
407 Ibid, at para. 7. 
408 . . . . 
Ibid. 
409 Ibid. See also George, supra note 332 at para.3, where the Court states that section 810.2: "..., is aimed 
at creating a mechanism for some modest level of community supervision for individuals who are found 
by the Court to present a particular and demonstrable risk to others". 
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that in general, "...past behaviour itself is the most reliable predictor of future 
conduct".410 According to the court, "[m]any s.810 applications require nothing more by 
way of evidentiary foundation than the criminal history of the defendant to secure an 
order".411 Arguably, this view is diametrically opposed to the general approach taken by 
courts when weighing evidence in criminal law. More factors should be taken into 
account than the criminal history of the defendant, including the current situation of the 
offender. 
In George, the court also pointed out that where there are no criminal records, expert 
assessment as to the risk of future dangerousness is desirable, if not required.412 The court 
also demonstrates a reluctance to accept the interpretation of risk assessments tools, such 
as the VRAG and HCR-20, from a lay person. In other words, the complexity of the 
results obtained with these tests can be better understood and explained by mental health 
professionals.413 In other words, expert testimony on the risk of future behaviour will 
"carry more weight" than the one given by a lay person.414 This view agrees with the 
reasoning of the judge in Budreo where he stated that risk factors "...need to be 
professionally evaluated to assess a person's risk of reoffending".415 
Conversely, there is some case law supporting the idea that the use of expert opinions is 
not required in all cases. In Giroux c. Pelletier, the Court of Quebec explained that in 
cases involving individuals with no prior criminal history, the required proof necessary to 
410 George, ibid, at para. 31. 
411 Ibid. 
412 Ibid, at para. 31. 
413 Ibid, at para. 31 and 32. 
414 George, ibid, at para. 31. 
415 Budreo, Gen. Crt., supra note 342 at para. 84. See also Giroux c. Pelletier 2009 CarswellQue 5560, 2009 
QCCQ4870, EYB 2009-159848 [Giroux cited to Carswell], at para. 19. 
416 Giroux, ibid, at para. 28. 
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obtain a recognizance order might be more difficult to present because of clarity issues as 
to his or her potential dangerousness.417 In those cases, expert evidence would be needed. 
However, in cases involving multi-recidivists, the required proof may be easier to 
4.1 R 
demonstrate, and the use of expert evidence may be less important. 
ix) The Detrimental Consequences of a Determination of Dangerousness 
and the Imposition of a Recognizance Order upon a Potential 
Offender 
The Court of Appeal in Budreo considered the restrictive conditions imposed on the 
defendant under section 810.1 as "...stop[ping] short of detention or imprisonment".419 
However, on this point, the court made no mention of the consequences of imprisonment 
for a period of up to two years in case of a refusal to enter into a recognizance or a breach 
of the recognizance.420 This is an alarming situation, especially when we consider that 
risk assessment tests are not always reliable, and that judges rely on them, nevertheless, 
to determine the likelihood of the future dangerousness of an individual.421 The 
imposition of restrictive conditions upon an individual on the basis that he might commit 
a crime is also at odds with the principle that in "...a democratic society under the rule of 
law and the Constitution..., there should be no coercive intervention by the state without a 
high measure of certainty that a crime has been, is being or will be committed".422 While 
417 . . . . 
Ibid. 
418 . . . . 
Ibid. 
419 
Budreo, supra note 8 at para.39. 
420 See generally Criminal Code, supra note 2 at ss. 810.01(4); 810.1(3.1); 810.2(4) and 811. It is worth 
pointing out that in the case of a refusal to enter into a recognizance under section 810.1 or 810.2 of the 
Criminal Code, the period of imprisonment cannot exceed twelve months [s.810.1(3.1) and s.810.2(4)]. 
421 But see Cohen, supra note 14 at 425, where he notes that much deference is accorded to officials in 
making a determination of dangerousness since it is an "imprecise art". In support of this contention, 
Cohen, ibid, at 425, also cites Morales, supra note 334 at 738: "[w]hile it is undoubtedly the case that it is 
impossible to make exact predictions about recidivism and future dangerousness, exact predictability of 
future dangerousness is not constitutionally mandated". 
422 Cohen, ibid, at 412. 
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the conditions imposed under sections 810.1 or 810.2 might be viewed as reasonable and 
necessary to prevent the commission of an offense, some conditions can prove to be 
particularly detrimental to an offender's reintegration into society. For example, 
restrictive conditions can literally confine a potential offender to his or her place of 
residence. 
In Budreo, the court even acknowledged that "...it [was] fair to conclude that detention or 
imprisonment under a provision that does not charge an offence would be an 
unacceptable restriction on a defendant's liberty and would be contrary to the principles 
of fundamental justice".423 Adding to this statement, the court also explained that the 
reasonableness of the conditions imposed upon the defendant enabled him "...to lead a 
reasonably normal life" but did not consider explicitly the real consequences upon the 
defendant's life.424 
In the case of R. v. George, the court described the serious implications of a section 810 
recognizance order in these terms: 
The s.810 order may have a very significant impact on the liberty of the subject. 
These orders are registered in law enforcement databases, require regular 
reporting to the police, impose limits on freedom of mobility and association, and 
carry penal sanctions for failing to comply. Undoubtedly a significant stigma also 
attaches to such an order...425 
Recognizance orders are powerful tools that can have serious implications on the life of 
potential offenders. In the next paragraphs, the potential detrimental effects of 
recognizance orders on the life of potential offenders will now be examined. 
423 Budreo, supra note 8 at para. 39. 
424 Ibid. 
425 George, supra note 332 at para. 22. 
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x) Examples of Difficulties that can be Encountered by Potentially 
Dangerous Individuals when Trying to Abide by the Conditions of 
Recognizance Orders 
In some cases, it might prove untenable for the offender to obey all the imposed 
conditions if he or she wants to live a normal life or to seek and find employment. The 
detrimental consequences of restrictive conditions under a recognizance order were 
examined by the John Howard Society. The John Howard Society described the 
restrictive nature of recognizance orders in the following terms: 
On the surface, the high-risk peace bond measure appears reasonable, but when a 
number of conditions are imposed, particularly when they are not realistic, 
offenders may be unable to abide by them. Consequently, released offenders 
subject to a peace bond have an inordinately difficult time staying out of jail.426 
It is argued that restrictive conditions pursuant to recognizance orders are not only 
supervisory measures, but also constitute a form of preventive detention in society. 
Despite the potential offender's best intentions when facing a recognizance order, he or 
she may very well breach the conditions of the order because of the virtual impossibility 
of abiding by them completely without remaining confined in their home. For example, 
an individual may have a hard time going to work without approaching areas where 
children are present. He or she may run afoul of conditions of his recognizance orders 
without even being aware of it. However, in this regard, there is some case law to the 
effect that a breach of recognizance order (at least under section 810(3)) requires a mental 
element, where "...guilt may not result from mere carelessness or negligence or 
forgetfulness". Moreover, "...a mental element is required for a breach under section 
426 John Howard, "Dangerous Offenders", supra note 51. 
427 R. v. Monrose [1998] Q.J. No. 1415,1998 CarswellQue 860,19 C.R. (5th) 359 [Monrose cited to 
Carswell], at para. 17, cited in Solicitor General of Canada, High-Risk Offenders: A Handbook for Criminal 
Justice Professionals, online: National Institute of Corrections 
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810 such that there is "...the wilful action of an accused knowing that it is contrary to the 
terms of an existing recognizance".4 
Nevertheless, restrictive conditions may, on some occasions, impose a heavy burden on 
an individual. This situation was once again highlighted by the John Howard Society that 
mentioned the case of a sex offender from Alberta who had been subjected to restrictive 
conditions under section 810.2. According to the John Howard Society, the conditions of 
the recognizance order included the following obligations: 
...inform local police about a change in residence, providing at least 24 hours 
before the change; ..., report weekly to a specified detective in a city about 100 
kilometers away, even though he does not have a vehicle;..., not come within 100 
meters of a public area where children under the age of 14 might be present;..., 
[or] enter a residence within which live children under 14 years of age".429 
Arguably, most of these restrictive conditions may appear reasonable at first glance since 
the Court was confronted with a convicted sex offender. However, by the John Howard 
Society's own description of the consequences on the life of the offender, it quickly 
becomes apparent that the restrictive conditions were hindering the possibility of the 
offender's reintegration. 
In the case described by the John Howard Society, the conditions imposed on the sex 
offender were breached by him on several occasions.430 The Society states that at one 
point, the offender changed residence and failed to notify the police. But in reality, he 
"...was evicted from a hotel in which he was living after his identity arid sex offender 
<http://ww2.pssp.gc.ca/publications/corrections/pdf/200105_handbook_e.pdf> [PSC, "High Risk 
Offenders"], at 124. 
Ibid. 
429 John Howard, "Dangerous Offenders", supra note 51. 
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status was publicized".431 According to the Society, the offender then tried to contact the 
police to notify them but to no avail. He decided to leave a message, but he breached his 
recognizance order because he had failed to notify the police 24 hours prior to a change 
of residence.432 The offender then breached his recognizance order a second time 
"...when he moved in with his wife because she [was] liv[ing] across the street from a 
playground".433 
The sex offender stigma, coupled with the restrictive conditions attached to a 
recognizance order, also caused several problems to the offender, including difficulties in 
seeking employment or receiving welfare benefits.434 According to the John Howard 
Society, the restrictive conditions imposed on the offender had a punitive effect rather 
than a preventive one: 
As it stands, he cannot walk down the street without potentially passing a young 
child. He risks returning to jail on a daily basis and is forced to stay in his hotel 
room twenty-four hours a day. In effect, the peace bond provision set out in 
section 810.2 of the Criminal Code, to which L. J. is subject, is operating as a 
435 
punitive provision. 
Therefore, conditions under a section 810.2 recognizance order can have far reaching 
consequences on the liberty of an individual. They can not only restrict movement, but 
also the ability to function properly in society. In the end, it is the reintegration of the 
offender that suffers. Consequently, it is argued that a court should exercise great care in 
imposing restrictive conditions pursuant to a recognizance order. The importance of 






rehabilitation and reintegration into society must also be weighed by the court before 
imposing a recognizance order.436 
Furthermore, although the imposition of a recognizance order is not, "technically 
speaking", the result of an offence as seen in Budreo and Noble, the effect of a breach of 
a restrictive condition under such an order does constitute an offence under section 811. 
In the Proceedings of the Special Senate Committee on Anti-terrorism Issue437 which 
looked at the consequences of the enactment of section 83.3 of the Criminal Code, Craig 
Forcese made the following observations with respect to the breach of conditions under a 
recognizance order: "...[t]o set up a condition that is essentially a hair trigger, the effect is 
to convert a pre-emptive mechanism -— a condition that avoids or mitigates the chances 
that an individual will be a threat — to an actual prosecution for an activity that, 
otherwise, is considered banal...".438 It is argued that given the serious implications of a 
436 The problem of proper reintegration into society posed by the implications of sections 810.1 and 810.2 
recognizance orders on the life of potentially dangerous individuals is arguably not limited to the 
Canadian situation. For example, in Australia, the case of post-sentence restrictive conditions was 
examined recently in McSherry, Bernadette, High Risk Offenders: Continued Detention and Supervision 
options, Community Issues Papers (August 2006), online: Sentencing Advisory Council: 
<http://www.sentencingcouncil.vic.gov.au/wps/wcm/connect/Sentencing+Council/resources/file/eb2046 
0d6d23bdf/High-Risk_Community_lssues_Paper.pdf> at 39: "[ajnother issue concerns the conditions that 
can be imposed in extended supervision orders. Orders can contain highly restrictive conditions which 
may severely limit offenders' opportunities for normal day-to-day interaction. Offenders who have 
completed parole and are subsequently placed on an extended supervision order may find the conditions 
more onerous than their parole conditions. Although restrictive conditions may be considered necessary 
to protect the community, their effect may be to 'punish' offenders by restricting their liberty at the 
expense of aiding their rehabilitation and reintegration into the community. There was concern that the 
number and degree of conditions of an extended supervision order have the potential effectively to 
transform it into a form of continued detention". 
437Parliament of Canada, Proceedings of the Special Senate Committee on Anti-terrorism Issue-Evidence-
Meeting, Issue 2, January 28, 2008, Second Session, Thirty-ninth Parliament, 2007-2008, Chair: The 





recognizance order and the risk of breaching a restrictive condition, these orders should 
only be imposed upon past convicted dangerous offenders. 
xi) The Over-Prediction of Dangerousness by Members of the Judiciary 
In Chapter V, we examined some of the problems associated with reliability in risk 
prediction tools used by mental health professionals. We also looked at how judges 
normally use these tools to assess the potential dangerousness of an individual in 
dangerous offender legislation and recognizance orders under sections 810.1 and 810.2. 
However, as some of the findings of a new study reveal, there is evidence that members 
of the judiciary are over predicting the risk of future behaviour despite the use of risk 
prediction tools.439 In the study by Lussier et al., the profiles of high-risk offenders under 
supervision (or bound by recognisance orders under section 810 of the Criminal Code) 
are examined. Of particular relevance to our analysis, Lussier et al. make the following 
observations: "...from those that have been identified by the courts as high-risk offenders 
to commit a sex crime while in the community, we found that about 50% did not meet the 
requirement of high risk when taking into account the two risk assessment tools [namely 
the Static-99 and the Stable]".440 In the words of the researchers, the Courts labelled a 
substantial proportion of individuals as dangerous and imposed community supervision 
under section 810, despite a low risk to re-offend.441 Once again, the results of this 
research demonstrate that judges must be particularly vigilant in assessing the evidence in 
a section 810 hearing. 
439 Patrick Lussier, Nadine Deslauriers-Varin & Tricia Ratel, "A Descriptive Profile of High-Risk 
Sex Offenders Under Intensive Supervision in the Province of British Columbia", Canada, International 
Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, (15 October 2008), online: Sage Journal Online 
<http://ijo.sagepub.com/cgi/rapidpdf/0306624X08323236vl.pdMLussier], at 19. 
440 Lussier, ibid. 
"'Ibid. 
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In the context of a statute which is primarily aimed at preventing crimes, by the 
imposition of restrictive conditions that undeniably affect fundamental principles of 
justice, it is a rather alarming situation. As explained earlier, not only are assessment 
tools plagued with reliability issues, but it appears that some members of the judiciary are 
over-predicting the results obtained by these tools. Perhaps, test results are prone to be 
misunderstood, partly because they can be difficult to interpret. However, arguably, the 
possibility of letting a potentially dangerous individual roam freely in the community, 
and later to commit a crime, may very well play a role in some judges' over-prediction. 
In other words, some members of the judiciary may be tempted to subjectively interpret 
test results in favour of a positive determination of dangerousness so as not to take any 
risk of enabling a potentially dangerous individual to commit a crime. In the eyes of the 
community, the negative consequences of a crime would be far more apparent than the 
ones attached to a false positive interpretation. 
xii) The Severe Implications of a Refusal to Enter into a Recognizance 
Order, or a Breach of a Restrictive Condition 
Earlier, it was explained that recognizance orders under sections 810.1 and 810.2 have 
been characterized as preventive measures rather than punitive ones, and that they do not 
constitute offenses.442 While the imposition of a recognizance order is not technically the 
result of an offense, the failure or refusal to enter into one can constitute an offense for 
which punitive measures can be applied. Considering that most restrictive measures 
under a recognizance order will seek to limit otherwise banal activities (like taking a walk 
near a school), it is important to understand the consequences of a failure to abide by the 
See generally Budreo, supra note 8. 
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conditions. In fact, not only does the scheme under section 810.1 and 810.2 rely on an 
imprecise system of determination of dangerousness to impose recognizance orders, it 
also creates a new opportunity for the State to prosecute potentially dangerous individuals 
when they fail to abide by the conditions of the order. 
In fact, failure or refusal to enter into a recognizance order can be severely punished by 
the court. For example, section 810.1(3.1) provides the following: 
(3.1) The provincial court judge may commit the defendant to prison for a term 
not exceeding twelve months if the defendant fails or refuses to enter into the 
444 
recognizance. 
Moreover, it is important to note that the breach of a recognizance order is considered an 
offense. The breach of a recognizance order can have serious repercussions on a potential 
offender. Section 811 provides: 
811. A person bound by a recognizance under section 83.3, 810, 810.01, 810.1 or 
810.2 who commits a breach of the recognizance is guilty of 
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two 
years; or 
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction. 
As noted earlier, the detrimental effects of a breach of section 811 were recently 
examined in the Proceedings of the Special Senate Committee on Anti-terrorism Issue.445 
Some members of the Committee criticised the "prosecution [of an] activity that, 
otherwise, is considered banal".446 Viewed from this angle, it could be argued that the 
This question was addressed by Craig Forcese in Proceedings, supra note 437. 
444 Criminal Code, supra note 2 at s. 810.1(3.1). See also ibid, at s. 810.2(4). 
445 Proceedings, supra note 437. 
446 Ibid. Comments from Craig Forcese. While it could be argued that Mr. Forcese was making these 
observations in the context of section 83.3 of the Criminal Code which provide for recognizance orders in 
suspected terrorists cases, the same reasoning could arguably be applied to sections 810.1 and 810.2 of 
the Criminal Code. In fact, with the exception of the intended victims it seeks to protect, both sections 
83.3, 810.1 and 810.2 are identical in nature. 
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scheme under sections 810.1 and 810.2 is not so concerned with the prevention of crimes, 
as with a new opportunity for the State to catch potentially dangerous individuals in 
conduct that would otherwise be considered legitimate. 
The breach of recognizance orders was also analysed at length in the decision of R. v. 
Helary447 In that case, the Newfoundland and Labrador Provincial Court underlined the 
seriousness of a breach of condition under a recognizance order which can amount to a 
lengthy period of incarceration.448 In the Court's opinion, when sentencing an individual 
for a breach of condition, the court should impose a sentence which takes into account the 
safety of the community.449 According to the Court, "[t]he community's safety can best 
be achieved by imposing sentences which ensure that those bound by a section 810.2 
recognizance clearly understand that a breach of such an order will consistently result in 
considerable periods of imprisonment being imposed".450 Objectives of deterrence in the 
sentencing of the accused under section 811 are therefore inherent to the provision. Other 
sentencing principles under section 811 denoted by the Court in Helary include the 
following: 
• the protection of the public is the Court's primary concern; 
• particular emphasis must be placed upon both specific and general deterrence 
and the separation of the offender from society when necessary; 
• rehabilitation will be of a much lesser concern than in sentencing for other 
offences; 
Helary, supra note 405. 
448 Ibid, at para. 10. 
Ibid. 
450 Ibid. See also R. v. Spun, 2000 CarswellOnt 6527 (Ont. C.J.)[Spurr], cited in Helary, supra note 405 at 
para. 73-75. In Spun, at para. 9, the Ontario Court of Justice states that in considering the relevant factors 
when sentencing, a court in order must"..., impose a just sentence which has as its objective, an 
appropriate blend of the need to separate the accused from society to reflect the gravity of the offence 
before the Court, to deter others, to deter the accused and to consider the accused's rehabilitation." 
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• the proportionality principle must be applied, but the Court must also consider 
the nature of the order that was breached and the potential danger to the public 
that the offender poses; 
• a breach of a section 810.2 recognizance is a signal or warning to the Court that 
the monitoring and controlling of the offender's behaviour and actions, so as to 
protect the public from him or her, cannot be achieved in the community; and 
• the appropriate sentence will normally involve lengthy periods of imprisonment 
and probation. 451 
The decision in R. v. Spurr also gives light to the principles of sentencing under section 
811.452 In that case, the court cautioned members of the judiciary that a reasonable and 
proportionate sentence should be ordered when a restrictive condition is breached: 
The fact that a peace bond is a prophylactic tool designed to prevent wrong-doing 
before it occurs does not mean that a sentencing court can impose a sentence of a 
length that is completely disproportionate to the gravity of the conduct before the 
court as a pure exercise of preventative detention.453 
Finally, in R. v Labbe,454 the Court reiterated the importance of the societal concern of the 
protection of the public from potentially dangerous individuals when sentencing them for 
a breach of a condition imposed under section 810.2. In the Court's opinion, the non-
respect of the conditions creates a situation where there is a real risk of dangerousness.455 
The consequences of a breach of a condition or a refusal to enter into a recognizance 
order under section 810.2 (and 810.1) are serious and entail the possibility of a lengthy 
period of incarceration. Because the imposition of a recognizance order is normally 
applied to potentially dangerous individuals, the court will not view a breach of a 
restrictive condition under a favourable eye, out of concern for the protection of the 
public. In effect, what section 811 does is to create an offense for a breach of a 
Helary, supra note 405 at para. 92. 
452 
Spurr, supra note 450. 
453 Spurr, ibid, at para.10, cited in Helary, supra note 405 at para.75. 
454 R. v. Labbe, [2006] O.J. No. 512 (Ont. C.J.), [2006] O.J. No. 512[iofabe],at para. 25, cited in Helary, ibid. 
at para. 84. 
Labbe, ibid. 
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recognizance order under section 810.1 or 810.2. One must not forget that these 
recognizance orders are often applied based on a determination of dangerousness that is 
far from being completely accurate. As well, the restrictive conditions normally imposed 
under a recognizance order would not constitute an illegal activity in the case of an 
individual who poses no risk to society. By imposing restrictive conditions under which 
to perform otherwise regular and legitimate activities, the State effectively opens the door 
to monitoring and prosecution of potentially dangerous individuals, even after their 
mandatory prison sentence. In other words, section 811 acts like the sword of Damocles, 
dangling over the head of the suspected dangerous individual. If the individual is truly 
dangerous, this may very well be an acceptable position. However, one must never forget 
that a determination of dangerousness is prone to false positives. 
xiii) Conclusions on the Applicability of Recognizance Orders under 
Sections 810.1 and 810.2 of the Criminal Code 
From the above analysis, it is possible to underline the following tendencies. First, 
Canadian courts appear to accept the notion that dangerousness can be proven, although 
the required threshold is subject to interpretation. Secondly, in the cases that were 
examined, the informants who had a fear of imminent danger were generally members of 
the police or correctional services. As a matter of fact, "[ojrdinarily, police and/or 
provincial crown attorneys apply for sections 810.1 and 810.2 of the Criminal Code".456 
Moreover, courts rely on all relevant evidence to make a determination as to the 
"likelihood of future dangerousness", which is the required threshold to issue a 
recognizance order. Courts adopted the "likelihood of future dangerousness" threshold 
456 Public Safety, supra note 263. 
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from the approach taken in dangerous offender designations and bail hearings, but did not 
modify it. Consequently, it appears that the impossibility of predicting future 
dangerousness with accuracy is not an argument against the validity of the preventive 
scheme under sections 810.1 and 810.2. The case of Lyons, although concerned with a 
dangerous offender application, established the required threshold to determine 
dangerousness, namely a "likelihood of future conduct".457 It confirmed that while 
psychiatric predictions of dangerousness may be unreliable, it is for the court to 
ACQ 
ultimately decide the weight to be given to the evidence. Of course, in Lyons, the Court 
was examining the dangerous offender scheme which deals entirely with the sentencing 
and labelling of convicted criminals who have demonstrated a pattern of violence.459 In a 
section 810.1 or 810.2 application, the court is not faced with a sentencing decision. 
Though in practice the court will have to determine the potential dangerousness of an 
individual who already has a criminal record, the legislation allows for the imposition of 
restrictive conditions upon an individual who has no criminal history. According to the 
decision on Noble, courts will impose a recognizance order under section 810.1 or 810.2, 
if it is satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the individual poses an imminent risk of 
dangerousness.460 In Noble, the court interpreted the threshold for proof of dangerousness 
under section 810.1 as being higher than a simple likelihood of dangerousness, because 
the legislation "...speaks of a reasonably grounded fear that the defendant "will" commit 
an offence".461 
Lyons, supra note 149 at 364-365. 
Ibid, at para. 98. 
Ibid, at para. 71-74. 
See generally Noble, supra note 9. 
Ibid.at para. 44. 
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While courts have examined the problem of inaccuracy in the context of dangerous 
offender legislation, they have remained silent on the issue with respect to recognizance 
orders under sections 810.1 and 810.2. In fact, the problem of the reliability of risk 
assessment tools and the possibility of false positive determinations, coupled with 
potential biases in psychological assessments due to the adversarial setting have not been 
addressed in the context of recognizance orders under sections 810.1 and 810.2. It has 
been established in Lyons that the required threshold to demonstrate dangerousness 
appears to be higher than a simple likelihood of dangerousness. However, the very 
process by which a risk of future dangerousness is determined and on which the court 
will weigh its decision can be inaccurate. Since the imposition of a recognizance order 
can have serious coercive effects on the liberties of an individual, it would have been 
appropriate to examine the process of the determination of dangerousness. 
Multiple questions remain unanswered as to the real consequences of a recognizance 
order, especially when it is applied to an individual with no prior history of criminal 
activity. Recognizance orders have coercive aspects which can severely curtail the 
liberties of an individual. Recent research has demonstrated that restrictive conditions 
under a recognizance order can "...put further hurdles on the community reintegration" of 
potential offender.46 
It is, therefore, worthwhile to examine the approach taken in other jurisdictions to 
compare their schemes of preventive measures applied to potentially dangerous 
individuals. In the next chapter, we will look at the French system of preventive measures 
462 Lussier, supra note 439 at 18. 
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which, in some aspects, resembles our system of recognizance orders. However, as we 
will demonstrate, the French legislator has decided not to apply preventive measures to 
individuals who have never committed a crime. In fact, the French scheme expressly 
limits the applicability of preventive measures to convicted offenders. While it is true that 
in practice, the applicability of the Canadian scheme is also limited to convicted 
offenders, sections 810.1 and 810.2, nonetheless, allow for the imposition of 
recognizance orders on individuals who have never committed a crime. Considering the 
fact that recognizance orders are imposed based on evidence demonstrating potential 
dangerousness, a process often plagued with problems of inaccuracy, the express limited 
applicability of the French scheme may very well be a reasonable compromise. 
Furthermore, as will be demonstrated in the next chapter, the particularities of the French 
investigatory system, which favours a concerted approach between experts in the 
determination of dangerousness and diminishes the risk of biases, also offers potential 
alternatives that are worth analysing. 
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CHAPTER VIII - PREVENTIVE MEASURES IN FRENCH CRIMINAL LAW 
In countries where the rule of law is paramount to maintain peace and order, it could be 
argued that prophylactic measures such as peace bonds and recognizance orders are a 
natural extension of one of the objectives of criminal law, namely the prevention of 
crime. In France, like Canada, crime prevention is also one of the objectives of criminal 
law. Therefore, one could reasonably assume that the French legislators have enacted 
legislation similar to the Canadian approach to prevent crimes and control the 
dangerousness of particular Violent individuals. While this affirmation is partly true, there 
are very important differences between the two systems. 
It is true that both systems have laws dealing with potentially dangerous offenders. For 
example, one can immediately think of the dangerous offender and long term offender 
legislation in Canada463 and the Loi sur la retention de surete464 in France. However, 
while the Canadian system explicitly allows the issuance of recognizance orders aimed at 
preventing potentially dangerous individuals from committing new crimes, the French 
system has no similar statutory provisions. This situation appears at odds with the fact 
that the concept of dangerousness or dangerosite (as it is known in France) and its control 
have been the primary focus of several new statutes enacted in recent years in France.4 5 
The next section will examine the non-existence of peace bond provisions and 
recognizance orders in French criminal law. Attention will then be given to possible 
explanations which could shed light on the non-existence of these preventive measures in 
463 Criminal Code, supra note 2 at Part XXIV. 
464 Loi sur la retention de surete, supra note 3. 
465 Danet, supra note 42. 
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France. Several hypotheses are advanced. The discussion then concludes on preventive 
measures currently in force in French criminal law, including the mesures de suretes and 
restrictive conditions under social-judicial probation. As we will see, these preventive 
measures on one level resemble Canadian recognizance orders in that they also impose 
conditions restricting the liberty of individuals. However, the key difference resides in 
their applicability. Generally, French preventive measures can only be imposed on 
convicted dangerous offenders, which is a clear departure from the possibility of 
imposing restrictive conditions on individuals with no criminal record in Canadian 
criminal law. 
i) The absence of Peace Bonds and Recognizance Orders in French 
Criminal Law 
A review of the Code de Procedure penal and relevant French legislation reveals that 
there are currently no peace bonds or recognizance orders in French criminal law. 
Differences in the language used in describing these preventive measures could partly 
explain the situation. In France, preventive measures are known as mesures de suretes. 
However, a review of these mesures de surete reveals that no restrictive conditions can be 
imposed in a form analogous to a Canadian peace bond or a recognizance order.467 On the 
other hand, some mesures de surete provide for the imposition of restrictive conditions 
upon individuals who are considered as posing a risk of future dangerousness at the end 
of their mandatory prison terms. They differ mainly from peace bond provisions in that 
See for example Code de Procedure penal, at Article 706-135. 
467 Bouquet, Alexandre, "Cautionnement penal et politique criminelle : une relation a geometrie 




regular citizens cannot ask the court to impose conditions on potentially dangerous 
individuals. 
Moreover, restrictive conditions under the mesures de suretes are only applicable to 
offenders who are both convicted dangerous muti-recidivists and/or mentally 
incapacitated individuals presenting a risk of dangerousness. In other words, the 
commission of a crime is normally a pre-requisite for the imposition of a mesures de 
surete in French criminal law. For example, a social-judicial probation (also known as 
suivi medico-judiciaire)^ probably the closest equivalent to restrictive conditions 
available under sections 810.1 and 810.2 of the Criminal Code, can only be imposed on a 
convicted offender, normally at the sentencing stage. One of the main goals of a 
mesure de surete such as social-judicial probation is to prevent recidivism. As for the 
equivalent of a "dangerous offender designation" in France, it can only be applicable to 
individuals who have been condemned for a period of incarceration that exceeds 15 
469 
years. 
ii) The Asseurement or the Caution de Bonne Vie: An Ancient French 
Preventive Measure Analogue to Canadian Peace Bond Provisions 
At the outset, it should be pointed out that French Criminal law has not always been 
without some type of peace bond provisions. In the ancien droit, the mesure de surete, 
known as asseurement or caution de bonne vie (similar to common law peace bonds) was 
available to prevent and control dangerousness.470 The ultimate goal of the asseurement 
468 See for example Code penal, at Article 131-36-1. 
469 See generally the Loi sur la retention de surete, supra note 3. 
470 Bonneville de Marsangy, Arnould, De I'amelioration de la loi criminelle en vue d'une justice 
plus prompte, plus efficace, plus genereuse et plus moralisante (Paris : Cosse et Marchal, 
1864)[Bonneville], at 203. See also Ginoulhiac, Charles, Cours elementaire d'histoire generate du droit 
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was to restore the peace between two diverging parties.471 The asseurement was a legal 
instrument that "...flourished in the later Middle Ages". According to Petkov, the 
asseurement was "[a] contract with a preventive character...[and] initially belonged to the 
domain of high justice but with time seeped down to bourgeois quarters".473 Bonneville 
de Marsangy remarks the following with respect to the applicability of the asseurement: 
Dans nos anciens usages, 1'asseurement etait une simple mesure de surete, 
reclamee par tout citoyen qui redoutait une attaque ou un dommage. Celui a qui 
l'asseurement etait demande, etait tenu de comparaitre en justice, et il devait 
l'accorder en promettant qu'il ne ferait aucun mal a celui qui avait doutance de 
lui.474 [Footnotes ommitted]. 
In other words, according to Bonneville de Marsangy, the asseurement was a simple 
preventive measure available to any citizen who feared an attack or harm.475 In that case, 
the presence of the individual facing an asseurement measure was required before the 
court. A promise not to commit any wrongs had then to be given to the court.47 
Historically, failure to obey the terms of the asseurement resulted in the imposition of a 
fine and a period of banishment or reclusion (also known as banissement), or even 
477 
punishment by hanging. Furthermore, as Bonneville remarks, the asseurement was 
only ordered by the judge in serious cases where the alleged threats were deemed to be 
sufficient.478 
frangais public et prive depuis les premiers temps jusqu'a la publication du code civil (Paris : Arthur 
Rousseau, 1884), at 526-527. 
471Bonneville, ibid, at 202. 
472 Petkov, Kiril, The Kiss of Peace ritual, self, and society in the high and late medieval West, Vol. 17 
(Leiden, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill, 2003)[Petkov], at 91. 
473 Petkov, ibid, at 91. 
474 Bonneville, supra note 470 at 202. 
475 Ibid. 
476 Ibid. 
477 Ibid, at 203. 
478 Ibid. 
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A review of the literature did not shed light on the exact time when the asseurement was 
abandoned. However, in the late 19th century, Bonneville was already treating the 
asseurement as a relic from the past.479 In that case, presumably, the asseurement would 
have been abandoned at the time of the French Revolution. Bonneville also attributes the 
abolition of the asseurement to the creation of a public system of magistrates in charge of 
maintaining the peace and investigating and prosecuting offenders in the name of 
society.480 It was also thought that the power of accusation and prosecution belonged 
only to the State.481 In other words, France abandoned the asseurement, a form of peace 
bond provision, partly because the State progressively assumed a greater role in 
preventing crime. The state also progressively took charge of all matters deemed to be 
criminal in nature. 
iii) Another French Preventive Measure: the Cautionnement Penal 
Another form of preventive measure that relates to peace bond provisions in French 
criminal law is the cautionnement penal. However, this form of preventive measure 
resembles most closely the Canadian scheme of bail or judicial interim release as it is 
known in the Criminal Code. 
The cautionnement penal in French criminal law has a restrictive applicability and is part 
of a series of judicial control measures contained in the Code de procedure penal. 
AQ'l 
More precisely, it is governed by article 138 and 142 of the Code de procedure penal. 
The cautionnement penal can be defined as the payment of a sum of money to the court 
4 7 9 . . . . 
Ibid. 
480 ., . , 
Ibid. 
481 Ibid, at 204. 
482 Bouquet, supra note 467. 
483 See Code de Procedure Penale, at Article 1138 and 142. See also Bouquet, ibid. 
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in guarantee that the individual will act in a certain manner.484 Bouquet remarks that the 
cautionnement penal has been part of the measures of controle judiciaire (judicial 
control) since 1970. As Larguier points out, the objectives of the measures under the 
controle judiciaire include an attempt to conciliate individual liberties with social 
protection.485 However, since a cautionnement penal is considered a measure of controle 
judiciaire, its applicability is limited to the instruction preparatoire (preparatory stage in 
which the accused awaits trial).486 Consequently, as Bouquet notes, the cautionnement 
penal cannot be used as an ante-delictum measure in French criminal law. 
iv) The Mesures de Suretes : an Ante-Delictum Scheme 
The social defense movement also had a substantial impact on the development of the 
mesures de suretes applicable to dangerous individuals suffering from mental health 
conditions. The mesures de suretes are not concerned with the fault of the individual 
and are normally imposed where a particular individual presents a risk of 
dangerousness.489 It is worth pointing out that the literature notes the absence of any clear 
definition of the concept of dangerousness in French legislative texts.490 Yet, numerous 
preventive laws are based upon the concept of dangerousness. 
484Bouquet, ibid. 
485 Larguier, Jean, Procedure penale, 17th ed. (Paris, Dalloz, 1999), at 128, cited in Bouquet, ibid. 
486 Bouquet, ibid. 
mlbid. 
488 Rhenter, supra note 49. Rhenter, ibid., points out that the social defense movement eventually led to 
the creation of prison-hospital to treat and control dangerous individuals suffering from mental health 
conditions. 
489 Georges Levasseur. "Politique criminelle : peines ou mesures de surete ?", online : Jean-Paul 
Doucet, Le droit criminel 
<http://ledroitcriminel.free.fr/la_science_criminelle/les_sciencesJuridiques/la_loi_penale/sanction/levas 
seur_peines_ou_mesures_surete.htm>. 
490 Damien Loup,. "Note electronique - Droit a la surete ou efficacite repressive ?" Libertes et 
culture (13 January 2009), online: Laforge <http://74.125.95.132/search ?q=cache:IOb410CZ_flJ:la-
forge.info/2009/01/13/note-electronique-droit-a-la-surete-ou-efficacite->[Loup]. 
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In the 1950s, proponents of the social defense movement advanced the idea of detaining 
dangerous individuals while offering them medical treatment aimed at lowering their 
level of dangerousness.491 The idea of creating a "hospital-prison" to punish and treat 
these potentially dangerous individuals also saw light during that time. Gradually, the 
treatments of criminals, coupled with new techniques in the detection of potential 
criminological factors, were to replace punishment.492 As we will see later, the recent 
enactment of the Loi sur la retention de surete puts emphasis on the development of these 
so called "hospital-prisons" to treat potentially dangerous individuals. 
v) The Development of « Repressive Prevention » in French Criminal 
Law and its Influence on the Enactment of New Preventive Measures 
In a country where much emphasis is placed on preventive justice, it is not surprising to 
note the importance of strategies of detection and neutralisation of potential 
criminological behaviour.493 In recent years, France has shifted towards a model of 
repressive prevention (prevention repressive) with the enactment of several new pieces of 
legislation that allow the identification, investigation and eventually the prosecution of 
potentially dangerous behaviour.494 These laws are primarily aimed at preventing 
delinquency, a form of dangerousness.495According to Loup, the shift toward repressive 
prevention has enabled the State to regroup institutions dealing with at-risk populations 
(national education, public health, social services) under the authority of the Prefect and 
491 
Rhenter, supra note 49. 
492 
Bertrand, supra note 87. 
493 
Loup, supra note 490. 
2 Ibid. 
Danet, supra note 42. 
137 
Prosecutor, while facilitating the collection of valuable information on the behaviour of 
potentially dangerous individuals.496 
In terms of concrete measures of repressive prevention, Loup identifies the Loi du 5 mars 
2007 relative a la prevention de la delinquance497 as a good example. The Loi relative a 
la prevention de la delinquance places the mayor at the center of the application of a 
policy that aims to prevent repression of delinquency.4 This new piece of legislation 
enables the mayor to gather valuable information, including normally confidential 
information with respect to at-risk populations under his or her authority. For example, 
the mayor can have access to the confidential reports of social workers and to 
performance records of school children.499 With the help of a team of professionals, the 
mayor is able to identify potential criminological tendencies, such as a lack of 
assiduousness in class. In other words, the mayor becomes the main actor in identifying 
potentially dangerous behaviour at the root, as he or she receives information about the 
social and educational difficulties encountered by citizens under his authority and 
coordinates an action plan aimed at eradicating the potential criminal behaviour. 
The Loi sur la prevention de la delinquance has been vividly criticised for two main 
reasons: it can transform the mayor into a sort of "sheriff, and it allows the exchange of 
confidential information normally retained by social workers.500 However, the real 
496 Loup, supra note 490. 
497 Loi sur la prevention de la delinquance, supra note 89. 
498 Loup, supra note 490. See also "La loi sur la prevention de la delinquance", Liberation.fr (16 January 
2007), online: 
Liberation.fr <http://www.liberation.fr/marbre/010118234-la-loi-sur-la-prevention-de-la-delinquance>. 
499 See Loi sur la prevention de la delinquance, supra note 89, at Article 8 and 12. 
500 Recit, "Prevention de la delinquance, un projet de loi dangereux et en trompe-l'ceil" Communique de 
presse DEI France (Droit des Enfants International) (July2006), online: Recit < 
http://recit.net/spip.php7article769>. 
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effects of this new legislation on the prevention of delinquency (which concerns for the 
most part minors) and the exchange of confidential information have still to be assessed 
due to its recent enactment in 2007. To this date, it would appear that the implementation 
of this preventive legislation has encountered numerous difficulties, and various 
provisions have yet to be concretely followed by mayors.501 
Under the repressive prevention model, Loup also notes the creation and multiplication of 
various records of individuals who have been convicted or suspected of acts of 
delinquency.502 Loup remarks that these records essentially fulfill two objectives: they 
place potential delinquents under surveillance and facilitate future repressive action by 
the State through collecting personal information. The main problem with these 
records, according to Loup, is that several thousand individuals are identified as potential 
criminals, without consideration as to the determination of guilt or innocence by a 
court.504 In effect, this type of legislation tries to identify potentially dangerous 
individuals even before they manifest their risk of future behaviour. Evidently, this 
approach inevitably raises questions on potential infringements of fundamental principles 
of justice, and may not prove to be the ideal solution in controlling dangerousness 
because of its serious "Orwellian" implications.505 




502 Loup, supra note 490. 
503 Ibid. Loup gives the example of two information records : « Service de traitement informatise des 
infractions constatees de la police nationale » and the « JUDEX ». 
504 Ibid. 
505 Orwellian refers to the "Big Brother concept" explained by Orwell, George, 1984 (New York: Signet 
Classic, 1981). 
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Loup also identifies elements of repressive prevention in the development of various 
preventive measures targeting convicted criminals who have completed their sentences of 
incarceration.506 These measures include the creation of a national record of sexual 
offenders, or FJAIS (Fichier Judiciaire National Automatise des Auteurs d'Infractions 
Sexuelles), and the mandatory treatment of potentially dangerous offenders or injonction 
de soin.507 According to Loup, individuals placed on the FJAIS can be required to inform 
authorities of their change of address and to report regularly to the police.508 Repressive 
prevention under this form targets potentially dangerous individuals by monitoring and 
treating their dangerousness. 
vi) The Suivi Medico-Judiciaire : An Ante-Delictum Measure Influenced 
by Repressive Prevention 
Loup also identified other measures of "repressive prevention" that have an impact on 
how dangerousness is treated in France, including the creation of a mandatory social-
judicial probation called -suivi medico-judiciaire5 These forms of probations are 
applicable to certain types of convicted criminals (including paedophiles and potentially 
dangerous offenders).510 In French criminal law, the social-judicial probation is 
Loup, supra note 490. 
507 Ibid. Loup explains that the FJAIS was created by the Loi n°2004-204 du 9 mars 2004 portant 
adaptation de la justice aux evolutions de la criminalite, J.O., 10 March 2004, 4567, also known as "Loi 
Perbenll". 
508 Ibid. See Code de Procedure penale, at Article 706-53-5. The obligation to report to police and to notify 
the authorities of a change of address is similar to some of the restrictive conditions that can be imposed 
under a recognizance order under section 810.1 and 810.2 of the Criminal Code. However, once again, 
there is an important distinction between the two schemes because a recognizance order can be applied 
to an individual who has never committed a crime, base solely upon his dangerousness. 
509 See generally Loi n° 98-468 du 17juin 1998 relative a la prevention et a la repression des infractions 
sexuelles et a la protection des mineurs, J.O., 18 June 1998, 9255. 
510 Loup, supra note 490. See also France, Ministere de la justice et des libertes, Les condamnations a une 
mesure de suivi socio-Judiciaire (9 March 2007) online : Ministere de la justice et des libertes 
<http://www.justice.gouv.fr/index.php?rubrique=10054&ssrubrique=10058&article=12571>, where the 
Ministere de la justice et des libertes notes that in 2005, more than a thousand social-judicial probation 
shave been ordered. 
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considered a mesure de surete. It is important to note that the restrictive conditions which 
can be attached to a social-judicial probation order resemble the conditions that can be 
imposed under a section 810 recognizance order. For the purpose of our comparative 
analysis, social-judicial probation orders are virtually identical to the Canadian scheme, 
with the exception that they are limited to convicted offenders. 
In fact, Article 131-36-2 specifies that an individual under a social-judicial order may be 
subjected to the following restrictive obligations: 
1° not to be present in such places or such category of places as specifically 
designated, in particular where minors are to be found; 
2° not to visit or to have contact with certain persons or certain categories of 
persons, and particularly minors, except, where relevant, those specified by the 
court; 
3° not to carry out any professional or voluntary activity involving regular contact 
with minors. 
As for Article 131-36-9, it gives the court the power to impose electronic monitoring on 
an offender who is subjected to a social-judicial prevention. 
Article 132-44 of the Code penal establishes the list of supervisory measures that can be 
imposed on an individual. They include follow-up visits with social workers; notification 
of any change in employment or residence; and required authorisation prior to 
traveling.513 
As for Article 132-45, it allows the judge to impose the following obligations upon a 
convicted offender: 
Code Penal, at Article 131-36-2. 
Ibid, at Article 131-36-9. 
Ibid, at Article 132-44. 
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A trial court or a penalties enforcement judge may specially impose on the 
convicted person a duty to observe one or more of the following obligations: 
1° to exercise a professional activity or to follow a course of education or 
professional training; 
2° to establish his residence in a determined place; 
3° to undergo medical examination, treatment or medical care, and where 
necessary hospitalisation; 
4° to demonstrate that he is contributing to family expenses or is regularly paying 
any alimony that he may owe; 
5° to make good, in all or part, according to his ability to pay, the damage caused 
by the offence, even in the absence of a court decision on civil liability; 
6° to demonstrate that he is paying according to his ability to pay the amounts due 
to the public Treasury in consequence of the sentence; 
7° to abstain from driving certain vehicles determined by the category of driving 
licences provided for under the Traffic Code; 
8° not to engage in professional activity in the exercise of which or on the 
occasion of which the offence was committed; 
9° to abstain from appearing in any place as specifically identified; 
10° not to engage in betting, especially in betting shops; 
11° not to frequent public houses; 
12° not to keep company with certain convicted persons, especially other 
offenders or accomplices to the offence; 
13° to abstain from contacting certain persons, especially with the victim of the 
offence; 
14° not to hold or carry any weapon.514 
Conditions 9 and 14 are similar to restrictive conditions imposed under sections 810.1 
and 810.2 of the Criminal Code. However, some of the conditions available under 132-5 
go further, such as condition 3, which obligate the offender "...to undergo medical 
examination, treatment or medical care, and where necessary hospitalisation".515 
The measures under a social-judicial probation are aimed at facilitating the person's 
social rehabilitation.516 In other words, unlike recognizance orders, they are only 
available to supervise potential recidivists. Social-judicial probation measures cannot be 
Ibid, at Article 132-45. 
Ibid, at Article 132-45, Condition 3. 
Ibid, at Article 131-36-3. 
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imposed prior to conviction. Arguably however, they resemble sections 810.1 and 810.2 
recognizance orders as they consist in a form of supervision of potentially dangerous 
individuals in society, upon their release from prison. Dangerousness is, therefore, 
controlled and monitored, but restrictive conditions are only applicable to convicted 
offenders who have committed a crime. This approach is more conservative than the 
Canadian scheme, because the risk of false positives and the problems of inaccuracy in 
determining dangerousness are limited to individuals who have committed a crime. 
In the end, the French "repressive prevention" measures all have the same objective: 
"...to detect, to monitor and to neutralise potentially dangerous individuals".517 As Loup 
remarks, all these preventive measures are based on a notion of dangerousness for which 
boundaries have never really been legally defined. The enactment of the Loi sur la 
retention de surete in February 2008, which aims at identifying, preventing and 
controlling the risk of future dangerousness of certain individuals, is the latest chapter in 
the development of the repressive prevention shift observed by Loup. It offers a novel 
approach in determining and controlling dangerousness. The next section will analyse 
some of the characteristics of the Loi sur la retention de surete, with an emphasis on the 
process of determining dangerousness. 
vii) The Loi sur la Retention de Surete, a Novel Approach in Determining 
and Controlling Dangerousness 
A comparative analysis of the French preventive measures and the determination of 
dangerousness would not be complete without a look at the newly enacted Loi sur la 
retention de surete (Loi relative a la retention de surete et a la declaration 
Loup, supra note 490. 
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d'irresponsabilite penale pour cause de trouble mental). The Loi sur la retention de 
surete is the latest attempt in a series of new legislation pertaining to the control of 
dangerousness. It is largely based on a 2006 report from the Commission des Lois, a 
French committee comprised of several members of the Senate, which had made various 
recommendations on the determination and treatment of dangerousness.518 One of the key 
recommendations made by the Commission was the development of "hospital-prisons" 
where the potential dangerousness of offenders could be identified and treated, controlled 
by a multidisciplinary team of experts.51 
At the outset, it should be pointed out that the Loi sur la retention de surete once again 
deals with the concept of dangerousness as it applies to convicted dangerous offenders. 
Moreover, a retention de surete equals preventive detention to control, and eventually 
lower the risk of future dangerousness of an offender. In a sense, it is probably more 
closely related to the Canadian dangerous offender scheme, than to sections 810.1 and 
810.2 recognizance orders. A retention de surete (or preventive detention) also falls 
under the category of the me sure de surete, and is only applicable at the end of the 
mandatory prison sentence, and for various rehabilitation measures.520 Therefore, a 
retention de surete cannot be imposed where no crime has been committed. 
518 France, Senat, Commission des lois et de la mission d'information de la commission des lois, 
"Rapport d'information n° 420 (2005-2006) de MM. Philippe GOUJON et Charles GAUTIER", No. 420 (22 
June 2006) (President: Jean-Jacques Hyest), online : Bienvenue au Senat <http://www.senat.fr/rap/r05-
420/r05-4201.pdf > [Senat], at 18. See also Sebastien Martineau, (Directed Research Paper, Dalhousie 
University, 2008)[unpublished][Martineau, Directed Research Paper]. 
519 See "Rachida Dati lance son plan contre les criminels dangereux", Le Figaro (27 September 2008), 
online : Le Figaro < http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2008/09/27/01016 20080927ARTFIG00202-
rachida-dati-lance-son-plan-contre-les-criminels-dangereux-.php>, where it is noted that the Centre socio-
medico-judiciare of Fresnes (the first French "prison-hospital") has recently opened its door to treat the 
potential dangerousness of individuals subjected to a "retention de surete". 
520 See Martineau, Directed Research Paper, supra note 518. 
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The Loi sur la retention de surete is a relevant to our comparative analysis because of the 
novel approach taken by the French legislature to treat and control dangerousness. For 
example, under the French scheme, a potentially dangerous individual is not simply sent 
back into prison at the end of his or her mandatory sentence. He or she is to be treated in 
a specially created facility that proposes a social-judicial approach. This particularity is 
just one of many others that are part of the newly enacted Loi sur la retention de surete. 
The following paragraphs will examine the controversial legislation in more detail, in an 
attempt to extract the relevant sections dealing with the concept of dangerousness. 
Following the recommendations of the Commission des Lois, the French Parliament 
amended the Code de procedure penale (CPP) to include several new provisions 
pertaining on the treatment of dangerousness. For example, Article 706-53-13 of the CPP 
confirms the exceptionality of the retention de surete and defines it as the placement of a 
dangerous individual in a specially created centre {Centre socio-medico-judiciaire) where 
a social, medical and judicial approach is offered. Only individuals convicted for a 
minimum of 15 years of incarceration and considered as presenting a risk of 
dangerousness (defined in Article 706-53-13 of the CPP "...as a high probability of 
recidivism combined with a serious personality disorder") can be subjected to a retention 
de surete.522 In essence, the approach taken by the French legislator in limiting the 
applicability of the retention de surete, shows that it is not ready to generalise preventive 
measures that restrict the liberties of individuals who have not committed a crime. While 
the French scheme recognizes the concept of dangerousness and the importance of 
521 Code de procedure penale, at Article 706-53-13. 
522 Ibid. See also Cons, constitutionnel, 21 February 2008, Commentaires aux cahiers, LOI n° 2008-174 du 
25fevrier 2008 relative a la retention de surete et a la declaration d'irresponsabilite penale pour cause de 
trouble mental, J.O. 2008. 3272, 08-562 DC [Cons. Constitutionnel], at para. 2 and 18. 
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preventing it, it also limits its control to very serious cases. Perhaps this is an implicit 
admission by the French legislator that the system of determination of dangerousness is 
imperfect and ought to be reserved only to the most extreme cases. 
Furthermore, the inclusion of Article 706-53-14 of the CPP probably represents the most 
drastic measure in terms of determination of dangerousness. It is argued that if some 
aspect of the measure were to be implemented in the context of Canadian recognizance 
orders, it would add additional safeguards in the determination of dangerousness of 
potential offenders. Article 706-53-14 provides that the risk of future dangerousness of an 
individual subjected to a retention de surete is assessed by a multidisciplinary panel of 
experts over a minimum period of 6 weeks. The determination of dangerousness, is 
therefore, not necessarily dependent on contradictory evidence, which is the hallmark of 
adversarial courts.524 Rather, it puts emphasis on a team approach, given the imprecise 
nature of a determination of dangerousness. Several experts work together to determine 
the potential dangerousness of a particular offender. Arguably, this conciliatory approach 
reduces the risk of bias in the determination of dangerousness, since both parties are at 
the same table, including the experts who can focus solely on the particularities of the 
case. In an adversarial setting, as explained earlier, mental health professionals may 
succumb to external pressures, including the consequences of a false-negative, or the 
influence of the lawyers of both parties. 
Under Article 706-53-14 of the CPP, the multidisciplinary panel of experts include the 
president of the Chambre de la Cour d'appel, the region prefect, the director of the 
523 Code de procedure penale, at Article 706-53-14. 
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regional penitentiary services, an expert psychiatrist, an expert psychologist, a 
representative from a victim association, and a lawyer.525 It is worth pointing out the 
presence of a representative from a victim association in the process demonstrates the 
legislator's willingness to hear "both sides of the story" in a conciliatory approach. 
In assessing the potential dangerousness of an offender, the panel can recommend a 
retention de surete to a regional authority comprised of three magistrates, if there is a 
high risk of recidivism, and if it is the only available method to control the individual's 
dangerousness.526 The ultimate decision to impose a retention de surete is taken by the 
regional authority under Article 706-53-15 of the CPP, after careful analysis of the 
evidence emanating from the multidisciplinary panel and the offender's counter-
expertise. In effect, this constitutes an adversarial procedure. However, the French system 
provides for the participation of the offender and independent mental health experts when 
the determination of dangerousness is made by the committee. Furthermore, the system 
prescribes that three magistrates must hear the evidence and decide on the reasonableness 
of the panel's recommendation. In Canada, a determination of dangerousness is 
ultimately done by a single judge. Arguably, it would appear that the use of three 
magistrates to decide whether or not an individual should be considered potentially 
dangerous increases the chances that the decision is objective and sound. This is 
Code de procedure penale, at Article R61-8. It should be noted that the multidisciplinary panel was 
created prior to the enactment of the Loi sur la retention de surete, supra note 3, by the Loi sur le 
traitement de la recidive, supra note 13. See also France, Ministere de la justice, Les commissions 
pluridisciplinaires des mesures de surete (6 November 2008) online : Ministere de la Justice 
<http://www.justice.gouv.fr/index.php?rubrique=10017&ssrubrique=10024&article=16212>and 
Martineau, Methodological Prospectus, supra note 21 at 8. 
526 Code de procedure penale, at Article 706-53-14. 
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especially important in the context of controversial evidence based on an imprecise 
science. 
Finally, pursuant to Article 706-53-16 of the CPP, a retention de surete can be imposed 
for a period of one year, and be renewed indefinitely every year, provided that the 
offender still presents a risk of future dangerousness.527 This allows for the court to re-
evaluate the dangerousness of the offender on a regular basis and to modify the 
conditions of the retention de surete. It also gives a chance to the offender to demonstrate 
that his level of dangerousness has decreased to an acceptable level. 
The Loi sur la retention de surete was recently examined by the Conseil 
Constitutionnel.529, With the exception of a clause of retroactivity which would have 
made the retention de surete applicable to cases decided before the enactment of the 
statute, the Conseil declared the retention de surete constitutional. In its decision, the 
Conseil Constitutionnel concluded that the retention de surete was an adequate, necessary 
and proportional measure to the objective sought by the legislature, namely the 
prevention of crime and the control of dangerousness. The exceptionality of the 
measure (only applicable to convicted dangerous offenders sentenced for a period of 
incarceration of 15 years or more) and the rehabilitative function of the measure (through 
a socio-judicial approach in a specially created hospital-prison and aimed at lowering the 
risk of recidivism), were two important factors in the Conseil Constitutionnel decision. 
Code de procedure penale, at Article 706-53-16. 
528 Cons, constitutionnel, supra note 522. See also generally Martineau, Directed Research Paper, supra 
note 518. 
529 Ibid. 
530 Cons. Constitutionnel, ibid, at para. 13. 
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Another important point is that the Conseil considers the retention de surete, not as 
punishment following the commission of an offense, but rather as a preventive measure. 
This view is similar to Canadian court's general opinion that recognizance orders are 
preventive and restrictive measures that are imposed when there is a high risk of future 
dangerousness. The imposition of restrictive conditions under Canadian recognizance 
orders is not the result of the commission of offenses. They are preventive in nature. 
As discussed earlier, the "preventive nature" of the scheme allows courts to circumvent 
the normally required burden of proof in criminal law, namely, proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and saves them from having to assure satisfaction of constitutional 
requirements. In other words, on a simple balance of probability, the court can impose 
restrictive conditions on an individual despite the fact that it is only suspected that he or 
she might commit a crime in the future. Arguably, the same situation currently prevails in 
France, where the retention de surete is considered a mesure de surete (or preventive 
measure). This also allows the court to impose restrictive conditions on an individual on a 
much lower burden of proof than the normally required intime conviction. 
The retention de surete has been extensively criticised in France because it inevitably 
infringes fundamental principles of rights, such as the right to liberty, and the right not to 
be punished where no crime has been committed.533According to some magistrates, the 
retention de surete equates to a punitive measure because it enables preventive detention 
531 See Budreo, supra note 8 at para. 25. 
532 On the question of the normally required burden of proof in French criminal Court (intime conviction), 
see Guinchard, supra note 214 at 303. See also McKillop, supra note 242 at 92. 
533 Cosse, Emmanuelle/'Retention de surete, Entretien avec Dominique Rousseau" (2008) 49 
Regard, online: <http://www.regards.fr/article/print/?id=3576>[Cosse]. 
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of potentially dangerous individuals for an indeterminate period of time in a closed 
environment.534 
While it is true that a retention de surete equates to the Canadian concept of preventive 
detention of a potentially dangerous individual (for example, under the dangerous 
offender legislation), it does provide for a more limited application. The retention de 
surete, as well as social-judicial probations are only applicable to multi-recidivists or 
high-risk dangerous offenders. This exceptional and limited applicability feature is the 
main distinction between the two preventive measures schemes. In the development of a 
judicial risk assessment method involving a co-ordinated approach from a team of 
experts, the French legislation provides for an alternative to a prickly problem: namely, 
the accuracy and sufficiency of procedural safeguards in the determination of 
dangerousness and the imposition of restrictive conditions. While French psychologists 
do not necessarily benefit from better risk assessment tools, they can now assess the 
dangerousness of a potential offender in an unbiased setting, far from the inherent 
pressures of an adversarial system based on a win or lose approach. In this regard, it is 
worth noting that the literature has identified benefits to a consensus approach in 
determining dangerousness. Campell's remarks on this particular issue are quite 
compelling: 
...when clinicians consult with each other (e.g., multidisciplinary review boards) 
and with victims of violence, they are able to pool their diverse knowledge and 
expertise in reaching a consensus. The social worker, psychologist, advanced 
nurse clinician, psychiatrist, counsellor, parole officer, and victim have very 
different perspectives; together they form a more complete assessment of risk for 
future violence.5 5 
534 Cosse, ibid. 
535 Campbell, supra note 176 at 10. 
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While some preventive measures, such as a social-judicial probation order, enable French 
courts to impose restrictive conditions on a multi-recidivist, there are currently no 
provisions enabling the issuance of pre-conviction recognizance orders in French 
criminal law. The following paragraphs will offer some hypotheses on absence of peace 
bond or recognizance order provisions in France. 
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CHAPTER IX -THE ABSENCE OF RECOGNIZANCE ORDERS IN FRENCH 
CRIMINAL LAW 
i) Possible Hypothesis Explaining the Absence of Peace Bonds and 
• Recognizance Order Provisions in French Criminal Law 
Because France is a member of the European Union and a signatory of the European 
Charter of Human Rights,536 it is possible that "supranational" restrictions may prevent 
the enactment of peace bond provisions. However, at the outset, it appears that section 
5(1) of the European Charter of Human Rights enables the enactment of restrictive 
measures: 
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived 
of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure 
prescribed by law: 
b. the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful 
order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by 
law; 
c. the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing 
him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having 
committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent 
his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; [Emphasis added]. 
It is argued that the French Parliament can comfortably rely on section 5(1) to enact 
preventive measures to curtail the freedom of an individual when it is "necessary" to do 
so to protect society. But preventive measures such as peace bonds are nonexistent in 
French criminal law. 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as amended by Protocol 
No. 11 with Protocol Nos. 1, 4, 6, 7,12 and 13, 4 November 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [European Charter of 
Human Rights]. 
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One hypothesis retained in the literature appears to be the progressive abandonment of 
peace bonds provisions known as asseurement due to the legislature's belief that these 
forms of preventive measures were a matter of private law.537 As we explained earlier, 
peace bond provisions and recognizance orders can be imposed on an individual when an 
informant (and not necessarily the State) demonstrates a reasonable fear that the 
individual will commit an offence. Generally, in Canadian criminal law, the Crown is the 
sole party who has the power to prosecute in criminal proceedings. However, peace bond 
provisions and recognizance orders are exceptions to this rule because an informant, the 
putative victim, can lay information before the court and request the imposition of 
restrictive conditions on a potentially dangerous individual. The Canadian Parliament did 
keep a public aspect to the peace bonds and recognizance orders scheme by requiring the 
coo 
consent of the Attorney General to proceed under a section 810.2 application. 
Furthermore, while it is true that in theory peace bond provisions and recognizance orders 
can be triggered by the application of a party other than the Crown, in reality, these 
preventive orders are normally sought by members of the police or correctional facilities 
employees.539 
Another hypothesis is the influence of the civil law tradition on the development of 
French criminal law. As we have explained earlier, peace bonds owe their origin to the 
development of the common law, a system foreign to French criminal law. There was no 
common law tradition on which the legislator could rely to attempt the codification of 
peace bond provisions in the Code de procedure de penal. 
537 Bonneville, supra note 470 at 204. 
538 See Criminal Code, supra note 2 at s. 810.2(1). 
539 Public Safety, supra note 263. 
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There are, however, at least two counter-arguments to this position. The first is the 
existence of the asseurement in the ancien droit.540 Earlier, we explained that the 
asseurement was a practice used in old French criminal law to obtain a so-called surety to 
keep the peace from an individual who presented a danger. This measure was similar 
to the common law power of courts to impose peace bonds. Therefore, in reality, there is 
a history of peace bond provisions in French criminal law, though they were abandoned 
progressively, mostly due to the pre-eminence of the State's action in all matters 
considered public. 
The second argument is that some civil law tradition countries have codified peace bond 
type provisions. This is the case of Switzerland that codified the cautionnement 
preventif541 Essentially, article 66 of the Code penal Suisse provides that if a person fears 
that a particular individual will commit a crime, a judge can request a recognizance order 
against the individual and require him or her to give sufficient sureties.543 Detention can 
be imposed on the individual in question if he or she refuses to follow the recognizance 
order.544 
540 Bonneville, supra note 470 at 203. 
541 Ibid, at 202. 
542 The French text of article 66.1 of the Code penal Suisse provides the following: 
" 1 . Cautionnement preventif 
1 S'il y a lieu de craindre que celui qui a menace de commettre un crime ou un delit ne le commette 
effectivement ou si un condamne pour crime ou delit manifeste I'intention formelle de reiterer son acte, 
le juge peut, a la requete de la personne menacee, exiger de lui I'engagement de ne pas commettre 
I'infraction et I'astreindre a fournir des suretes suffisantes. 
2 S'il refuse de s'engager ou si, par mauvaise volonte, il ne fournit pas les suretes dans le delai fixe, le juge 
peut I'y astreindre en ordonnant sa detention. Cette detention ne peut exceder deux mois. Elle est 
executee comme une courte peine privative de liberte (art. 79). 
3 S'il commet I'infraction dans les deux ans a partir du jour ou il a fourni les suretes, celles-ci sont acquises 
a I'Etat. En cas contraire, elles sont rendues a I'ayant droit". 
543 Code penal Suisse, ibid, at art. 66.1. 
544 Ibid, at art, 66.2. 
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Procedural differences in the determination of dangerousness may also be part of the 
answer. In the French scheme of determining dangerousness, it is argued that collegiality 
amongst mental experts and the desire to reach consensus in search of the truth due to 
non-adversarial influences, do not favour the development of preventive measures such 
as recognizance orders. Moreover, peace bonds, being a creation of the common law, 
thrive in an adversarial setting because citizens are encouraged to take action in a judicial 
arena against potential offenders in the name of protecting the public. As explained 
earlier, though it is true that in Canadian criminal law, informants may only initiate a 
peace bond or recognizance order proceeding with the consent of the Attorney General, 
these provisions give informants a means to participate in the criminal procedure. In 
French law, only the Public Prosecutor is entitled to bring an action where public order is 
jeopardised: "... [w]here a crime causes no harm to an individual, but simply endangers 
public order, such as possession of a drug or a forbidden weapon, only a Public 
Prosecutor will be able to initiate the prosecution...".545 
Another potential explanation resides in the fact that dangerousness as a concept is not 
viewed or controlled in the same manner by the French legislator. The Defense sociale 
has had influences on the development of preventive measures targeting potentially 
dangerous individuals to the same extent that the community protection model described 
by Petrunik influenced the development of dangerous offender legislation in Canada.546 
The Defense sociale favoured the development of mesures de suretes, and eventually the 
newly enacted Loi sur la retention de surete, but limited its application to convicted 
Elliot, supra note 218 at 33. 
See generally Petrunik, "Models of dangerousness", supra note 4 and Ancel, supra note38. 
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.dangerous offenders. It is as if the State alone is able to identify potentially dangerous 
actors and to neutralise them. Perhaps part of the answer to this affirmation lies in the 
important role played by the French State in all aspects of its citizen's life; a sort of 
socialistic influence that prevents everyday citizens from initiating criminal proceedings 
in cases where they fear the actions of a potentially dangerous individual. In the French 
context, crime prevention appears to be oriented around State enacted measures, whereby 
the State is responsible for preventing, identifying threats, investigating and prosecuting 
crimes. 
Danet, supra note 42. 
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CHAPTER X - CONCLUSION 
This thesis explored the concept of dangerousness in Canada and in France as it applies 
to controversial preventive measures such as high risk judicial restraint orders under 
sections 810.1 and 810.2 of the Criminal Code, and their French equivalent. It was 
thought that a comparative analysis of the French scheme of preventive measures could 
only benefit our system of recognizance orders by identifying new alternatives in 
controlling dangerousness. 
The French scheme was deemed a good measure of comparison because its criminal law 
system is influenced by similar factors. In fact, similarities between the philosophies of 
the Canadian and French criminal legal systems facilitated our comparative analysis on 
how dangerousness is determined and controlled. Both systems are concerned with the 
prevention of crime, and both countries are obsessed with the security and protection of 
the community. In Canada, emergence of the community protection model identified by 
Petrunik has certainly pushed law-makers into enacting restrictive measures such as 
recognizance orders. In France, the protection of the community is also an important 
concern, but the identification of potential criminological factors and the rehabilitation of 
offenders are equally important. 
The obsession with security has resulted in the proliferation of new policies and 
preventive legislation concerning dangerousness in the last few decades. Surprisingly, 
these new preventive measures have been implemented in both countries despite a 
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decrease in the general crime rate in recent years. Inevitably, the following questions 
come to mind: has our world become more dangerous, or is the proliferation of 
preventive measures the result of unwarranted fear based on sensationalistic media 
coverage? One could argue that the dissemination of information is certainly a factor that 
could help explain why states are concerned, more than ever before, with the concept of 
dangerousness. Perhaps the answer also lies in societies' generalised fear of dangerous 
individuals who may commit random criminal acts. And perhaps, new preventive 
measures are actually efficient in decreasing the crime rate. In the end, the enactment of 
preventive measures appears to be popular with the electorate who feels that the State is 
actually taking action, but at what cost? 
Early on, it was determined that recognizance orders had been deemed constitutional by 
lower courts in Canada. The analysis could have stopped there. However, as Zweigert 
and Kotz explained in citing Rudolph v. Jhering: "[n]o one bothers to fetch a thing from 
afar when he has one as good or better at home, but only a fool would refuse quinine just 
because it didn't grow in his back garden (Geist des romischen Rechts, Part 1 (9th edn., 
1955)8f.)".549 Consequently, it was determined that a comparative analysis with a foreign 
system may yield valuable alternatives. 
It was first determined that the process by which dangerousness is usually assessed has 
received virtually no attention from the courts in the context of recognizance orders, 
548 See for example Statistics Canada, "Crime Statistics"(17 July 2007), online: Statistics Canada 
<http://www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/080717/dq080717b-eng.htm>", where it is stated: "Canada's 
national crime rate, based on data reported by police, declined for the third consecutive year in 2007, 
continuing the downward trend in police-reported crime since the rate peaked in 1991". 
549 Zweigert, Konrad & Hein Kotz, Introduction to comparative law, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998) [Zeigert & Kotz], at 16. See also Martineau, Methodological Prospectus, supra note 
21 at 14. 
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despite its fundamental importance in the imposition of restrictive conditions. The thesis 
also established that recognizance orders under sections 810.1 and 810.2 can be applied 
to any potentially dangerous individuals. A recognizance order is not intended to punish a 
crime that was committed.550 Rather, it is concerned with the risk of future dangerousness 
of a particular individual. However, a review of the literature has revealed that some risk 
assessment tools used in the prediction of dangerousness are plagued with inaccuracy and 
reliability issues.551 A determination of dangerousness is not an easy task because it 
involves the consideration of highly technical data, based on a science that is still in its 
early stages. Over the last decades, mental health professionals have developed tests to 
predict the future risk of dangerousness of a particular individual. These include clinical 
judgment, actuarial assessments and structured clinical judgment.552 However, even if the 
reliability of these tests has increased over the years, the fact remains that there is, and 
will always be, a margin of error. No test will ever be perfect in the prediction of future 
criminal acts because that would equate to predicting the future. Do inaccuracy issues in 
determining dangerousness justify the abolition of all preventive measures that are based 
on an assessment of the risk of future behaviour? Given the fact that the protection of the 
community from a potentially dangerous individual is important in a society like ours, the 
answer to this question lies in how much a society is ready to endure constitutional 
infringements upon fundamental principles of justice in the name of security and the 
control of potentially dangerous individuals. Inaccuracy issues should not prevent the 
enactment of preventive measures based on determination of dangerousness, but 
numerous procedural safeguards must exist to reach a balance. 
550 Budreo, supra note 8 at para. 25. 
551 See for example Menzies, supra note 111. See also MacAlister,supra note 37 at 27. 
552 MacAlister, ibid. 
159 
The challenges faced by mental health experts and members of the judiciary in 
determining dangerousness with accuracy are encountered in other sciences. Although 
not dealing with the concept of dangerousness per se, meteorologists, for instance, are 
constantly faced with the problem of inaccuracies in their predictions, but they always 
talk in terms of probabilities of precipitations, and so on. In fact, despite considerable 
improvements in technology, weather is still difficult to predict with accuracy, just as it is 
the case in determining dangerousness. Moreover, meteorologists know that weather 
involves complex variables that need to be taken into account. For example, it is not 
sufficient to rely on the temperature of a given day to predict with any exactitude future 
temperatures. Patterns of weather may prove to be helpful, but have to be considered as 
simple probabilistic indicators. However, the possibility of inaccuracy does not prevent 
many industries that rely on meteorology, such as the aviation sector, to use probabilities 
rather than certainties on an everyday basis. 
The same can be said of predictions of dangerousness. An individual's criminal history 
may offer valuable information as to his or her propensity to commit a crime, but experts 
will generally qualify the risk in terms of probabilities because there is no way of 
knowing if a crime will actually be committed in the future.554 Therefore, predictions of 
future events are possible, but they are based on "probabiliti[es] rather than 
See Monahan, John, "Violence Risk Assessment: Scientific Validity and Evidentiary Admissibility 
Symposium: The Law's Scientific Revolution" (2000) 57 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 901,at 914, where he states: 
"[n]o one questions that the state of the science is such that the prediction of violence, like the prediction 
of the weather, is subject to a considerable margin of error." See also Monahan, John & Henry J. 
Steadman, "Violent Storms and Violent People: How Meteorology Can Inform Risk Communication in 
Mental health Law" (1996) 51 Am. Psychologist 931. 
554 See Campbell, supra note 176 at 10 where she explains the importance of taking into account the 
history of violence in predicting dangerousness: "[rjeasearch into the prediction of interpersonal violence 
consistently shows that a history of violence is one of the best predictors of future violence...". 
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certainties]". Given the possibility of error in prediction, the underlying concern with 
determination of dangerousness should always be the effect and consequences of a 
positive determination. The measure of redress should be reasonable and proportional 
while minimally impacting fundamental principles of justice. 
Furthermore, as discussed in the thesis, clinicians' predictions of dangerousness are also 
influenced by internal and external factors. Internal factors, such as the risks of personal 
biases, subjectivity, the complexity of understanding and interpreting risk factors 
included in risk assessments tools, as well as the risk of false positives can all affect the 
reliability of risk assessments tools. External factors, such as the political agenda of a 
legislator, the pressures of the population to protect it from potentially dangerous 
individuals, statutory provisions defining what constitutes dangerousness and what 
threshold must be attained to prove it, as well as the procedural system in place 
(adversarial or investigatory), can all arguably affect the accuracy of a prediction of 
dangerousness. 
Despite these difficulties in accurately determining dangerousness, recognizance orders 
under sections 810.1 and 810.2 have been deemed constitutional by lower courts across 
Canada. For example, in the case of Budreo, the court concludes that recognizance orders 
under section 810.1 are not overbroad or unconstitutional, even if they can be applied to 
individuals who have never committed a crime.556 However, as noted earlier, this 
reasoning does not take into account the fact that a determination of dangerousness is 
subjected to a risk of false positives. Furthermore, the fact that the accuracy and 
555 See Menzies, supra note 111 at 67. 
556 Budreo, supra note 8 at 42. 
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reliability of predictions of dangerousness depends on the type of risk assessment tool 
used by mental health experts is also not explored by the Court of Appeal in Budreo. In 
other words, arguably, the court's reasoning is based on the assumption that a 
determination of dangerousness is possible and sufficient to justify the imposition of 
restrictive conditions. 
In this regard, in Budreo, the court followed the Supreme Court of Canada reasoning in 
Lyons which dealt with the problem of inaccuracy in the determination of dangerousness 
and the constitutionality of the dangerous offender scheme. In Lyons, the Supreme Court 
of Canada stated that a finding of potential dangerousness could be made where the Court 
was satisfied that there was "a likelihood of future conduct".557 But again, this 
determination was made in the context of the dangerous offender scheme. The dangerous 
offender scheme deals with convicted criminals,at the sentencing stage. It is a designation 
imposed on a particularly dangerous offender. In those cases, several experts' reports and 
assessments will generally be needed to designate an offender as dangerous. Even if, as 
the literature demonstrates, expert evidence with respect to dangerousness presents 
problems of inaccuracy, it can constitute a good indicator. Moreover, an individual 
subjected to a dangerous offender designation has presumably a long and/or extreme 
criminological history on which the judge can formulate an opinion as to his or her 
potential dangerousness. 
Arguably, in the context of sections 810.1 and 810.2 of the Criminal Code, the court 
could make a finding of dangerousness without any expert reports and impose severe 
restrictive conditions upon any individual. The only condition is that it must be satisfied 
557 Lyons, supra note 149 at 364-365. 
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that the informant's fear is reasonable with respect to the potential dangerousness of the 
offender. Dangerousness already presents numerous challenges in its assessment and 
prediction even with the help of expert reports. Consequently, questions remain as to how 
it could be demonstrated without any expertise. With the current wording of section 
810.1 and 810.2, a court could impose a recognizance order on an individual who has no 
criminal history without the benefit of an expert's report. When one considers the fact 
that the possibility of over-predicting dangerousness is real, even in cases involving 
convicted dangerous offenders, there are causes to be concerned with a scheme that 
allows the imposition of recognizance orders on individuals who have no criminal 
history. The imposition of recognizance orders upon an individual who has never 
committed a crime and who would be erroneously labelled as potentially dangerous could 
have serious detrimental consequences on his or her enjoyment of life because of the 
stigma attached to such a designation. It is unclear how false positives would impact the 
assessment of dangerousness in those cases, but the possibility of over-prediction is real 
and the consequences of an erroneous determination are undeniably devastating. Thus, 
while the current wording of sections 810.1 and 810.2 may answer society's need to rely 
on a quick method to control imminent danger, it does so at the expense of fundamental 
principles of justice. 
In response, one might argue, based on the decision in Noble, that the required threshold 
to impose a recognizance ord er has been interpreted as being higher than a simple 
demonstration of a likelihood of dangerousness. In a sense, that would prevent serious 
infringements on fundamental principles of justice. However, the fact remains that the 
threshold is lower than proof beyond a reasonable doubt and that severe restrictive 
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conditions can be imposed on an individual on a simple balance or probabilities. 
Arguably, whenever coercive measures can be applied in cases where the standard of 
proof is lowered, it opens the door to abuse of powers. 
It is, therefore, important to look at the least invasive compromise in terms of protecting 
society from potentially dangerous individuals while preserving fundamental principles 
of justice. As noted earlier, the possibility of imposing serious restrictive conditions upon 
individuals who have yet to commit a crime inevitably raises questions as to potential 
infringements of fundamental principles of justice. Generally, Canadian courts have 
declared that procedural safeguards, such as a right to appeal the decision, are sufficient 
in the context of recognizance orders under sections 810.1 and 810.2 of the Criminal 
Code. However, one cannot consider Canadian recognizance orders as a perfect system of 
preventing and controlling dangerousness. In many respects, the Canadian scheme could 
actually learn from the French perspective on dangerousness. 
For one, with the exception of the newly enacted Loi sur la prevention de la delinquance, 
the French scheme is more respectful of fundamental principles of justice because it 
limits expressly the applicability of restrictive measures to convicted criminals, multi-
recidivists and individuals who are mentally ill and considered dangerous. Restrictive 
conditions under a social-judicial probation or a retention de surete cannot be imposed 
upon an individual who has no criminal record. While in practice recognizance orders in 
the Canadian context are not usually imposed upon individuals who have no criminal 
records, the legislation does not expressly limit its applicability, as is the case in France. 
Furthermore, peace bond and recognizance order provisions with their citizen initiated 
aspect are also absent from French criminal law. Therefore, the State is solely in charge 
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of identifying and controlling potentially dangerous individuals. In a sense, this further 
limits the use of restrictive conditions, since a citizen cannot apply for a recognizance 
order, as is the case in Canada. The French legislature has crafted the preventive 
measures scheme around the notions of exceptionality and limited applicability. On the 
other hand, arguably, the Canadian scheme of recognizance orders under sections 810.1 
and 810.2 of the Criminal Code could be considered as a "disguised" state power over its 
citizen, closer in essence to post-detention provisions such as the dangerous offender 
scheme, than to peace bonds. As noted earlier, recognizance orders under sections 810.1 
and 810.2 are usually sought by the Crown, upon the release from prison of an offender, 
despite the fact that these measures are available for anyone who has a fear that an 
individual will commit a crime. The wording used in sections 810.1 and 810.2 may very 
well hide Parliament's true intentions. Instead of being a simple variant of peace bonds, 
recognizance orders create a new tool to restrict the liberties of individuals after they 
have served their mandatory incarceration sentence. It also creates new means to control 
and monitor the whereabouts of these individuals. In this context, the sentence is no 
longer definite, but continues insidiously, although in a different manner, after the 
mandatory period of incarceration has been served. 
The French scheme of restrictive measures also benefits from the influences of the judge-
centered investigatory system. As demonstrated earlier, an investigatory system appears 
to favour an unbiased determination of dangerousness by mental health experts. The 
French scheme also favours a concerted approach between various mental health experts 
when determining and assessing dangerousness. On the downside, the literature 
demonstrates that French mental health experts are still relying on psychoanalysis in 
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predicting a risk of future behaviour, a method that has been criticised for its unreliability 
and inaccuracy.558 In this regard, the actuarial methods and structured clinical judgment 
method widely used by Canadian clinicians have proved to be more reliable.559 
Perhaps one of the most notable features of the French scheme of preventive measures 
geared toward the effective control of dangerousness is that it recognizes the importance 
of rehabilitation and treatment of dangerousness in a specially created environment, 
namely hospital-prisons. This forms a comprehensive system that focuses on the 
identification of criminological factors, the control of multi-recidivists and the treatment 
of these individuals considered as potentially dangerous individuals. Of course, the 
identification of potential dangerous individuals as permitted by the newly enacted Loi 
sur la prevention de la delinquance may infringe upon fundamental principles of justice. 
However, when one look at the French scheme of determination of dangerousness, 
coupled with the fact that French law-makers are not only concerned with controlling 
dangerousness, but also with treating and eradicating it, it can be argued that the French 
scheme offers potential reasonable alternatives in the application of recognizance orders. 
Thus, given the problems in terms of reliability of predictions of dangerousness, it is 
suggested that the Canadian scheme be modified to include some of the French features. 
In particular, Canadian recognizance orders should be expressly limited to convicted 
criminals and multi-recidivists. In practice, this is already the case, but the legislation 
should be modified to reflect the reality. While not settling the issue of inaccuracies in the 
prediction of dangerousness and the effect of fundamental principles of justice, it would 
558 
Bebin, supra note 141, at 2. 
559 See generally MacAlister, supra note 37. 
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at least expressly limit the applicability of the measure to individuals who have a criminal 
history. Arguably, this would help respect fundamental principles of justice even more. 
Moreover, since the courts base their decisions on the reasonableness of the informant's 
fear that an individual will commit an offence, it is suggested that assessment of 
dangerousness should be the product of a concerted approach by a multidisciplinary team 
of experts. Cooperation between clinicians, instead of competition, could potentially 
decrease the risk of biased opinion, while offering the judge a clearer picture from which 
to form his or her opinion. A mandatory team of experts, similar to the multidisciplinary 
panel of experts in existence in France, and comprised of mental health experts, prison 
officials, and lawyers, could also be involved in assessing the dangerousness of a 
particular individual. The panel could then formulate recommendations to the court that 
would make the ultimate decision. 
Additionally, it is suggested that a panel of judges should ultimately decide on the 
dangerousness of an individual, instead of leaving the entire task on the shoulders of a 
single provincial court judge. Arguably, this would also decrease the risk of error in the 
determination of dangerousness, because more than one individual would be involved in 
the determination process. While lower courts in Canada have already declared the 
scheme under sections 810.1 and 810.2 constitutional, the impact on fundamental 
principles of justice would be reduced even more by integrating some of the above-noted 
aspects of the French scheme. 
The comparative analysis also underlines several potential problems with the accuracy 
and reliability of determination of dangerousness. Several factors can have an influence 
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on the accuracy of determination of risks of future behaviour. In fact, not only is 
dangerousness a concept difficult to define, it is even more difficult to determine it. The 
task is not impossible, however. Some risk assessment tools, such as actuarial 
assessment, have promising results.560 But the risks of false positives, over-prediction and 
misinterpretation remain. It is, therefore, important to seek a reasonable compromise 
between the need of society to protect itself from potentially dangerous individuals, and 
respecting fundamental principles of justice. Accordingly, based on the above findings of 
the comparative analysis, the following amendments are proposed to the recognizance 
scheme under sections 810.1 and 810.2 of the Criminal Code. 
First, the wording in sections 810.1 and 810.2 should be modified to limit the persons to 
whom restrictive conditions may apply. The scheme should be reserved for convicted 
offenders and multi-recidivists who present a high risk of future dangerousness. As noted 
earlier, the problems of reliability in determining dangerousness, coupled with the risk of 
false positives militates in favour of a restrictive approach in the imposition of 
recognizance orders. 
Second, to respect fundamental principles of justice, it is argued that restrictive 
conditions under recognizance orders should be clearly delineated in the legislation. In 
other words, judges' discretion should be limited. In effect, this would decrease the risk 
of imposing unreasonable conditions on an individual. While this may certainly add 
rigidity to the system, one should never forget that the individual subjected to a 
recognizance order has not yet committed a crime. In this regard, the comments of Mr. 
Forcese in the Proceedings of the Special Senate Committee on Anti-terrorism, with 
560 See generally MacAlister, supra note 37. 
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respect to the wide discretion of judges in imposing restrictive conditions under sections 
83.3 and 810.01 of the Criminal Code (two similar provisions to sections 810.1 and 
810.2) are quite relevant: "[i]n our system, it is an open invitation for a judge to impose 
conditions, the outer limit of which have not been tested in our courts, subject to being 
persuaded to do so by the Crown".561 Even more shocking is the fact that there is 
currently no way of tracking which conditions are imposed on potentially dangerous 
individuals. Again, in this regard, Mr. Forcese raises the following concerns: 
Yes, in large measure that is right. I am also motivated by the current problem of 
tracking this use. It is not always easy to determine what conditions are imposed 
as part of a peace bond. For example, it is only if there is a constitutional 
challenge to the peace bond provision writ large that there is some resolution on 
what those peace bonds include. Absent greater disclosure of what these 
conditions are, the existing open invitation in the Criminal Code in terms of 
the imposition of conditions is unmanageable. There is no check and balance 
so it is difficult to monitor exactly what is happening. It remains in the hands 
of individual judges across the country to develop measures that seem 
reasonable in the circumstances. Given the extraordinary nature of these 
provisions, I want to see more guaranteed continuity.562[Emphasis added]. 
In a scheme that relies heavily on an inaccurate science to determine dangerousness and 
impose restrictive conditions, fundamental rights of justice ought to be given a high 
importance. Accordingly, given the negative impact and stigma attached to a 
recognizance order, restrictive conditions should be clearly set out in the legislation, as it 
is the case in France. This would give more clarity to the system and prevent the 
imposition of unreasonable conditions. While it is true that an individual can exercise his 
Proceedings, supra note 418. 
Proceedings, ibid. 
563 For example, conditions are clearly defined under social-judicial probations orders. See Code penal, at 
Article 131-36-2. 
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right to appeal under a recognizance order application, this, technically, constitutes 
another procedural burden for an often under-resourced party. 
Furthermore, the legislative scheme under sections 810.1 and 810.2 of the Criminal Code 
should be modified to reflect the fact that restrictive conditions can have potentially 
detrimental effect on the lives of individuals subjected to them. In fact, there are 
questions as to the effectiveness of restrictive conditions in lowering the risk of 
dangerousness of an individual. It was argued that in some cases, an offender's ability to 
reintegrate into society properly can be hampered by over-restrictive conditions.564 
Consequently, the scheme should have a very restrictive applicability. In this regard, the 
court's interpretation in Noble of a higher threshold than a simple demonstration of a 
likelihood of dangerousness is a step in the right direction. 
In addition, the legislation should provide for a rehabilitative component as part of the 
conditions that can be imposed on an individual. It is argued that society in general would 
benefit from a rehabilitative approach that not only aims at controlling dangerousness but 
also at reducing it with concrete measures. Building on the French experience in this 
field, it would be worth examining the feasibility of creating "hospital-prisons" where 
potentially dangerous individuals would be assessed and treated as needed. 
Finally, another point worth considering in amending the legislation is that failure to 
abide by the conditions of a recognizance order constitutes a punishable offense under 
section 811 of the Criminal Code. In the context of sections 810.1 and 810.2 of the 
Criminal Code, conditions can be imposed upon an individual based on a simple 
564 See John Howard, "Dangerous Offenders", supra note 51. 
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determination of dangerousness. This enables the state to monitor and restrict the liberties 
of an individual, while creating new opportunities to arrest him or her for non-
compliance. In cases of non-compliance, an individual faces the possibility of having a 
criminal record and being incarcerated. However, as noted earlier, restrictive conditions 
can, sometimes, have the effect of imprisoning an individual inside their house, thereby 
seriously restricting their mobility and hampering any chance of reintegrating into 
society.565 When individuals fail to abide by the conditions imposed under a recognizance 
order, whether by their own misfortune or by reasons out of their control, a sentence of 
imprisonment may not constitute the most reasonable measure. 
In this regard, in the debates before the Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs 
which examined Bill C-55, one of the members of the Committee raised the issue and 
offered a potential solution: 
Even on that assumption, I see a problem with clause 810.2, and that's the fourth 
point which states that the judge may commit the defendant to prison for a term 
not exceeding 12 months if the defendant fails or refuses to enter into the 
recognizance. You know very well that if a person is found guilty under clause 
810.2, sub-clause 4), the person will have a criminal record pursuant to the 
Criminal Records Act. 
Therefore, by administering a rule based on the preponderance of evidence, 
we start from point A to arrive to point B, and the person who refuses will 
then have a criminal record. I therefore feel it would be wiser to consider the 
person as having been in contempt of court, as is the case, if memory serves 
me, when a warrant is issued, [Emphasis added]. 
When we factor in unreliability in the determination of dangerousness and the numerous 
imperfections of the scheme, it would seem reasonable to place an individual who fails to 
John Howard, "Dangerous Offenders", ibid. 
Standing Committee, Allan Rock, supra note 278, at 1215 [Comments from Mr.Langlois (Bellechasse)]. 
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enter into a recognizance order in contempt of court, rather than impose a prison sentence 
on him or her; at the very least, the option should exist. Another alternative to 
imprisonment would be to allow a judge to review the conditions imposed in a 
recognizance order in a "breach of conditions hearing". This would enable a judge to 
re-evaluate the relevance of the conditions and monitor their impact on the life of the 
potential offender. 
Evidently, there is no guarantee that the above-noted recommendations which were 
influenced by the French scheme are necessarily applicable to the Canadian context. In 
this regard, Zweigert and Kotz offer a warning: 
[w]henever it is proposed to adopt a foreign solution which is said to be 
superior, two questions must be asked: first, whether it has proved 
satisfactory in its country of origin, and secondly, whether it will work in 
the country where it is proposed to adopt it. It may well prove to be 
impossible to adopt, at any rate without modification, a solution tried and 
tested abroad because of differences in court procedures, the powers of the 
various authorities, the working of the economy, or the general social 
context into which it would have to benefit. 
Once again, it is argued that some aspect of the French approach in determining 
dangerousness (i.e. assessment by multidisciplinary panel of experts, creation of prison-
hospital, etc.), are worth exploring in the hopes of implementing or modifying preventive 
measures and rendering more respectful of fundamental principles of justice. Of course, 
before implementing any recommendations based on the French scheme, it would be 
necessary to explore in more detail the French approach to determine if it has proven to 
be satisfactory. One should remember, however, that some French preventive measures, 
such as the retention de siirete, have only been enacted recently. 
Zeigert & Kotz, supra note 549 at 16. 
172 
In implementing some of the above recommendations, there is, of course a downside 
from the State's perspective: fewer people would be subjected to the legislation. On the 
other hand, it would better preserve the balance between the right of society to be 
protected from potentially dangerous individuals, and the importance of protecting 
fundamental principles of justice. 
In conclusion, there are several key differences between the two systems with respect to 
the determination of dangerousness. Perhaps the most notable distinction between the two 
systems is the applicability of restrictive conditions. As noted earlier, the French scheme 
limits the applicability of restrictive conditions to convicted offenders and multi-
recidivists, while the Canadian scheme also encompasses individuals who have no 
criminal history. 
In this context, with the exception of the newly enacted Loi sur la prevention de la 
delinquance which raised concerns, the French system appears more advantageous in 
terms of respect of fundamental principles of justice. In addition, the French investigatory 
system appears to provide for numerous procedural safeguards in the imposition of 
restrictive conditions similar to recognizance orders under the Canadian scheme. The 
investigatory system, at least with respect to the mesure de sitrete such as the retention de 
surete, favours objective opinion from mental health experts by relegating the difficult 
tasks of determining dangerousness to a multidisciplinary panel of experts who do not 
work for one party or the other. 
In the end, however, whether dangerousness is assessed by two mental health experts 
who provide conflicting evidence in an adversarial setting, or by a multidisciplinary team 
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in an investigatory setting, similar difficulties will be encountered in determining the risk 
of dangerousness. Problems such as the inaccuracy and unreliability of certain risk 
assessment tools, difficulties in the interpretation of results, as well as the risks of false 
positives, will continue to present challenges for both criminal law systems. Arguably, 
despite these challenges, preventive measures will also continue to be developed to 
control dangerousness. Hopefully, lawmakers will be concerned with the protection of 
fundamental principles of justice when enacting preventive measures. In the end, perhaps 
a move toward a new and better system that integrates the best characteristics of the 
French investigatory system, such as the assessment of dangerousness by a 
multidisciplinary team of experts, coupled with the Canadian approach of using improved 
risk assessment tools, such as the structured clinical judgment in determining 
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APPENDIX A - CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA - SECTION 810 
Source: Department of Justice Canada, online: 
<http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/ShowFullDoc/cs/C-46//20090805/en>. 
SURETIES TO KEEP THE PEACE 
Where injury or damage feared 
810. (1) An information may be laid before a justice by or on behalf of any person 
who fears on reasonable grounds that another person will cause personal injury to him or 
her or to his or her spouse or common-law partner or child or will damage his or her 
property. 
Duty of justice 
(2) A justice who receives an information under subsection (1) shall cause the parties 
to appear before him or before a summary conviction court having jurisdiction in the 
same territorial division. 
Adjudication 
(3) The justice or the summary conviction court before which the parties appear may, 
if satisfied by the evidence adduced that the person on whose behalf the information was 
laid has reasonable grounds for his or her fears, 
(a) order that the defendant enter into a recognizance, with or without sureties, to keep 
the peace and be of good behaviour for any period that does not exceed twelve 
months, and comply with such other reasonable conditions prescribed in the 
recognizance, including the conditions set out in subsections (3.1) and (3.2), as the 
court considers desirable for securing the good conduct of the defendant; or 
(b) commit the defendant to prison for a term not exceeding twelve months if he or 
she fails or refuses to enter into the recognizance. 
Conditions 
(3.1) Before making an order under subsection (3), the justice or the summary 
conviction court shall consider whether it is desirable, in the interests of the safety of the 
defendant or of any other person, to include as a condition of the recognizance that the 
defendant be prohibited from possessing any firearm, cross-bow, prohibited weapon, 
restricted weapon, prohibited device, ammunition, prohibited ammunition or explosive 
substance, or all such things, for any period specified in the recognizance and, where the 
justice or summary conviction court decides that it is so desirable, the justice or summary 
conviction court shall add such a condition to the recognizance. 
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Surrender, etc. 
(3.11) Where the justice or summary conviction court adds a condition described in 
subsection (3.1) to a recognizance order, the justice or summary conviction court shall 
specify in the order the manner and method by which 
(a) the things referred to in that subsection that are in the possession of the accused 
shall be surrendered, disposed of, detained, stored or dealt with; and 
(b) the authorizations, licences and registration certificates held by the person shall be 
surrendered. 
Reasons 
(3.12) Where the justice or summary conviction court does not add a condition 
described in subsection (3.1) to a recognizance order, the justice or summary conviction 
court shall include in the record a statement of the reasons for not adding the condition. 
Idem 
(3.2) Before making an order under subsection (3), the justice or the summary 
conviction court shall consider whether it is desirable, in the interests of the safety of the 
informant, of the person on whose behalf the information was laid or of that person's 
spouse or common-law partner or child, as the case may be, to add either or both of the 
following conditions to the recognizance, namely, a condition 
(a) prohibiting the defendant from being at, or within a distance specified in the 
recognizance from, a place specified in the recognizance where the person on whose 
behalf the information was laid or that person's spouse or common-law partner or 
child, as the case may be, is regularly found; and 
(b) prohibiting the defendant from communicating, in whole or in part, directly or 
indirectly, with the person on whose behalf the information was laid or that person's 
spouse or common-law partner or child, as the case may be. 
Forms 
(4) A recognizance and committal to prison in default of recognizance under 
subsection (3) may be in Forms 32 and 23, respectively. 
Modification of recognizance 
(4.1) The justice or the summary conviction court may, on application of the 
informant or the defendant, vary the conditions fixed in the recognizance. 
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Procedure 
(5) The provisions of this Part apply, with such modifications as the circumstances 
require, to proceedings under this section. 
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 810; 1991, c. 40, s. 33; 1994, c. 44, s. 81; 1995, c. 22, s. 8, c. 39, s. 
157; 2000, c. 12, s. 95. 
Fear of certain offences 
810.01 (1) A person who fears on reasonable grounds that another person will commit 
an offence under section 423.1, a criminal organization offence or a terrorism offence 
may, with the consent of the Attorney General, lay an information before a provincial 
court judge. 
Appearances 
(2) A provincial court judge who receives an information under subsection (1) may 
cause the parties to appear before a provincial court judge. 
Adjudication 
(3) The provincial court judge before whom the parties appear may, if satisfied by the 
evidence adduced that the informant has reasonable grounds for the fear, order that the 
defendant enter into a recognizance to keep the peace and be of good behaviour for any 
period that does not exceed twelve months and to comply with any other reasonable 
conditions prescribed in the recognizance, including the conditions set out in subsection 
(5), that the provincial court judge considers desirable for preventing the commission of 
an offence referred to in subsection (1). 
Refusal to enter into recognizance 
(4) The provincial court judge may commit the defendant to prison for a term not 
exceeding twelve months if the defendant fails or refuses to enter into the recognizance. 
Conditions — firearms 
(5) Before making an order under subsection (3), the provincial court judge shall 
consider whether it is desirable, in the interests of the safety of the defendant or of any 
other person, to include as a condition of the recognizance that the defendant be 
prohibited from possessing any firearm, cross-bow, prohibited weapon, restricted 
weapon, prohibited device, ammunition, prohibited ammunition or explosive substance, 
or all of those things, for any period specified in the recognizance, and where the 
provincial court judge decides that it is so desirable, the provincial court judge shall add 
such a condition to the recognizance. 
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Surrender, etc. 
(5.1) Where the provincial court judge adds a condition described in subsection (5) to 
a recognizance, the provincial court judge shall specify in the recognizance the manner 
and method by which 
(a) the things referred to in that subsection that are in the possession of the defendant 
shall be surrendered, disposed of, detained, stored or dealt with; and 
(b) the authorizations, licences and registration certificates held by the defendant shall 
be surrendered. 
Reasons 
(5.2) Where the provincial court judge does not add a condition described in 
subsection (5) to a recognizance, the provincial court judge shall include in the record a 
statement of the reasons for not adding the condition. 
Variance of conditions 
(6) A provincial court judge may, on application of the informant, the Attorney 
General or the defendant, vary the conditions fixed in the recognizance. 
Other provisions to apply 
(7) Subsections 810(4) and (5) apply, with any modifications that the circumstances 
require, to recognizances made under this section. 
1997, c. 23, ss. 19, 26; 2001, c. 32, s. 46, c. 41, ss. 22, 133; 2002, c. 13, s. 80. 
Where fear of sexual offence 
810.1 (1) Any person who fears on reasonable grounds that another person will 
commit an offence under section 151, 152, 155 or 159, subsection 160(2) or (3), section 
163.1, 170, 171 or 172.1, subsection 173(2) or section 271, 272 or 273, in respect of one 
or more persons who are under the age of 16 years, may lay an information before a 
provincial court judge, whether or not the person or persons in respect of whom it is 
feared that the offence will be committed are named. 
Appearances 
(2) A provincial court judge who receives an information under subsection (1) may 
cause the parties to appear before a provincial court judge. 
Adjudication 
(3) If the provincial court judge before whom the parties appear is satisfied by the 
evidence adduced that the informant has reasonable grounds for the fear, the judge may 
order that the defendant enter into a recognizance to keep the peace and be of good 
behaviour for a period that does not exceed 12 months. 
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Duration extended 
(3.01) However, if the provincial court judge is also satisfied that the defendant was 
convicted previously of a sexual offence in respect of a person who is under the age of 16 
years, the judge may order that the defendant enter into the recognizance for a period that 
does not exceed two years. 
Conditions in recognizance 
(3.02) The provincial court judge may add any reasonable conditions to the 
recognizance that the judge considers desirable to secure the good conduct of the 
defendant, including conditions that 
(a) prohibit the defendant from engaging in any activity that involves contact with 
persons under the age of 16 years, including using a computer system within the 
meaning of subsection 342.1(2) for the purpose of communicating with a person 
under that age; 
(b) prohibit the defendant from attending a public park or public swimming area 
where persons under the age of 16 years are present or can reasonably be expected to 
be present, or a daycare centre, schoolground or playground; 
(c) require the defendant to participate in a treatment program; 
(d) require the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device, if the Attorney 
General makes the request; 
(e) require the defendant to remain within a specified geographic area unless written 
permission to leave that area is obtained from the provincial court judge; 
(/) require the defendant to return to and remain at his or her place of residence at 
specified times; or 
(g) require the defendant to abstain from the consumption of drugs except in 
accordance with a medical prescription, of alcohol or of any other intoxicating 
substance. 
Conditions — firearms 
(3.03) The provincial court judge shall consider whether it is desirable, in the interests 
of the defendant's safety or that of any other person, to prohibit the defendant from 
possessing any firearm, cross-bow, prohibited weapon, restricted weapon, prohibited 
device, ammunition, prohibited ammunition or explosive substance, or all of those things. 
If the judge decides that it is desirable to do so, the judge shall add that condition to the 
recognizance and specify the period during which the condition applies. 
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Surrender, etc. 
(3.04) If the provincial court judge adds a condition described in subsection (3.03) to 
a recognizance, the judge shall specify in the recognizance how the things referred to in 
that subsection that are in the defendant's possession should be surrendered, disposed of, 
detained, stored or dealt with and how the authorizations, licences and registration 
certificates that are held by the defendant should be surrendered. 
Condition — reporting 
(3.05) The provincial court judge shall consider whether it is desirable to require the 
defendant to report to the correctional authority of a province or to an appropriate police 
authority. If the judge decides that it is desirable to do so, the judge shall add that 
condition to the recognizance. 
Refusal to enter into recognizance 
(3.1) The provincial court judge may commit the defendant to prison for a term not 
exceeding twelve months if the defendant fails or refuses to enter into the recognizance. 
Judge may vary recognizance 
(4) A provincial court judge may, on application of the informant or the defendant, 
vary the conditions fixed in the recognizance. 
Other provisions to apply 
(5) Subsections 810(4) and (5) apply, with such modifications as the circumstances 
require, to recognizances made under this section. 
1993, c. 45, s. 11; 1997, c. 18, s. 113; 2002, c. 13, s. 81; 2008, c. 6, ss. 52, 54, 62. 
Where fear of serious personal injury offence 
810.2 (1) Any person who fears on reasonable grounds that another person will 
commit a serious personal injury offence, as that expression is defined in section 752, 
may, with the consent of the Attorney General, lay an information before a provincial 
court judge, whether or not the person or persons in respect of whom it is feared that the 
offence will be committed are named. 
Appearances 
(2) A provincial court judge who receives an information under subsection (1) may 
cause the parties to appear before a provincial court judge. 
Adjudication 
(3) If the provincial court judge before whom the parties appear is satisfied by the 
evidence adduced that the informant has reasonable grounds for the fear, the judge may 
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order that the defendant enter into a recognizance to keep the peace and be of good 
behaviour for a period that does not exceed 12 months. 
Duration extended 
(3.1) However, if the provincial court judge is also satisfied that the defendant was 
convicted previously of an offence referred to in subsection (1), the judge may order that 
the defendant enter into the recognizance for a period that does not exceed two years. 
Refusal to enter into recognizance 
(4) The provincial court judge may commit the defendant to prison for a term not 
exceeding twelve months if the defendant fails or refuses to enter into the recognizance. 
Conditions in recognizance 
(4.1) The provincial court judge may add any reasonable conditions to the 
recognizance that the judge considers desirable to secure the good conduct of the 
defendant, including conditions that require the defendant 
(a) to participate in a treatment program; 
(b) to wear an electronic monitoring device, if the Attorney General makes the 
request; 
(c) to remain within a specified geographic area unless written permission to leave 
that area is obtained from the provincial court judge; 
(d) to return to and remain at his or her place of residence at specified times; or 
(e) to abstain from the consumption of drugs except in accordance with a medical 
prescription, of alcohol or of any other intoxicating substance. 
Conditions — firearms 
(5) The provincial court judge shall consider whether it is desirable, in the interests of 
the defendant's safety or that of any other person, to prohibit the defendant from 
possessing any firearm, cross-bow, prohibited weapon, restricted weapon, prohibited 
device, ammunition, prohibited ammunition or explosive substance, or all of those things. 
If the judge decides that it is desirable to do so, the judge shall add that condition to the 
recognizance and specify the period during which the condition applies. 
Surrender, etc. 
(5.1) If the provincial court judge adds a condition described in subsection (5) to a 
recognizance, the judge shall specify in the recognizance how the things referred to in 
that subsection that are in the defendant's possession should be surrendered, disposed of, 
detained, stored or dealt with and how the authorizations, licences and registration 
certificates that are held by the defendant should be surrendered. 
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Reasons 
(5.2) If the provincial court judge does not add a condition described in subsection (5) 
to a recognizance, the judge shall include in the record a statement of the reasons for not 
adding the condition. 
Condition — reporting 
(6) The provincial court judge shall consider whether it is desirable to require the 
defendant to report to the correctional authority of a province or to an appropriate police 
authority. If the judge decides that it is desirable to do so, the judge shall add that 
condition to the recognizance. 
Variance of conditions 
(7) A provincial court judge may, on application of the informant, of the Attorney 
General or of the defendant, vary the conditions fixed in the recognizance. 
Other provisions to apply 
(8) Subsections 810(4) and (5) apply, with such modifications as the circumstances 
require, to recognizances made under this section. 
1997, c. 17, s. 9; 2002, c. 13, s. 82; 2008, c. 6, s. 53. 
Breach of recognizance 
811. A person bound by a recognizance under section 83.3, 810, 810.01, 810.1 or 
810.2 who commits a breach of the recognizance is guilty of 
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two 
years; or 
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction. 
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 811; 1993, c. 45, s. 11; 1994, c. 44, s. 82; 1997, c. 17, s. 10, c. 23, 
ss. 20, 27; 2001, c. 41, s. 23. 
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APPENDIX B - CODE DE PROCEDURE PEN ALE 
Code de Procedure Penale : Article 131-36-1 to 131-36-8; Article 132-44 to 132-46. 
Source : "LEGIFRANCE - With the participation of John Rason SPENCER, Professor at the 




Inserted by Act no. 1998-468 of 17 June 1998 Article 1 Official Journal of 18 June 1998 
Where the law so provides, the trial court may order socio-judicial probation. 
Socio-judicial probation entails, for the convicted person, the duty to submit, 
under the supervision of the penalties enforcement judge for the period determined by the 
trial court, to measures of supervision and assistance designed to prevent recidivism. The 
period of socio-judicial probation may not exceed ten years in the case of conviction for a 
misdemeanour or twenty years in the case of conviction for a felony. 
The trial court also fixes the maximum term of imprisonment to be served by the 
convicted person where he fails to observe the obligations imposed upon him. This 
imprisonment may not exceed two years in the case of a conviction for a misdemeanour 
or five years in the case of a conviction for a felony. The manner in which the penalties 
enforcement judge may order the imprisonment to be wholly or partly executed is 
determined by the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
The president of the court, after giving judgment, warns the convicted person of 
the obligations arising from it and of the consequences if they are not fulfilled. 
ARTICLE 131-36-2 
Inserted by Act no. 1998-468 of 17 June 1998 Article 1 Official Journal of 18 June 1998 
The measures of supervision applicable to the person sentenced to socio-judicial 
probation are those laid down by article 132-44. 
The convicted person may also be subjected by the trial court or by the penalties 
enforcement judge to the obligation specified by article 132-45. He may also be subjected 
to one or more of the following obligations: 
1° not to be present in such places or such category of places as specifically designated, 
in particular where minors are to be found; 
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2° not to visit or to have contact with certain persons or certain categories of 
persons, and particularly minors, except, where relevant, those specified by the court; 
3° not to carry out any professional or voluntary activity involving regular contact 
with minors. 
ARTICLE 131-36-3 
Inserted by Act no. 1998-468 ofl 7 June 1998 Article 1 Official Journal of 18 
June 1998 
The object of assistance measures to which a convicted person is subjected is to 
support his efforts towards rehabilitation. 
ARTICLE 131-36-4 
Inserted by Act no. 1998-468 ofl 7 June 1998 Article 1 Official Journal of 18 
June 1998 
Socio-judicial probation may include a requirement of treatment. 
This requirement may be ordered by the trial court if it is established after a report 
by a medical expert, obtained in the conditions laid down by the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, that the person prosecuted is a suitable case for such treatment. This 
examination is carried out by two experts in the case of a prosecution for the murder of a 
minor preceded or accompanied by rape, torture or acts of barbarity. The president warns 
the convicted person that no treatment may be undertaken without his consent, but that if 
he refuses the treatment offered to him, imprisonment imposed under the third paragraph 
of article 131-36-1 may be enforced. 
Where the trial court orders treatment and a non-suspended custodial sentence has 
also been imposed on the relevant person, the presiding judge informs the convicted 
person that he has the option of starting treatment whilst serving the sentence. 
ARTICLE 131-36-5 
Inserted by Act no. 1998-468 of 17 June 1998 Article 1 Official Journal of 18 
June 1998 
Where the socio-judicial probation order is imposed with an immediate custodial 
sentence, the probation order is enforced, for the period fixed in the sentence, to run from 
the day when the custodial sentence comes to an end. 
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The socio-judicial probation order is suspended by any detention that intervenes 
while it is running. 
Imprisonment ordered on account of failure to observe the obligations contained 
in the socio-judicial probation order is consecutive to any immediate custodial sentence 
imposed for offences committed during the currency of the order, and may not be 
concurrent with them. 
ARTICLE 131-36-6 
Inserted by Act no. 1998-468 of 17 June 1998 Article 1 OfflcialJournal of 18 
June 1998 
A socio-judicial probation may not be ordered together with a custodial sentence 
which is suspended, in whole or in part, on condition of good behaviour. 
ARTICLE 131-36-7 
Inserted by Act no. 1998-468 ofl 7 June 1998 Article 1 Official Journal of 18 
June 1998 
In proceedings for misdemeanours, socio-judicial probation may be imposed as 
the main sentence. 
ARTICLE 131-36-8 
Inserted by Act no. 1998-468 of 17 June 1998 Article 1 Official Journal of 18 
June 1998 
The manner of enforcement of a socio-judicial probation is determined by Title 
VII bis of Book V of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
ARTICLE 132-44 
Act no. 2000-516 of 15 June 2000 Article 124 Official Journal of 16 June 2000 
The supervision measures the convicted person must undergo are the following: 
1° to attend when required to do so by the penalties enforcement judge or the 
designated social worker; 
2° to receive the visits of the social worker and to provide him with such 
information or documents as are necessary to verify his means of existence and 
the execution of his obligations; 
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3° to inform the social worker of any change of employment; 
4° to inform the social worker of any changes of residence or of any journey in 
excess of fifteen days and to explain how he will return; 
5° to obtain the prior authorisation from the penalties enforcement judge for any 
journey abroad and, where it is liable to obstruct the execution of his obligations, 
for any change of employment or residence. 
ARTICLE 132-45 
A trial court or a penalties enforcement judge may specially impose on the 
convicted person a duty to observe one or more of the following obligations: 
1° to exercise a professional activity or to follow a course of education or 
professional training; 
2° to establish his residence in a determined place; 
3° to undergo medical examination, treatment or medical care, and where 
necessary hospitalisation; 
4° to demonstrate that he is contributing to family expenses or is regularly paying 
any alimony that he may owe; 
5° to make good, in all or part, according to his ability to pay, the damage caused 
by the offence, even in the absence of a court decision on civil liability; 
6° to demonstrate that he is paying according to his ability to pay the amounts due 
to the public Treasury in consequence of the sentence; 
7° to abstain from driving certain vehicles determined by the category of driving 
licences provided for under the Traffic Code; 
8° not to engage in professional activity in the exercise of which or on the 
occasion of which the offence was committed; 
9° to abstain from appearing in any place as specifically identified; 
10° not to engage in betting, especially in betting shops; 
11° not to frequent public houses; 
12° not to keep company with certain convicted persons, especially other 
offenders or accomplices to the offence; 
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13° to abstain from contacting certain persons, especially with the victim of the 
offence; 
14° not to hold or carry any weapon. 
ARTICLE 132-46 
The objective of an assistance measure is to support the convicted person's efforts 
towards social reintegration. 
These measures take the form of social, and if need be, financial assistance, and 
are implemented by the probation service with the participation, where appropriate, of 
any private or public institution. 
202 
APPENDIX C - EXAMPLE OF THE RAPID ASSESSMENT FOR SEXUAL 
OFFENSE RECIDIVISM (RRASOR) 
Excerpt from: 
Hanson, R. Karl, The Development of a Brief Actuarial Risk Scale for Sexual Offense 
Recidivism, 1997-04, online: Department of the Solicitor General of Canada 
<http://ww2.pssp.gc.ca/publications/corrections/199704_e.pdf>, at 14: 
Table 4 
The Rapid Risk Assessment for Sexual Offense Recidivism (RRASOR). 
Prior sex offenses (not including index offenses) 
None 0 
1 conviction; 1 -2 charges 1 
2-3 convictions; 3-5 charges 2 
4 or more convictions; 6 or more charges 3 
Age at release (current age) 
more than 25 0 
less than 25 1 
Victim gender 
only females 0 
any males 1 
Relationship to victim 
only related 0 
any non-related 1 
To standardize the rates across studies, certain assumptions concerning the 
recidivism rates were required. Based on previous long-term follow-up studies (e.g., 
Hanson et al., 1993; Rice & Harris, 1997), it was assumed that the recidivism rate was 
quickest during the first five years and then continued at a lower rate (approximately half) 
for up to 15 years post release. The amount of recidivism following 15 years post release 
was considered to be negligible. It was also assumed that the ratio of the recidivism rates 
for the different risk levels would be approximately constant across time (i.e., the 
"proportional hazard" assumption). Consequently, the adjustment was based on the 
following simple formula: 
Total recidivism rate = 
YRR*years(for years 1 - 5) + (!/2)YRR*years(for years 6-15), 
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